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The notion of traitor tracing was introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [47]
in the early 90s with the goal of solving accountability problem in broadcast
systems. While the original motivation was of catching users that create pirate
decoder boxes in broadcast TV systems, there are several applications that go
beyond that setting. Despite wide applicability of such systems all existing
solutions for the traitor tracing problem suffer from one or more deficiencies
(such as have large ciphertext size, or prove security in the bounded-collusion
setting, or provide only weak tracing guarantees, or rely on strong crypto-
graphic assumptions).
In this proposed thesis, we provide the first traitor tracing scheme that
does not suffer from any of the aforementioned deficiencies. That is, we pro-
vide a collusion resistant traitor tracing system with ciphertexts that grow
polynomially in log(n) (where n is the number of users), and prove it secure
under the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption [107, 108]. This is the first
viii
traitor tracing scheme with such parameters provably secure from a standard
cryptographic assumption.
We achieve our results by first conceiving a novel approach to building
traitor tracing that starts with a new form of Functional Encryption that we
call Mixed FE. In a Mixed FE system the encryption algorithm is bimodal and
works with either a public key or master secret key. Ciphertexts encrypted
using the public key can only encrypt one type of functionality. On the other
hand the secret key encryption can be used to encode many different types of
programs, but is only secure as long as the attacker sees a bounded number of
such ciphertexts.
We first show how to combine Mixed FE with Attribute-Based En-
cryption to achieve traitor tracing. Second we build Mixed FE systems for
polynomial sized branching programs (which corresponds to the complexity
class logspace) by relying on the polynomial hardness of the LWE assump-
tion with super-polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. In addition to achieving
new traitor tracing results, the techniques developed push forward the broader
area of computing on encrypted data under standard assumptions. Notably,
traitor tracing is a substantially different problem from other cryptography
primitives that have seen recent progress in LWE-based solutions.
Additionally, we show that our techniques could be used to provide
new constructions for traitor tracing systems with embedded identity tracing
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The concept of covert communication, or encryption, can be traced
to as early as the era of ancient empires such as the Roman Empire (see
Caesar cipher [38]). This predates the conception of computers itself by many
centuries. Even until modern times, the broad science of cryptography was
referred almost exclusively to as encryption. Simply put, encryption can be
understood as the process of recasting sensitive information (called plaintext)
into an unintelligible form (called ciphertext). While decryption is the opposite
process of recovering the plaintext from a ciphertext.
Until about forty years ago, a widely-held belief was that for two parties
to establish a private communication channel, that is covertly communicate,
it was necessary for them to share some common secret information (called
a secret key). This belief was dispelled by Diffie and Hellman [57, 58] who
put forth an unconventional and radical concept of public-key cryptography,
where two parties can covertly communicate with each other without sharing
any a-priori agreed upon mutual secret.
Since its advent, public-key encryption (PKE) [57, 58, 109, 73] has re-
mained a cornerstone in modern-day cryptography and has been one of the
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most widely used and studied cryptographic primitive. It is an invaluable tool
and its use is ubiquitous in building tools from secure web communication
(e.g., SSH, SSL), to disk encryption, and secure software patch distribution
to state a few. The traditional view of public-key encryption, however, only
enables a one-to-one private communication channel between two users over a
public broadcast network. Over the last several decades, significant research
effort has been made by the cryptographic community in re-envisioning the
original goals of public-key encryption, in turn pushing towards more expres-
siveness from such systems thereby enabling newer applications. This effort has
lead to the introduction of encryption systems with more powerful functional-
ities such as identity-based encryption (IBE) [114, 49, 20], broadcast encryp-
tion (BE) [66, 16], searchable encryption (SE) [18], attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [111, 86], and most notably functional encryption (FE) [112, 26] that
is meant to encapsulate all previously thought-out PKE, IBE, BE, SE, and
ABE functionalities.
The problem
Even with such re-envisioning, the fundamental underlying goal of en-
cryption systems has stayed the same, that is to enable secure communication
and deliver content. This leaves open the possibility of an entirely different
and uncaptured attack strategy which can succinctly be labeled as piracy. For
instance, consider a scenario where the content provider (say AT&T, Netflix
etc.) wants to privately broadcast to a set of paying customers. Now if an
2
attacker either corrupts some of the already paying customers, or buys a lim-
ited number of subscriptions, then it can potentially extract secret information
from the corrupt recipient devices, and use it to produce arbitrary pirate de-
vices that recover the private content. Such pirate devices could be extremely
detrimental for the content provider (i.e., the sender), and although this con-
stitues as unauthorized distribution of private content, the regular plaintext
hiding encryption systems do not provide any guarantees against such attack-
ers.
Motivated by the piracy problem in widescale content distribution,
Chor, Fiat, and Naor [47] in the early 90s, introduced the concept of traitor
tracing. Traitor tracing (TT) systems are designed especially to prevent such
adversarial threats. Intuitively, these systems provide the content distributor
the capability to “trace” the customers who are responsible for the unautho-
rized distribution as long as the content distributor can get access to one such
pirate device. Formally, the notion of traitor tracing is captured as follows.
In a (traitor) tracing [47] system an authority runs a setup algorithm
that takes in a security parameter λ and the number, n, of users in the system.
The setup outputs a public key pk, master secret key msk, and n secret keys
(sk1, sk2, . . . , skn). The system has an encryption algorithm that uses the public
key pk to create a ciphertext for a message m that is decryptable by any of the
n secret keys, but where the message will be hidden from any user who does
not have access to the keys. The last property is the standard plaintext hiding,
more commonly referred to as the IND-CPA security (or, indistinguishability
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under chosen plaintext attack). The most salient feature of a traitor tracing
system is the presence of an additional “tracing algorithm” which is used
to identify corrupt/coerced users. Suppose an attacker corrupts some subset
S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of authorized users and produces a special decryption box D
that can decrypt the ciphertexts with some nonnegligible probability. The
tracing property of the system states that the tracing algorithm, given the
master secret and only oracle access to box D, outputs a set of users T where
T contains at least one user from the colluding set S and no users outside of
S.
The landscape
Existing approaches for achieving traitor tracing can be fit in the frame-
work of private linear broadcast encryption (PLBE) introduced by Boneh, Sa-
hai, and Waters (BSW) [25]. In a PLBE system the setup algorithm takes as
input a security parameter λ and the number of users n. It outputs a public
key pk, master secret key msk, and n private keys sk1, sk2, . . . , skn where a user
with index j is given key skj. Any of the private keys is capable of decrypting
a ciphertext ct created using pk. However, there is an additional TrEncrypt
algorithm that takes in the master secret key, a message, and an index i. This
produces a ciphertext that only users with index j > i can decrypt. Moreover,
any adversary-produced decryption box D that was created with private keys
in the set of S will not be able to distinguish between encryptions to index
i − 1 or i, where i /∈ S. In addition, encryptions of two different messages
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m0,m1 to index n must be indistinguishable.
The tracing system is set up by simply running the PLBE setup and
distributing each PLBE key to the corresponding user. To trace the set of
colluding parties given a decoding box D, the tracing algorithm first measures
(with several samples) the probability that D correctly decrypts a ciphertext
encrypted to index i for all i ∈ [0, n]. If the box D originally decrypted with
probability ε, then there must exist some index i where the probability the box
decrypts on index i − 1 is at least ε/n more than the probability it decrypts
on ciphertexts encrypted to index i, since by PLBE security D cannot decrypt
encryptions to index n with nonnegligible probability. At this point the tracing
algorithm marks user i as a traitor/colluder.
Prior to developments made as part of this thesis, there were three ap-
proaches to building PLBE. The most basic approach is to simply create n
public/private key pairs under a standard IND-CPA secure public key encryp-
tion system. A PLBE ciphertext is formed by encrypting the message m to
each user’s public key individually and concatenating all of the subciphertexts
to form one long ciphertext, ct = (ct1, ct2, . . . , ctn). A user with secret key ski
in the system will decrypt by running decryption on cti and ignore the rest
of the ciphertext components. To TrEncrypt to index i simply encrypt the all
0’s string in first i ciphertexts ct1, . . . , cti in place of the message. The index
hiding property follows directly from IND-CPA security of the underlying en-
cryption scheme, since without secret key i no attacker can determine whether
cti is an encryption of the message or all 0’s string.
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The above approach works because there is a portion of the ciphertext
cti dedicated to each user i in the system which is not touched during the
decryption process of other users with keys skj for j 6= i. This dedicated ci-
phertext space strategy makes it easy to silently kill user i’s ability to access
the message in a way unnoticeable to other users, but also inherently requires
a ciphertext size that grows linearly in n. In order to achieve PLBE with
sublinear size ciphertexts, one needs to implement some form of computing on
encrypted data.
BSW [25] provided the first construction that achieved PLBE with
ciphertext growth that was sublinear in n. They leveraged composite order
bilinear groups to achieve ciphertexts that grew proportionally to
√
n. While
future variants [27, 70, 67] used bilinear maps to obtain additional properties,




Several years later Boneh and Zhandry [29] showed how to utilize indis-
tinguishability obfuscation [11, 12] and apply punctured programming tech-
niques [113] to achieve the ideal case where ciphertexts grow polynomially in
log(n) and λ. The downside of applying indistinguishability obfuscation is that
all current obfuscation candidates are based on nonstandard multilinear map
group assumptions, and several such multilinear candidates [68, 54, 71, 56]
have been attacked (see [55, 45, 51, 31, 52, 53, 28, 89, 87, 44, 98, 46, 7] and the
references therein). (One could also achieve similar results by using the func-
tional encryption scheme of Garg et al. [69], but this also relies on multilinear
6
maps.)
Therefore, even with all this progress the following question remained
unresolved since the inception of traitor tracing in early 90s:
Can we build secure traitor tracing with poly(λ, log(n))-sized ciphertexts
from standard assumptions?
The result
In this thesis we resolve the above question by providing a traitor trac-
ing scheme with ciphertexts that grow polynomially in log(n) and λ and prove
it secure under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [107, 108]. This is
the first traitor tracing scheme with such parameters that is provably secure
from a standard assumption.1 In addition to achieving new traitor tracing
results, we believe our techniques push forward the broader area of computing
on encrypted data under standard assumptions. Notably, traitor tracing is a
substantially different problem from other cryptography primitives that have
seen recent progress in LWE solutions.
We achieve our result by first conceiving a novel approach to building
traitor tracing that starts with a new form of functional encryption that we call
mixed functional encryption (Mixed FE). In a Mixed FE system the encryption
algorithm is bimodal and works with either a public key or master secret
1The results provided here were obtained in a joint work with Venkata Koppula and
Brent Waters [82, 83].
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key. Ciphertexts encrypted using the public key can only encrypt one type
of functionality. On the other hand, the secret key encryption can be used
to encode many different types of programs, but is only secure as long as the
attacker sees a bounded number of such ciphertexts.
We first show how to combine Mixed FE with attribute-based encryp-
tion (ABE) to achieve traitor tracing. Second, we show under the LWE as-
sumption how to construct Mixed FE systems for polynomial-sized branching
programs (which corresponds to the complexity class logspace). A detailed
description of our techniques is provided in the next chapter in Section 2.1.
Towards more applications
While the concept of traitor tracing was originally motivated by catch-
ing corrupt users in broadcast systems, the notion of traitor tracing has nu-
merous other applications such as transmitting sensitive information to first
responders (or military personnel etc) on an ad-hoc deployed wireless network,
accessing and sharing encrypted files on untrusted cloud storage etc. This pro-
pels us to study the problem of traitor traitor more finely with a dedicated
focus on understanding the issues that prevent a wider adoptability of such
systems.
One major hurdle is that, as per the traditional description of the prob-
lem, the tracing portion (that is identifying the corrupt users) is inherently
tied to the central authority (key generator) in the system. This is due to
the fact that the authority needs to keep track of the users who have been
8
issued private keys, and thus it needs to maintain an explicit mapping (as a
look-up table) between the user identification information and the indices of
their respective private keys. Otherwise, the output of the tracing algorithm
will simply be a subset T of the user indices which can not be linked to actual
users in the system, thereby introducing the problem of accountability and
circumventing the whole point of tracing traitors. In addition, this not only
constrains the authority to be fully stateful (with the state size growing linear
with the number of users) by necessitating that the authority must record the
user information to key index mapping, but also restricts the authority to be
the only party which can perform any meaningful notion of tracing if (au-
thorized) user privacy/anonymity is also desired.2 Therefore, even if the TT
system achieves public traceability, that is the tracing key key can be included
as part of public parameters, no third party would be able to identify traitors
in system due to lack of a public mapping as described above.
Furthermore, in certain situations the user information to key index
mapping might be undetermined. For example, suppose all the users in the
system obtain their private decryption keys without revealing any sensitive
identification information to the key generating authority. (Note that this can
be achieved by some sort of two party computation-based transfer between
the user and authority.) In such a scenario, it is not clear how tracing would
2Although the problem of statefulness can be avoided by posting the identity of all
authorized users along with their respective (decryption key) indices on a public-bulletin
board, such a solution is particularly undesirable in practice as the user identities might
include highly sensitive information such as passport information, driving license number,
etc.
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work since the authority would not be able to point to any user in the system
as a traitor because the key index to user identity mapping is unknown, even
if the tracing algorithm correctly outputs an index of some coerced secret key.
Embedding identities
These observations lead to the following question —
Is it possible to embed the user identification information in the private
decryption keys such that during tracing the algorithm not only finds the
corrupted key indices, but also extracts the corresponding user identities from
the pirate decoding box?
Formally, this is captured by giving an additional parameter κ as an input
to the setup algorithm, where κ denotes the length of the user identities that
can be embedded in the private keys. The setup now outputs a master se-
cret key msk, instead of n private user keys, where msk is used to generate
private keys ski,id for any index-identity pair (i, id) ∈ [n] × {0, 1}κ. And the
tracing algorithm outputs a set of user identities T ⊆ {0, 1}κ, where id ∈ T
indicates that id was one of the corrupted users.3 This interpretation of traitor
tracing resolves the above issues of statefulness, third-party traceability, and
maintaining a private look-up table for providing user anonymity.
3Note that the tracing algorithm could be additionally asked to output the corresponding
user index along with the identity, but since the index i ∈ [n] could itself be encoded in the
identity id using only log(n) bits therefore this seems unnecessary.
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The above-stated question of traitor tracing with embedded informa-
tion in secret keys was first studied by Nishimaki, Wichs, and Zhandry [104].
Their approach was to directly work with the existing private linear broad-
cast encryption (PLBE) framework [25], however that resulted in solutions
based on non-standard assumptions. Concretely, they assume existence of
an adaptively-secure collusion-resistant public-key functional encryption (FE)
scheme with compact ciphertexts. Currently all known instantiations are ei-
ther based on multilinear maps [68, 54, 71, 56], or indistinguishability obfus-
cation [11, 12].
An important open question here is whether the above problem of em-
bedded information traitor tracing can be solved from standard assumptions.
In this thesis, we study this question as well and provide a general framework
for solving the identity embedding problem.
Reinforcing the main result
Augmenting our solution to the regular traitor tracing problem, we also
provide new constructions for traitor tracing systems with embedded identity
tracing functionality.4 We build a compact embedded identity traitor tracing
schemes (EITT) scheme secure under the learning with errors (LWE) assump-
4Nishimaki, Wichs, and Zhandry [104] used the term “flexible” traitor tracing to refer to
schemes where the space of identities that can be traced is exponential. Here we call such
TT systems as embedded identity traitor tracing schemes (or EITT for short).
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tion.5 Here compactness is defined analogous to regular TT, that is it means
the size of ciphertexts and public key scales only polynomially with log(n)
and κ, where n is the number of users and κ denotes the length of identities
embedded. (Since one could set the number of users as exponential in the
security parameter λ, thus one could simply interpret the size of all system
parameters as scaling polynomially in λ and κ.)
Furthermore, a very important and useful piece of our approach is that
it allows us to avoid subexponential security loss in the transformation (due to
complexity leveraging) if we allow an exponential number of users in the system
and the intermediate primitives used are only selectively-secure. Particularly,
this is useful since our LWE-based solution relies on the Mixed FE primitive
that we introduce, and currently we only provide a selective proof of security
for our underlying Mixed FE scheme. Therefore, our approach also answers
the question whether adaptivity is necessary for building EITT schemes if the
system is required to support an unbounded number of users. Note that in the
prior work of Nishimaki, Wichs, and Zhandry [104], it was crucial that they
start with an “adaptively-secure” FE scheme for security purposes, but here
our approach helps in bypassing the adaptivity requirement.6
A detailed description of our techniques for embedding identities is
5The results provided here were obtained in a joint work with Venkata Koppula and
Brent Waters [84].
6Following our work, Chen et al. [42] provide two new constructions for Mixed FE that
are secure under the LWE assumption. And, one of the proposed constructions were proven
to be adaptively-secure.
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provided in the next chapter in Section 2.2.
1.1 Impact of our results and techniques
In just a short duration (between now and the original publication
of our traitor tracing construction [82, 83]) our techniques and framework
have seen numerous other applications in making progress as well as resolving
various other open problems. The results obtained in the domain of embedded
identity traitor tracing [84], that partially contribute to this thesis, also serve as
an indicator of the usefulness and wide applicability of our techniques. Below
we highlight some recent results that are direct derivatives of our constructions
and the techniques therein.
Following our work, Chen et al. [42] extended our traitor tracing frame-
work to provide new constructions for the problem of attribute-based traitor
tracing that are provably secure under the LWE assumption. Very briefly, an
attribute-based traitor tracing system is a regular attribute-based encryption
system in which the predicate key also contains a user tag, and the tracing
property of the system states that the authority can trace corrupt users from a
useful decoding box as long as it can decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under any
arbitrary selected attribute string. Additionally, Chen et al. presented two
alternate constructions for Mixed FE, one from lockable obfuscation [80, 117]
and the other starting from key-homomorphic private constrained pseudoran-
dom functions [39, 36, 43].
Moreover, recently in two independent lines of work [78, 85], we were
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able to demonstrate applications of our techniques in the problems of soft-
ware watermarking [11, 99, 88, 119, 12, 103, 50] as well as broadcast and
trace [102, 100]. Specifically, in [78] we presented the first construction for col-
lusion resistant watermarkable attribute-based encryption schemes from stan-
dard assumptions. The starting point of our watermarking construction is also
our Mixed FE framework. While in [85], we extended our Mixed FE abstrac-
tion by adding a broadcast feature which we called broadcast mixed functional
encryption, and we showed that combining such broadcast mixed functional
encryption schemes with attribute-based encryption with succinct ciphertexts,
we obtained new results to the broadcast and trace problem from standard as-
sumptions with significantly shorter ciphertexts than other existing broadcast
and trace systems from standard assumptions [27].
As we partially elaborate in this thesis, in our most recent work [84]
we show that our Mixed FE abstraction also has direct applications in embed-
ding identities in a traitor tracing system. For building the embedding iden-
tity traitor tracing system, we relied on our Mixed FE scheme being highly
expressive, that is instead of comparison functions we exploited the fact that
our Mixed FE scheme supports encrypting a much richer class of functions
(polynomial-sized branching programs). And most recently, Kim and Wu [91]
studied the problem of trace and revoke again looking through the lens of
Mixed FE.
In conclusion, all these follow-up works [42, 78, 85, 84, 91] support the
belief that the techniques developed in this thesis have a much broader impact.
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1.2 Organization
In Chapter 2, we provide a detailed overview of our techniques and
discuss some future and related works. Next, in Chapter 3 we present the pre-
liminaries required for this work, and in Chapter 4 we provide the definition for
traitor tracing and introduce a new primitive called Mixed FE. In Chapter 5,
we show how 1-query PLBE implies decoder-based PLBE, and how decoder-
based PLBE suffices for constructing TT schemes. Therefore, the problem of
constructing a TT scheme reduces to the problem of constructing a 1-query
PLBE scheme, which we in turn show how to construct using Mixed FE and
ABE. In Chapter 7, we present our Mixed FE construction (before presenting
the Mixed FE construction, in Chapter 6 we present new lattice tools which
are required for our construction). Lastly, in Chapter 8, we describe our ap-
proach for embedding identities in TT schemes. Also, in Chapter A we briefly
describe an alternate TT construction that achieves perfect correctness as long
as the underlying ABE schem is perfectly correct.
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Chapter 2
Overview of our techniques
In this chapter, we provide a detailed overview of the techniques devel-
oped for building efficient collusion resistant traitor tracing systems that also
provide the embedded identity tracing functionality. First, we overview our
techniques for building a regular traitor tracing scheme that achieves the de-
sired efficiency and collusion resistance properties. Next, we describe how our
introduced framework could be extended to embed identities as well. Finally,
we conclude the chapter by describing a few directions for future work as well
as discussing some related works.
2.1 Building traitor tracing
We now give a technical overview of our main traitor tracing result.
This overview is broken into four parts. In the first part we review the BSW
notion of private linear broadcast encryption (PLBE) and its transformation
into a traitor tracing system. Along the way we discover that the PLBE
definitions as presented in [25] do not imply traitor tracing. We then show how
to repair the argument by giving the attacker an additional oracle encryption
query in the PLBE definitions. Second, we present the notion of Mixed FE
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and show how an ABE and Mixed FE system (for the right functionalities)
can be used to construct a PLBE system. The third part of our overview
describes a new LWE toolkit which includes “enhanced” versions of lattice
trapdoor sampling algorithms with additional security properties. Finally, we
outline our main ideas for constructing the Mixed FE system and proving it
secure under the LWE assumption.
2.1.1 Part 1: Breaking and Repairing the PLBE to Tracing Argu-
ment
First, let us review the PLBE algorithms as defined in [25]. A PLBE
scheme consists of a setup, encryption, decryption, and trace-encryption algo-
rithm. The setup algorithm outputs a public key, a master secret key, and n
secret keys, one for each index in [n]. The encryption/decryption algorithms
are self-explanatory; the trace-encryption algorithm is a special encryption
algorithm that requires the master secret key, and can be used to encrypt
a message to any index i ∈ [0, n]. The output ciphertext can be decrypted
only by secret keys for indices j > i. BSW defined three security properties.
The first security property (public to zero-index indistinguishability) requires
that a standard encryption of message m is indistinguishable from a trace-
encryption of m to the index 0, even when the adversary has all n secret keys.
The second security property (index hiding) states that a trace-encryption of
m to index i− 1 is indistinguishable from a trace-encryption of m to index i,
even when the adversary has all the secret keys except the ith one. Finally, the
third security property states that trace-encryption of m0 to index n is indis-
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tinguishable from trace-encryption of m1 to index n, even when the adversary
is given all n secret keys.
BSW argued that these three properties of PLBE are sufficient for
constructing a traitor tracing (TT) scheme. In their transformation, the TT
public key and n secret keys are set to be the PLBE public key and n secret
keys, respectively. The TT encryption/decryption algorithms are identical to
the PLBE encryption/decryption algorithms. Finally, the tracing algorithm
uses the PLBE trace-encryption algorithm. Given a decoder box D, the trac-
ing algorithm encrypts random messages to each index and checks if D can
decrypt it correctly. If the decoder box is ε-successful1 in decrypting (stan-
dard) encryptions, then it is also ε successful in decrypting trace-encryptions to
index 0 (via the first security property). Next, note that the decoder box can-
not decrypt trace-encryptions to index n (via the message indistinguishability
property). Therefore, there must exist an index i∗ ∈ [n] where the success of
the decoder box in decrypting trace-encryptions to index i∗− 1 is at least ε/n
more than its success in decrypting trace-encryptions to i∗. This index i∗ must
be one of the indices queried by the adversary (since if the adversary does not
have a key for index i∗, then the decoder box must not be able to distinguish
between trace-encryptions to i∗ − 1 and i∗). For each index i, the tracing
algorithm computes an estimate of the decoder box’s success probability in
decrypting random trace-encryptions for index i. For all indices i where the
1A decoder box is said to be ε-successful if its probability of correctly decrypting a
ciphertext is at least ε, where the probability is taken over the choice of the ciphertext and
D’s random coins.
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measured success probabilities for i− 1 and i are substantially different, user
i is declared to be a traitor.
At an intuitive level, it seems like the BSW transformation should work.
However, here we argue that it is indeed possible to have a PLBE scheme secure
under the original BSW definition, but produce an insecure TT scheme in this
regard. The problem lies in the fact that there is a “semantic gap” between
the TT definition and the PLBE definition. The TT definition considers an
attacker that produces a (stateless) decoder D whose success on decrypting
multiple trace-encryptions is measured, whereas the PLBE definition considers
indistinguishability on a single ciphertext (in particular, no ciphertext queries).
Diving deeper, we show a separation by adding a feature to a PLBE scheme
where the feature does not impact PLBE security, but results in an insecure
TT scheme.
Given any secure PLBE scheme P, consider a scheme P′ defined as
follows. The setup algorithm of P′ is similar to the setup of P, except it also
samples an additional pseudorandom function (PRF) key K as part of the mas-
ter secret key (we will assume the PRF has single-bit output). The (standard)
encryption algorithm computes a ciphertext ct using the underlying scheme’s
encryption algorithm, chooses a uniformly random bit b, and outputs (ct, b).
The trace-encryption of message m is the ciphertext ct′ = (ct, y = PRFK(i)),
where ct is the ciphertext obtained from the trace-encryption algorithm of P.
It is easy to see that the new scheme satisfies all three PLBE security def-
initions, since there are no encryption queries allowed in the PLBE scheme
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beyond the challenge ciphertext.
However, it is possible to construct a decoding box using only the secret
key for index n such that the trace algorithm falsely accuses some user i < n.
The decoder D, on input of a ciphertext ct′ = (ct, y), tests if y = 1. If so, it
decrypts the ciphertext using key skn; otherwise it outputs a random message.
Using PRF security, we can argue that there exists an index i < n such that
PRFK(i − 1) = 1 and PRFK(i) = 0 with high probability. In this case the
probability that D decrypts ciphertexts for index i − 1 will be measurably
different than the case in which it decrypts ciphertext for index i. Thus user
i will be flagged as a colluder.
We repair the BSW transformation from PLBE to TT by considering a
modified set of PLBE security definitions and prove that these do imply TT.
We do so in two steps. First, we consider a decoder-based version of the BSW
PLBE definitions. For concreteness, let us consider the index hiding definition.
The decoder-based version of the index hiding version states that no adversary,
given all secret keys except the ith one, can produce a decoder box D and a
message m such that D can distinguish between trace-encryptions of m to
index i − 1 and trace-encryptions of m to index i. Decoder-based versions of
the other properties are defined similarly.
Now that we have decoder-based PLBE definitions that align with the
decoder in the TT definitions, it is fairly straightforward to prove that the
BSW transformation implies TT. The downside of introducing decoder-based
PLBE definitions is that they are more difficult to work with as a target for
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a construction. We address this issue by circling back to the original (BSW)
PLBE definitions and augmenting them by allowing an attacker to make an
a priori bounded number of queries to an encryption oracle. We show that
1-query PLBE implies decoder-based PLBE. This gives us an easier target
(that is, 1-query PLBE).
Before describing the transformation from 1-query PLBE to decoder-
based PLBE, we would like to point out that if the BSW definitions were
augmented to allow an unbounded number of ciphertext queries, then decoder-
based security follows immediately. For instance, let us consider the index
hiding game. The reduction algorithm (that reduces unbounded-query PLBE
to decoder-based PLBE) receives a decoder box D from the attacker. Given
the unbounded queries, the reduction algorithm can measure (with reasonable
accuracy) the success probabilities of D for indices i− 1 and i, and therefore
whether it can use D to distinguish between an encryption to index i − 1
and i. However, with only 1 encryption query no such precise measurement
is possible. Therefore, showing an attacker on decoder-based PLBE security
implies an attacker on 1-query PLBE is a bit tricky. The reduction algorithm,
after receiving the decoder box and message m from the adversary, chooses a
random index i∗ ∈ {i − 1, i}, and queries the challenger for encryption of m
for index i∗. It receives a ciphertext ct. Next, it queries the challenger with
challenge message m and receives a challenge ciphertext ct∗. The reduction
algorithm checks if D(ct) = D(ct∗); if so, it guesses that m was encrypted for
index i∗. We would like to point out that choosing query index i∗ uniformly at
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random from {i− 1, i} (as opposed to just fixing one of the two) is important
for our analysis. The idea of running the decoder twice is sometimes referred
to as the double-run trick [10, 32, 59]. The complete details of our analysis
can be found in Section 5.3.
Impact on prior TT works using the PLBE framework. Traitor tracing
schemes that had secret key tracing would need a new proof under the new
PLBE definitions with 1-query allowed. We believe the bilinear map construc-
tions [25, 70, 67] are likely secure under this definition, but showing this is
outside scope of this paper. Note that the same problem is not present in
PLBE with public trace-encryption (e.g., [27]), since the public key allows the
reduction algorithm to generate ciphertexts.
2.1.2 Part 2: Constructing PLBE from Mixed FE
The hardness of constructing a PLBE scheme stems from the fact that
it needs to satisfy the following two properties at the same time. First, a PLBE
scheme needs to provide a predicate encryption (PE) like functionality where
each secret key is associated with an “index,” and each ciphertext is associated
with an index comparison predicate. Also, the ciphertexts must not reveal any
more information about the associated index comparison predicate other than
what can be learned by running decryption. Second, the scheme must provide
a broadcast encryption (BE) like compactness guarantee, which is that the size
of ciphertexts must be short. In particular, the index needs to be represented
in binary, which means the index comparison must be “sufficiently complex.”
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In this work, instead of directly building a PLBE scheme, we further
reduce the task to constructing a new form of functional encryption scheme
called Mixed FE. We show how Mixed FE can be combined with ABE for
circuits to obtain PLBE. At a very high level, our approach is to decouple the
functionality (delivering the message to users) and security requirements of a
PLBE scheme, and to deal with them separately.
We begin by informally introducing the notion of Mixed FE. A Mixed
FE scheme consists of setup, normal (or public key) encryption, secret key
encryption, key generation, and decryption algorithms. The setup algorithm
takes as input the security parameter λ and description of a function class F
and outputs the public parameters pp and the master secret key msk. The
normal encryption algorithm only takes as input the public parameters pp and
outputs a (normal) ciphertext ct. The secret key encryption algorithm takes
as input the master secret key msk and a function f ∈ F and outputs a (secret
key) ciphertext ct. The key generation algorithm takes as input the master
secret key msk and a message m and outputs a key skm. The decryption algo-
rithm takes as input a ciphertext ct and a secret key skm and outputs a single
bit. Now for correctness we require that decrypting a secret key encryption
of any function f using a secret key skm outputs the evaluation of function f
on message m, i.e., f(m), whereas the decryption algorithm (almost) always
outputs 1 when given a normal ciphertext as input, irrespective of the secret
key used. Thus, one could visualize the normal encryption algorithm as always
encrypting a “canonical” always-accepting function.
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Intuitively, security states that no attacker should be able to distinguish
between two ciphertexts that decrypt to the same values under all the secret
keys in the attacker’s possession. Now since there are two separate encryp-
tion algorithms, we have two different security properties. The first property
says that secret key encryptions of two functions f0 and f1 should be indis-
tinguishable if for every key in the attacker’s possession the output of f0, f1 is
identical. We call this function the indistinguishability property. The second
property says that it should be hard to distinguish between a normal (public
key) encryption and secret key encryption of a function f , where f(m) must
be equal to 1 for all keys skm in the attacker’s possession. We call this the
accept indistinguishability property.
We show that we can construct a PLBE scheme from a (key-policy)
ABE scheme and a Mixed FE scheme. The idea is to encrypt a message using
the ABE system with the attribute being set to be a Mixed FE ciphertext.
Each user’s secret key will be an ABE private key. Here the ABE private key
is generated for the Mixed FE decryption circuit in which a Mixed FE secret
key, corresponding to the user’s index, is hardwired. The high level intuition
is that when the attribute is a normal functional encryption ciphertext then
all Mixed FE keys decrypt it to 1; thus any user with an appropriate ABE key
could perform the decryption, whereas if the attribute is set to be a secret key
ciphertext, then we can control the users who can decrypt it.
Formally, the scheme works as follows. During setup, the algorithm
samples both ABE and Mixed FE key pairs (abe.pp, abe.msk), (mixed.pp,mixed.msk).
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To compute the ith user’s private key, it samples a Mixed FE secret key
mixed.ski for input i and also computes an ABE key abe.ski for predicate
Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·), i.e., Mixed FE decryption circuit with key mixed.ski
hardwired. And the ABE key abe.ski is set to be the ith user’s private key.
Now to encrypt a message m, the algorithm simply runs the ABE encryption
algorithm with attributes set to be a Mixed FE ciphertext ctattr. For standard
PLBE encryption, ctattr is computed as a Mixed FE normal ciphertext, and
for PLBE index encryption to some index i, ctattr is computed as a Mixed FE
secret key encryption of function greater than i. Lastly, the PLBE decryption
is the same as the ABE decryption algorithm.
Correctness can be observed directly. For standard PLBE ciphertext,
ctattr is a normal FE ciphertext which decrypts to 1; thus the predicate, which
is the decryption circuit Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·), is satisfied for all i. Therefore,
by ABE correctness, the ABE decryption algorithm will output the message
m. For the PLBE index i ciphertext, ctattr is a Mixed FE secret key encryption
of function “> i” which decrypts to 1 for all keys mixed.skj with j > i; thus
the predicate is satisfied for all users with indices larger than i. Therefore,
by ABE correctness, the ABE decryption algorithm will output the message
m whenever j > i. For proving security, we rely on the fact that Mixed FE
ciphertexts are indistinguishable to any adversary that does not have distin-
guishing secret keys. For instance, suppose there exists an adversary that can
distinguish between PLBE normal encryptions and index 0 encryptions; then
such an adversary can also be used to distinguish between Mixed FE normal ci-
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phertexts and secret key ciphertexts encrypting function “> 0” (note that this
is an always-accepting function). Thus, such an attack can be used to break
the accept indistinguishability property of the Mixed FE scheme. Similarly,
we can prove index hiding and message hiding security of the construction by
reducing to Mixed FE and ABE (selective) security, respectively. Now if the
Mixed FE scheme is 1-query secure, then so is the PLBE scheme.
Now the size of ciphertexts has only poly-log dependence on the number
of users n as required. Because each user can be uniquely identified using a
bit string of length log n, so the length of the attribute (Mixed FE ciphertext)
will be polynomial in log n, and thus the PLBE ciphertext, which is in turn
an ABE ciphertext, will have length polynomial in log n as well. Also, note
that to use the above transformation it is sufficient to construct a Mixed FE
scheme that supports comparison operation on log n bit strings. In this work,
we show how to construct a Mixed FE scheme for any class of polynomial-sized
branching program from the LWE assumption.2 Our construction relies only
on the polynomial hardness of LWE, although we require a superpolynomial
modulus-to-noise ratio. Since we already have circuit ABE schemes from the
LWE assumption [76, 22], combining that with our Mixed FE construction
gives us collusion resistant traitor tracing from the LWE assumption as well.
Looking back, it is easy to observe that Mixed FE for branching pro-
grams that support comparison functionality is sufficient for our application.
2Note that this also gives us an alternate construction for selectively secure private key
functional encryption with bounded collusions [110, 75].
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However, as a design choice, here we instead chose to construct Mixed FE
for general polynomial length branching programs as it is possible that this
generalization leads to more applications in the future. Moreover, focusing
on logarithmic length branching programs supporting comparisons, instead of
general branching programs, did not lead to any significant simplification in
the Mixed FE construction or its proof.
2.1.3 Part 3: An Enhanced LWE Toolkit
Before describing our LWE-based construction for Mixed FE, we define
new “enhanced” properties for lattice trapdoors that will be useful in our work,
and we believe it will find more applications in the future. In many LWE-based
works, in addition to the LWE assumption itself, a critical tool has been the
notion of lattice trapdoors [6, 72]. Lattice trapdoor samplers consist of a pair
of algorithms, TrapGen and SamplePre. The trapdoor generation algorithm
TrapGen outputs a matrix A (that defines the lattice) and a trapdoor TA. The
preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre takes as input a matrix Z, a trapdoor
for matrix A, and a Gaussian parameter σ and outputs a matrix U such that
U maps A to Z (that is, A ·U = Z).3
These algorithms satisfy the following properties. First, the matrix A
output by the trapdoor generation algorithm “looks like” a uniformly random
matrix; we call this the well-sampledness of matrix property. Second, the
3Although the notion of preimage sampling is usually defined with respect to (w.r.t.) vec-
tors instead of matrices, here we stick to using matrices for technical reasons discussed later
in Chapter 6.
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matrix output by SamplePre is indistinguishable from a matrix drawn from a
discrete Gaussian distribution with parameter σ over the set of all matrices
V such that A · V = Z. In particular, if Z is chosen uniformly at random,
then the output of SamplePre “looks like” a matrix U drawn from a discrete
Gaussian distribution with parameter σ; we call this the preimage sampling
property. Lattice trapdoors with these properties have found a remarkable
number of applications in building LWE-based cryptography.
In this work, we introduce two new enhanced properties for lattice
trapdoors. The first property is the row removal property, which can be in-
tuitively described as follows. Consider a setting where an adversary specifies
some “target vectors,” and the challenger must output a matrix A and a ma-
trix U such that U maps some of the rows of A to the target vectors, and maps
the remaining rows to uniformly random vectors. Then these rows targeting
uniformly random vectors can be removed from the trapdoor sampling. In
particular, the challenger can sample a shorter matrix B with a trapdoor, ex-
tend B with uniformly random vectors to get A, and set U to be a matrix that
maps B to the target vectors. These two scenarios will be indistinguishable
for the PPT adversary.
The second property is called the target switching property. In this
setting, consider an adversary that specifies two matrices, Z0,Z1, and a set
of “target” indices such that the rows of Z0 and Z1 agree on these target
indices. The challenger is supposed to sample a matrix A with a trapdoor,
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compute a matrix U that maps A to Z0,
4 and output U together with the
rows of A corresponding to the target indices and only those rows. Then the
challenger can switch the U to map A to Z1, and the target switching property
requires that this change is indistinguishable to the adversary (note that this
would not be possible if the adversary receives any of the nontarget rows of
A). Moreover, the adversary is allowed to adaptively query for different target
vectors/indices in both these games.
Now that we have these enhanced properties, let us discuss how to
construct lattice trapdoors with these enhanced properties (using standard
lattice trapdoors). Our construction is similar to the SampleLeft/SampleRight
algorithms of [3, 40]. The enhanced trapdoor generation algorithm uses the
standard trapdoor sampling algorithm to sample two matrices, A1,A2, to-
gether with the respective trapdoors TA1 , TA2 . It outputs A = [A1|A2] as the
matrix and TA = (TA1 , TA2) as the trapdoor. To sample a matrix U that
maps A to Z, the preimage sampling algorithm first chooses a uniformly ran-
dom matrix W (of the same dimensions as Z). It then uses TA1 to compute
a matrix U1 that maps A1 to W, and uses TA2 to compute a matrix U2 that






the matrix well-sampledness and preimage sampling properties of the standard
lattice trapdoors to prove these enhanced properties; the detailed proof can
be found in Section 6.2.
4Strictly speaking, we require U to map the target vectors of A to the target vectors of
Z0, but the remaining vectors of A approximately map to the corresponding vectors of Z0.
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2.1.4 Part 4: Constructing Mixed FE from LWE
Here we outline our Mixed FE construction for polynomial-sized (lev-
eled) branching programs from the LWE assumption. The main ingredient
of our construction is the “enhanced” lattice trapdoor sampling procedure
LTen = (EnTrapGen,EnSamplePre) discussed above.
First, let us recall the notion of leveled branching programs. A leveled
branching program of length ` and width w can be represented using w states
per level, 2` state transition functions πj,b for each level j ≤ `, an input-selector
function inp(·) which determines the input read at each level, and an accepting
and rejecting state. The program execution starts at state st = 1 of level 1.
Suppose the branching program reads the first input bit (say, b) at level 1 (i.e.,
inp(1) = 1). Then the state of the program changes from st to π1,b(st). Such
a process is carried out (iteratively) until the program’s final state at level `
is computed. Depending upon the final state, the program either accepts or
rejects.
For ease of exposition we will start with a simpler goal of constructing
a 0-query secure Mixed FE scheme for a class of width-w read-once branching
programs where each input bit is read once and in ascending order. Below we
first outline a construction for such a 0-query system as it contains most of
the central ideas, but is easier to digest. Later we discuss the modifications
with which we can improve it to a secure 1-query scheme (and, more generally,
q-query secure for any polynomial q) as well as expand the function class to
arbitrary polynomial-sized branching programs.
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Moving on to our 0-query Mixed FE construction, the master secret
key consists of two sets of matrices and some trapdoor information. The first
set, labeled as “randomization” matrices, consists of 4` matrices {Bi,b,Ci,b}i,b
for i ∈ [`], b ∈ {0, 1}. The second set, labeled as “program” matrices, consists
of w` matrices {Pi,v}i,v for i ∈ [`], v ∈ [w]. Here the Ci,b matrices are sampled
uniformly at random from Zn×mq , whereas the remaining (randomization and
program matrices) are sampled jointly with common trapdoors (per level).
Basically, for each level i ∈ [`], we sample a (w + 2)n×m matrix Mi as
(Mi, Ti)← EnTrapGen(1(w+2)n, 1m, q).
Now each Mi matrix is parsed as w+2 matrices of dimensions n×m stacked on
top of each other, where the first two matrices are the randomization matrices
and the remaining w matrices are the program matrices for the ith level. That







All ` trapdoors T1, . . . , T` are stored as the trapdoor information in the master
secret key. The public parameters, on the other hand, only include the matrix
dimensions, LWE modulus, and noise parameters, but none of these matrices
or trapdoor information.
At a high level, the encryption and key generation algorithms will ad-
here to the following structure. To (secret key) encrypt a branching program,
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the trapdoors will be used to sample 2` low norm matrices {Ui,b}i,b (two per
level) such that each matrix Ui,b encodes the corresponding state transition
function by mapping/targeting level i “program” matrices to level i+ 1 “pro-
gram” matrices per the transition function πi,b. Now the secret key for an
input x will consist of ` + 1 key vectors {ti}i. The first key component, t1,
will contain the program matrix P1,1 (which represents the starting state) plus
some randomization component generated using the level 1 randomization ma-
trix B1,b. The remaining ` key vectors will have two components—the first
component will cancel the previous randomization component, and the second
component will add new randomization terms.5 The idea is that if decryption
is performed honestly, then all the randomization terms will get canceled and
the final output will reflect the output of the branching program.
So this way the program matrices will be tied in such a manner that
they encode the state transition information, and they can be used to perform
the branching program execution. And the randomization matrices are added
to make sure that (1) the computation is hidden at each step, and (2) if
ciphertext matrices and key vectors are combined in any inadmissible way,
then the randomization components do not get canceled. Let us now look at
how to execute the above ideas.
Key generation. The key generation algorithm takes as input a string x
and generates key vectors {ti}i as follows. It chooses ` uniform secret vectors
5Technically, the last key vector will only remove the previous randomization component.
It doesn’t add a new randomization term.
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si ∈ Znq for i ∈ [`] and `+1 noise vectors ei ∈ Zmq for i ∈ [`+1]. It also chooses
a short secret vector s̃ ∈ Znq and sets key vectors as follows:
∀ i ∈ [`+ 1], ti =

s1 ·B1,x1 + s̃ ·P1,1 + e1 if i = 1,
−si−1 ·Ci−1,xi−1 + si ·Bi,xi + ei if 1 < i ≤ `,
−s` ·C`,x` + e`+1 if i = `+ 1.
In words, the randomization component (likewise, cancellation component)
added in the ith key vector ((i+ 1)th key vector) is an LWE sample where the
public matrix used depends on the ith bit of input x. Looking ahead, choosing
the “randomization” matrices depending on the string x would assert that the
ciphertext matrices cannot be arbitrarily combined to learn meaningful terms.
Normal encryption. The normal (public key) encryption algorithm sim-
ply samples 2` random short matrices {Ui,b}i,b as Ui,b ← χ
m×m, where χ is
the noise distribution chosen during setup.
Secret key encryption. Moving on to the secret key encryption al-
gorithm, on input the master secret key and a branching program BP =(
{πi,b}i,b , acc, rej
)
, it samples low norm matrices {Ui,b} as follows. It first
chooses two “program” matrices for the last level ` + 1 as P`+1,rej = 0
n×m
and P`+1,acc ← Zn×mq . That is, for the accepting state, it chooses a ran-
dom program matrix, and for the rejecting state it sets the matrix to be all
zeros. Next, using the ith trapdoor Ti (included in the master secret key) it
runs the EnSamplePre algorithm to sample the ciphertext (transition) matrices
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Here we use “$” to denote a uniformly random n × m matrix of appropri-
ate dimension. In words, the structure we enforce here is that the matrix
Ui,b targets the Bi,b randomization matrix to its Ci,b counterpart, and the
Bi,1−b randomization matrix to a random matrix. Additionally, Ui,b encodes
the information about transition function πi,b by targeting the level i program
matrices to their level i + 1 counterparts per πi,b. Thus, from the perspec-
tive of both correctness and security, this guarantees that a key vector ti for
some input x must be combined with ciphertext component Ui,xi , as other-
wise the randomization matrix would be mapped to a random matrix, thereby
destroying the underlying structure.
Decryption. First, let us focus on decrypting a secret key encryption
of branching program BP using a secret key {ti}i corresponding to an input
x. Intuitively, one could visualize the matrices {Ui,0,Ui,1}i in the ciphertext
as “encodings” of the branching program state transition functions πi,0, πi,1,
respectively. Therefore, decrypting the ciphertext using a secret key for some
input x will be analogous to evaluating the branching programs BP on input
x directly. Recall that we assumed (for ease of exposition) that the branching
programs are read-once, and input bits are read sequentially in ascending
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order. Thus, the first input bit x1 is read at level 1. Then evaluation of BP at
level 1 would map the state st1 = 1 at level 1 to state st2 = π1,x1(1) at level 2.
Analogously, the decryptor can compute
t1 ·U1,x1 + t2 ≈ (s1 ·B1,x1 + s̃ ·P1,1) ·U1,x1 + t2
≈ s1 ·C1,x1 + s̃ ·P2,st2 + t2
≈ 
s1 ·C1,x1 + s̃ ·P2,st2 + (
−s1 ·C1,x1 + s2 ·B2,x2)
≈ s2 ·B2,x2 + s̃ ·P2,st2 .
In general, if the program state at level i during execution is sti, then the
decryptor will accumulate the term of the form si ·Bi,xi+s̃·Pi,sti by successively
summing and multiplying secret key and ciphertext components as
(· · · ((t1 ·U1,x1 + t2) ·U2,x2 + t3) · · ·+ ti) .
This can be verified as follows. We know that the bit read at level i is xi, and
thus the new state at level i+1 will be sti+1 = πi,xi(sti). Now the accumulated
sum-product during decryption will be
(si ·Bi,xi + s̃ ·Pi,sti) ·Ui,xi + ti+1
≈ si ·Ci,xi + s̃ ·Pi+1,sti+1 +
(

−si ·Ci,xi + si+1 ·Bi+1,xi+1
)
≈ si+1 ·Bi+1,xi+1 + s̃ ·Pi+1,sti+1 .
Therefore, the invariant is maintained. Continuing in this way, the decryptor
can iteratively compute the sum-product combining all key and ciphertext
components. Note that (by definition) adding in the (`+ 1)th key component
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t` does not introduce a term like s`+1 ·B`+1,x`+1 to the sum-product; thus the
accumulated term at the top will be ≈ s̃ · P`+1,st`+1 , where st`+1 is either acc
or rej depending on BP(x). Finally, the decryptor simply checks whether the
norm of the final sum-product term is small or not. Recall that the program
matrix for the last level corresponding to the rejecting state is set to be all
zeros, i.e., P`+1,rej = 0
n×m. Therefore, if BP(x) = 0, then the norm of the final
sum-product term will be small, which the decryptor can test and output 0.
Otherwise, with high probability the final sum-product term will be large and
it outputs 1.
By the above analysis, correctness follows in the case where ciphertext
is a secret key encryption. The correctness of decryption when the ciphertext
is a normal (public key) ciphertext follows from the fact that the ciphertext
matrices {Ui,0,Ui,1}i are independently sampled random short matrices.
0-query security. To prove 0-query security of our construction, we need
to argue that it satisfies both function indistinguishability as well as accept in-
distinguishability properties. We start by proving the function indistinguisha-
bility security. Recall that in the 0-query function indistinguishability security
game, an adversary submits two branching programs, BP(0),BP(1), and is al-
lowed to make a polynomial number of key queries such that for each queried
input x, BP(0)(x) = BP(1)(x) (i.e., every secret key given out has same output
on both the challenge programs). The adversary receives secret key encryption
of either BP(0) or BP(1), and its goal is to distinguish between them.
Although the full security proof is technically involved, the main ideas
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behind our proof are very intuitive. Before diving into the proof structure, we
point out that the construction described above has to be slightly modified
for proving security. Below we describe our proof ideas as well as discuss the
modifications required along the way.
At a high level, our idea is to “hardwire” the output of the challenge
branching programs in every secret key given to the adversary. Note that the
security definition states that both challenge programs must evaluate to the
same value on all queried inputs, and thus we only need to hardwire a single
value in each key. For ease of exposition, assume that the adversary makes
exactly one secret key query. (In the general case of polynomially many key
queries, the proof proceeds by hardwiring the level 1 components in all secret
keys, followed by level 2 hardwiring, and so on.) Let {Ui,b}i,b be the challenge
ciphertext, and let {ti}i be the secret key computed by the challenger. Our
hardwiring strategy works as follows. We start by rewriting the second secret
key vector t2 in terms of t1 as follows:
t2 = −s1 ·C1,x1 + s2 ·B2,x2 + e2
= −s1 ·B1,x1 ·U1,x1 + s2 ·B2,x2 + e2
= −s1 ·B1,x1 ·U1,x1 − s̃ ·P2,st2 + s̃ ·P2,st2 + s2 ·B2,x2 + e2
= − (s1 ·B1,x1 + s̃ ·P1,1) ·U1,x1 + s̃ ·P2,st2 + s2 ·B2,x2 + e2
= −(t1 − e1) ·U1,x1 + s̃ ·P2,st2 + s2 ·B2,x2 + e2.
Here st2 is the state of the challenge branching program encrypted (after one
step is executed). Now in the above term, we can smudge the term e1 ·U1,x1
37
by appropriately choosing the noise distributions, i.e., e2  e1 ·U1,x1 .6 (Note
that since we require smudging here, thus the LWE modulus q needs to be
superpolynomial in the lattice dimension.) Thus, the second key component
can be indistinguishably computed as follows without requiring any explicit
knowledge of the C1,x1 matrix:
t1 = s1 ·B1,x1 + s̃ ·P1,1 + e1,
t2 =
−(t1 − e1) ·U1,x1 + s̃ ·P2,st2
+ s2 ·B2,x2 + e2
Smudging−−−−−−−−−→ t2 =
−t1 ·U1,x1 + s̃ ·P2,st2
+ s2 ·B2,x2 + e2.
Next, we use the row removal property of our enhanced trapdoor sam-
pling algorithms to remove the B1,0,B1,1 rows from the first matrix M1 and
instead sample these randomly. To understand why this can be done, recall
that in the actual construction the encryptor needs the ability to create a ci-
phertext for any branching program that could be chosen even after all the
keys have been distributed. That is, the encryptor must be able to sample
matrices U1,0,U1,1 such that they map level 1 program matrices {P1,v}v to
level 2 program matrices {P2,v}v per some transition functions {π1,b}b, as well
as ensure that B1,b · U1,b = C1,b. Now since the keys contain the matrices
C1,0,C1,1 and they could be given out even before matrices U1,0,U1,1 are sam-
pled, thus matrices B1,0,B1,1 must be sampled together with {P1,v}v such that
they share a common trapdoor.
6If we keep on smudging this way, our noise distributions will have to grow by an ex-
ponential factor at each step. In the main body, we show how to avoid this by a better
smudging argument.
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However, at this stage in the proof the challenge branching program is
(selectively) fixed ahead of any secret key queries. Therefore, in this context we
can sample matrices U1,0,U1,1 to only map level 1 program matrices to their
level 2 counterparts, and simply set the matrices C1,b as C1,b = B1,b · U1,b
and use these to compute the secret keys. We would like to point out that in
order to perform this row removal securely, it is important that B1,b ·U1,1−b =
$, that is, matrices U1,0,U1,1 map both matrices B1,0,B1,1 to random and
uncorrelated matrices.
Now once we have removed the B1,0,B1,1 rows from the first matrix,
we use the LWE assumption to switch the first key component t1 to a random
vector. Note that at this point since matrices B1,0,B1,1 are sampled uniformly
(i.e., are no longer sampled with trapdoor information) and secret vector s1 is
not used in computing the second key component t2, thus we can apply LWE
to switch t1 to random, where the LWE secret is s1 and the LWE public matrix
will be B1,x1 .
7 Concretely, using LWE we can perform the following switch,
which essentially erases the information about the level 1 program matrix P1,1
from the secret keys, thereby rendering the program evaluation to start from
level 2 and state st2 instead:
t1 = s1 ·B1,x1 + s̃ ·P1,1 + e1
LWE−−−−−−→ t1 = $,
t2 = −t1 ·U1,x1 + s̃ ·P2,st2 + s2 ·B2,x2 + e2.
7In the general case of multiple key queries the LWE public matrices will be both
B1,0,B1,1 and the LWE secret will consist of all the secret key vectors si that are cho-
sen independently and per key.
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Now iteratively performing this hardwiring strategy (` times), we end
up switching all but the last key components to be random vectors. Also, the
last key component will contain the final program matrix, which is either a
random matrix or a zero matrix, depending on the program output. Thus,
the key vectors contain no information about the “program” matrices chosen
during setup. At this point, the challenge matrices {Ui,b}i,b still contain the
information about the branching program encrypted in the form of mapping
between level i and i+1 “program” matrices, i.e., the state transition functions
{πi,b}i,b. Finally, to argue indistinguishability here (i.e., between the challenge
matrices) we use the target switching property of our enhanced trapdoors. We
apply a bottom-up approach to execute this change. First, note that the level
1 program matrices do not explicitly appear anywhere, except that they are
used to sample the level 1 ciphertext matrices U1,0,U1,1. Thus, we can use the
target switching property to switch the targets of matrices U1,0,U1,1. Observe
that this now removes the information about level 2 program matrices as well
as the level 1 transition functions of challenge branching programs. Next, by
the same principle, we can perform the same target switching step for U2,0,U2,1
and continue so on. If we keep on performing the target switching step this
way until the top, then the challenge ciphertext will contain no information
about the challenge programs (i.e., their state transition functions), thereby
completing our claim of function indistinguishability.8 This completes the first
8Technically, we cannot apply the target switching property here, because the target
switching property only guarantees that targets being switched are approximately mapped,
whereas here we target exactly. Therefore, we also need to add some noise in the targeted
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proof.
The proof of the 0-query accept indistinguishability security of our con-
struction is similar, but more technical due to the fact that we need to argue
that the challenge ciphertext is indistinguishable from random short matrices.
However, for our PLBE construction, the Mixed FE scheme must han-
dle one ciphertext query as well, and it is not clear how to prove the above
construction to be 1-query secure directly. The bottleneck is the fact that in
the above proof strategy we hardwire all secret key components to match the
output of the challenge program. Now if the adversary is allowed to make a
secret key encryption query, then it is not clear how the challenger would still
program the secret key vectors. To get around this problem, we expand our
system such that it consists of λ pairs of 0-query subsystems. Very briefly,
during encryption, the algorithm now also samples a λ-bit string tag randomly
and depending on each bit of tag, it chooses one subsystem in each pair and
runs the 0-query encryption for that subsystem. Now during key generation,
it (linearly) secret shares the starting program across these λ pairs of subsys-
tems such that the same secret share is used for both subsystems in each pair.
Then it runs the 0-query key generation algorithm for all these 2λ subsystems
with their corresponding secret shares as the starting program matrices. For
decryption, the subsystems chosen during encryption are combined with their
counterparts in the secret keys, and 0-query decryption is performed in these
“program” matrices before running EnSamplePre algorithm. For simplicity, we avoid this
modification.
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subsystems along with a (linear) reconstruction on top of the output. More
details are provided in the main body.9
This completes the technical overview of our construction.
Relation to recent LWE-based schemes. There have been several recent
works that have advanced the state of the art in computing branching programs
on encrypted data with the goal of reducing security to LWE or LWE-like
assumptions [71, 37, 15, 81, 39, 80, 117]. While our construction above benefits
from that lineage, we wish to briefly call out a few important distinctions.
First, from a purely mechanical perspective, the construction of our
Mixed FE scheme is structurally very different from the constructions of the
aforementioned primitives. Very briefly, in all previous constructions the eval-
uator multiplies a set of matrices and sums them up to get the final output,
whereas in our construction, we do not use this “one-shot” approach for eval-
uation. Instead, we multiply a component from the ciphertext with a secret
key component, then add in another secret key component, multiply this sum
with another ciphertext component, and so on. Thus, our mechanism of com-
bining the secret key and ciphertext components is much different than what
was used in prior works.10
9We would like to point out that the above idea could also be used to improve the Mixed
FE construction to be q-query secure for any polynomial q. The idea will be to sample
tag strings tag from a larger alphabet instead of {0, 1}. However, we only focus on 1-query
security, as it is sufficient for our result.
10Although one can always express such a nested matrix multiplication and addition
mechanism using only a sequence of matrix multiplications with much larger (and repetitive)
matrices, we point out that the underlying structure of such matrices as well as the modified
42
Second, we structure our proof of security to hardwire the outputs for
keys one level at a time until we hit the final output level in which we have
the final outputs hardwired but lost information about the program that got
us there. In this sense at a high level this leveled programming proof structure
much more closely resembles that of garbled circuit proofs. Thus, we need to
develop new lower LWE-specific techniques to match these goals. In contrast,
works such as [37, 81, 80, 117] have a different aim of losing all meaningful
information when a secret is not known.
2.2 Embedding indentities in traitor tracing
We start by formally defining the notion of embedded identity traitor
tracing (EITT) systems. In order to capture a broader class of traitor trac-
ing systems, we consider three different variants for embedded identity tracing
— (1) indexed EITT, (2) bounded EITT, and (3) full (unbounded) EITT. Al-
though the notion of full/unbounded EITT is the most general notion we define
and therefore it is also likely the most desirable notion, we believe that both
indexed and bounded EITT systems will also find many direct applications as
will be evident later during their descriptions. In addition, we also show direct
connections between all three notions by providing different transformations
among these notions.
Next, we move on to realizing these EITT systems under standard
evaluation algorithm will still be much different from those used in previous works.
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assumptions. To that end, we first introduce a new intermediate primitive
which we call embedded-identity private linear broadcast encryption (EIPLBE)
that we eventually use to build EITT schemes. As the name suggests, the
notion of EIPLBE is inspired by and is an extension of private linear broadcast
encryption (PLBE) schemes. In this work, we show that the above-stated
extension of PLBE systems can be very useful in that it leads to new solutions
for the embedded identity traitor tracing problem.
Finally, we instantiate our EIPLBE scheme under the LWE assumption.
2.2.1 Embedded Identity Traitor Tracing Definitions
Let us first formally recall the notion of standard traitor tracing (i.e.,
without embedding identities in the secret keys). A traitor tracing system
consists of four poly-time algorithms — Setup, Enc, Dec, and Trace. The
setup algorithm takes as input security parameter λ, and number of users n
and generates a public key pk, a tracing key key, and n private keys sk1, . . . , skn.
The encryption algorithm encrypts a message m using public key pk, and the
decryption algorithm decrypts a ciphertext using any one of the private keys
ski. The tracing algorithm takes tracing key key, two messages m0,m1 as
input, and is given (black-box) oracle access to a pirate decoding algorithm
D.11 It outputs a set S ⊆ [n] of users signalling that the keys skj for j ∈ S
11Traditionally, the tracing algorithm was defined to work only if the decoder box could
decrypt encryptions of random messages. However, as discussed in [79], this definition does
not capture many practical scenarios. Therefore we work with a broader abstraction where
the trace algorithm works even if the decoder can only distinguish between encryptions of
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were used to create the pirate decoder D. The security requirements are as
described in the previous section.
Let us now look at how to embed identities in the private user keys such
that the tracing algorithm outputs a set of identities instead. Below we de-
scribe the identity embedding abstractions considered in this work. Through-
out this thesis, κ denotes the length of identities embedded (that is, identity
space is {0, 1}κ).
Indexed EITT. We begin with indexed EITT as the simplest way to in-
troduce identity embedding functionality in the standard TT framework is as
follows. The setup algorithm takes both n and κ as inputs and outputs a mas-
ter secret key msk. Such systems will have a special key generation algorithm
that takes as input msk along with an index-identity pair (i, id) ∈ [n]×{0, 1}κ,
and outputs a user key ski,id. When the i
th user requests a key then it can
supply its identity id, and the authority runs key generation on corresponding
inputs to sample a secret key for that particular user.
Encryption, decryption, and tracing algorithms remain unaffected with
the exception that the tracing algorithm outputs a set of user identities S ⊆
{0, 1}κ instead.12 Now the IND-CPA and secure tracing requirements very
naturally extend to indexed EITT systems with one caveat that the adversary
two specific messages.
12Although one could ask the tracer to output a set of index-identity pairs instead of only
identities, this seems unnecessary as the user index can always be embedded in its identity.
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can only obtain a user key for each index at most once in the traitor tracing
game. Comparing this with standard TT schemes in which each corrupted
user receives a unique private key depending on its index, this constraint on
set of corruptible keys is a natural translation.
Looking carefully at the above abstraction, we observe that using such
indexed systems in practice would seem to resolve the ‘look-up table’ problem
thereby allowing third party tracing, but the problem of statefulness is not yet
completely resolved. Concretely, the key generating authority still needs to
maintain a counter (that is log(n) bits) which represents the number of keys
issued until that point. Basically each time someone queries for a secret key
for identity id, the authority generates a secret key for identity id and index
being the current counter value, and it increments the counter in parallel.
This constraint stems from the fact that for guaranteeing correct tracing it
is essential that the adversary receives at most one key per index i ∈ [n].
Although for a lot of applications indexed EITT might already be sufficient,
it is possible that for others this is still restrictive. To that end, we define
another EITT notion to completely remove the state as follows.
Bounded EITT. The idea behind bounded EITT is that now the input
n given to the setup algorithm represents an upper bound on the number
of keys an adversary is allowed to corrupt while the system still guarantees
correct traceability. And importantly, the key generation algorithm now only
receives an identity id as input instead of an index-identity pair. Thus, the
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authority does not need to maintain the counter, that is it does not need to
keep track of number of users registered. Another point of emphasis is that in
a Bounded EITT system if the number of keys an attacker corrupts exceeds
the setup threshold n, the attacker may avoid being traced; however, even in
this scenario tracing procedure will not falsely indict an non-colluding user. In
addition to being a useful property in its own right, the non-false indictment
property will be critical in amplifying to Unbounded EITT.
Interestingly, we show a generic transformation from any indexed EITT
scheme to a bounded EITT scheme with only a minor efficiency loss. More
details on this transformation are provided towards the end of this section.
Looking ahead, this transformation only relies on the existence of signatures
additionally.
Unbounded EITT. Lastly the most general notion of embedded identity
traitor tracing possible is of systems in which the setup algorithm only takes
κ the length of identities as input, thus there is no upper bound on the num-
ber of admissible corruptions set during setup time. Therefore, the adversary
can possibly corrupt an arbitrary (but polynomial) number of users in the
system. In this work, we additionally provide an efficient unconditional trans-
formation from bounded EITT schemes to unbounded EITT schemes thereby
completely solving the embedded identity tracing problem. More details on
this transformation are also provided towards the end of this section.
Next, we move on to building the indexed EITT schemes under standard
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assumptions. As discussed before, we first introduce the intermediate notion
of EIPLBE.
2.2.2 Embedded-Identity Private Linear Broadcast Encryption
Let us start by recalling the notion of private linear broadcast encryp-
tion (PLBE) [25]. Syntactically, a PLBE scheme is same as a traitor tracing
scheme as in it consists of setup, key generation, encryption, decryption al-
gorithms with the exception that instead of tracing algorithm it provides an
additional encryption algorithm usually referred to as index-encryption algo-
rithm. In PLBE systems, the setup algorithm outputs a public, master secret,
and index-encryption key tuple (pk,msk, key). As in TT systems, the key gen-
eration uses master secret key to sample user private keys skj for any given
index j ∈ [n], while the PLBE encryption algorithm uses the public key to
encrypt messages. The index-encryption algorithm on the other hand uses the
index-encryption key to encrypt messages with respect to an index i. Now
such a ciphertext can be decrypted using skj only if j ≥ i, thus one could con-
sider such ciphertexts as encrypting messages under the comparison predicate
‘≥ i’.
BSW showed that the PLBE framework could be very useful for build-
ing TT systems. An inconvenient limitation of their tracing schema is that
during tracing the algorithm essentially runs a brute force search over set of
user indices {1, 2, . . . , n} to look for traitors. This turns out to be problematic
if we want to embed polynomial length identities in the secret keys. Because
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now the search space for traitors is exponential which turns the above brute
force search mechanism rather useless. Thus it is not very clear whether the
PLBE framework is an accurate abstraction for ‘embedded identity’ TT.
In this work, our intuition is to extend the PLBE framework such that
it becomes more conducive for implementing the embedded identity tracing
functionality in TT systems. Hence, we propose a new PLBE framework
called embedded-identity PLBE. As in PLBE, an EIPLBE scheme consists
of a setup, key generation, encryption, decryption and special-encryption al-
gorithm. (Here special-encryption algorithm is meant to replace/extend the
index-encryption algorithm provided in general PLBE schemes.) Semanti-
cally, the differences between PLBE and EIPLBE are as follows. In EIPLBE,
the user keys are associated with an index-identity pair (j, id). And, special-
encryptions are associated with a index-position-bit tuple (i, `, b), where posi-
tion is a symbol in [κ] ∪ {⊥}. The special-encryption ciphertexts can further
be categorized into two types:
(` = ⊥) In this case the special-encryption ciphertext for index-position-bit
tuple (i, ` = ⊥, b) behaves identical to a PLBE index-encryption to index
i. That is, such ciphertexts can be decrypted using skj,id as long as j ≥ i.
(` 6= ⊥) In this case the ciphertext can be decrypted using skj,id as long as
either j ≥ i+ 1 or (j, id`) = (i, 1− b). In words, these ciphertexts behave
same as a PLBE index-encryption to index i, except decryption by the
users corresponding to index-identity pair (i, id) is also disallowed if `th
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bit of their id matches bit value b.
In short, the special-encryption algorithm (when compared with PLBE index-
encryption) provides an additional capability of disabling decryption ability
of users depending upon a single bit of their identity. The central idea be-
hind introducing this new capability is that it facilitates a simple mechanism
for tracing the identity bit-by-bit. The tracing algorithm runs as a two-step
process where the first phase is exactly same as in the PLBE to TT transfor-
mation which is to trace the indices of corrupt users. This can be executed
as before by using the PLBE functionality of disabling each index one-by-one,
that is estimate successful decryption probability of encryptions to indices in
1 to n+ 1 while keeping position variable ` = ⊥. This is followed by the core
identity tracing phase in which the tracing algorithm performs a sub-search on
each user index i where it noticed a gap in first phase. Basically the sub-search
corresponds to picking a target index obtained during first phase, and then
sequentially testing whether the `th bit in the corrupted identity is zero or one
for all positions ` ∈ [κ]. And, this is where the above additional disabling
capability is used.
Next we discuss the expanded set of security properties required from
EIPLBE. More details on the above transformation are provided afterwards.
normal-hiding. Standard encryptions are indistinguishable from special-encryptions
to (1,⊥, 0).
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index-hiding. Special-encryptions to (i,⊥, 0) are indistinguishable from special-
encryptions to (i + 1,⊥, 0) if an adversary has no secret key for index
i.
lower-ID-hiding. Special-encryptions to (i,⊥, 0) are indistinguishable from
special-encryptions to (i, `, b) if an adversary has no secret key for index
i and identity id such that id` = b.
upper-ID-hiding. Special-encryptions to (i + 1,⊥, 0) are indistinguishable
from special-encryptions to (i, `, b) if an adversary has no secret key for
index i and identity id such that id` = 1− b.
message-hiding. Special-encryptions to (n + 1,⊥, 0) hide the message en-
crypted.
Building Indexed EITT from EIPLBE. The setup, key generation, en-
cryption and decryption algorithms for the tracing scheme are same as that
for the underlying EIPLBE scheme. Let us now look at how to trace identities
from the pirate decoding device. As mentioned before, the tracing proceeds
in two phases — (1) index tracing, followed by (2) identity tracing. The idea
is to first trace the set of indices of the corrupted users, say Sindx ⊆ [n], and
then in the second phase for each index i ∈ Sindx, the tracer will (bit-by-bit)
extract the corresponding identity corrupted. Formally, the tracing proceeds
as follows
Phase 1. For i ∈ [n+ 1], do the following:
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A. Compute polynomially many special-encryptions to index-position-
bit (i,⊥, 0).
B. Run decoder D on each ciphertext individually to test whether it
decrypts correctly or not. Let p̂i denote the fraction of successful
decryptions.
Let Sindx denote the set of indices i of such that p̂i and p̂i+1 are noticeably
far.
Phase 2. Next, for each i ∈ Sindx and ` ∈ [κ], do the following:
A. Compute polynomially many special-encryptions to index-position-
bit (i, `, 0).
B. Run decoder D on each ciphertext individually to test whether it
decrypts correctly or not. Let q̂i,` denote the fraction of successful
decryptions.
Output Phase. Finally, for each i ∈ Sindx, it sets the associated traced iden-
tity id as follows. For each ` ∈ [κ], if p̂i and q̂i,` are noticeably far, then
set `th bit of id to be 0, else sets it to be 1.
Let us now see why this tracing algorithm works. In the above procedure, the
first phase (index tracing) is identical to the PLBE-based tracing algorithm.
Thus, by a similar argument it follows that if i ∈ Sindx, then it suggests that the
decoder D was created using a key corresponding to index-identity pair (i, id)
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for some identity id. (This part of the argument only relies on normal-hiding,
index-hiding and message-hiding security properties.)
The more interesting component of the tracing algorithm is the iden-
tity tracing phase (i.e., phase 2). The idea here is to selectively disable the
decryption ability of users for a fixed index if a particular bit in their identities
is 0. Recall that an adversary can not distinguish between special-encryptions
to tuple (i,⊥, 0) and (i, `, 0) as long as it does not have any secret key for
(i, id) such that id` = 0. This follows from ‘lower-ID-hiding’ property. Sim-
ilarly, an adversary can not distinguish between special-encryptions to tuple
(i + 1,⊥, 0) and (i, `, 0) as long as it does not have any secret key for (i, id)
such that id` = 1. This follows from ‘upper-ID-hiding’ property. Now when-
ever i ∈ Sindx we know that p̂i and p̂i+1 are noticeably far. Also, recall that in
indexed EITT tracing definition the adversary is allowed to key query for at
most one identity per index. Therefore, the estimate q̂i,` will either be close
to p̂i or to p̂i+1, as otherwise one of upper/lower-ID-hiding properties will be
violated. Combining all these observations, we can prove correctness/security
of the above tracing algorithm.
2.2.3 Building EIPLBE from LWE
Our EIPLBE scheme also follows the Mixed FE+ABE approach de-
scribed in the previous section. Here instead of the comparison function, the
Mixed FE ciphertexts in our scheme will be for more expressive functions. In
particular, it suffices to have a Mixed FE scheme where the functions are pa-
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rameterized by (y∗, `∗, b∗), and it checks if input (y, id) either satisfies y > y∗,
or y = y∗ and id` 6= b∗. Since such simple functions can be implemented in
log-depth, we can use the ABE+Mixed FE approach for building EIPLBE as
well.
2.2.4 Indexed Embedded-Identity TT to Bounded Embedded-Identity
TT
In this part, we discuss our transformation from a tracing scheme with
indexed key generation to one where there is no index involved, but the correct
trace guarantee holds only if total number of keys is less than an apriori set
bound. For technical reasons we require the bounded EITT system to pro-
vide a stronger false tracing guarantee, which states there should be no false
trace even if the adversary obtains an unbounded (but polynomial) number of
keys. Looking ahead, this property will be crucial for the transformation from
bounded EITT to its unbounded counterpart.
The high-level idea is to have λ different strands, and in each strand,
we have a separate indexed-system with a large enough index bound (that
depends on the bound on number of keys n). When generating a key, we choose
λ random indices (within the index bound) and generate λ different keys for
the same identity in the different strands using the respective randomly chosen
indices. Now, we will set the index bound to be n2, and as a result, at least one
strand has all distinct indices (with overwhelming probability). To (special-
)encrypt a message, we secret-share the message in the λ different strands, and
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encrypt them separately. This approach satisfies the correct-trace guarantee,
but does not satisfy the false-trace guarantee. In particular, note that the
false-trace guarantee should hold even if the number of key queries is more
than the query bound. This means the underlying indexed scheme should not
report a false trace even if there are multiple identities for a index, which is
a strictly stronger false-trace guarantee for the underlying system (and our
system does not satisfy it).
There is an elegant fix to this issue. Instead of generating keys for the
queried identity id, the key generation algorithm now generates a signature on
id, and generates keys for (id, σ). This fixes the false-trace issue. Even if an
adversary queries for many secret keys, if it is able to produce a decoding box
that can implicate a honest user, then that means this box is able to forge
signatures, thereby breaking the signature scheme’s security. We describe the
scheme a little more formally now.
To build a tracing scheme with bound n, the setup algorithm chooses λ
different public/secret/tracing keys for the indexed scheme with index bound
set to be n2. The setup algorithm also chooses a signature key/verification
key. It sets the λ different public keys and the verification key to be the new
public key, and similarly the master secret key has the λ different master secret
keys and the signature key. Encryption of a message m works as follows: the
encryption algorithm chooses λ shares of the message, and then encrypts the
ith share under the ith public key. To compute a secret key for identity id, the
key generation algorithm first chooses λ different indices j1, . . . , jλ. It then
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computes a signature σ on id, and generates a key for (id, σ) using each of the
λ master secret keys with the corresponding indices. The tracing algorithm
uses the underlying indexed scheme’s trace algorithm to obtain a set of (id, σ)
tuples. It then checks if σ is a valid signature on id; if so, it outputs id as a
traitor.
Now, suppose an adversary queries for t(< n) secret keys, and outputs
a decoding box D. Let ji,k denote the k
th index chosen for the ith secret key.
With high probability, there exists an index k∗ ∈ [λ] such that the set of
indices {j1,k∗ , j2,k∗ , . . . , jt,k∗} are all distinct. As a result, using the correct-
tracing guarantee of the underlying tracing scheme for the k∗ strand, we can
extract at least one tuple (id, σ).
Next, we need to argue the false trace guarantee. This follows mainly
from the security of the signature scheme. Suppose an adversary receives a
set of keys corresponding to an identity set I, and outputs a decoding box D.
If trace outputs an identity id /∈ I, then this means the sub-trace algorithm
output a tuple (id, σ) such that σ is a valid signature on id. As a result, σ
is a forgery on message id (because the adversary did not query for a key
corresponding to id).
2.2.5 Bounded Embedded-Identity TT to Unbounded Embedded-
Identity TT
The final component is to transform a tracing system for bounded keys
to one with no bound on the number of keys issued. For this transformation
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to be efficient, it is essential that the underlying bounded EITT scheme to
have ciphertexts with polylogarithmic dependence on the key bound n. The
reason is that our core idea is to have λ (bounded) EITT systems running in
parallel, where the ith system runs the bounded tracing scheme with bound
ni = 2
i, and if the ciphertext size does not scale polylogarithmically with the
bound ni, then this transformation would not work.
13
More formally, the setup algorithm runs the bounded system’s setup λ
times, the ith iteration run with bound ni = 2
i. It sets the public key (resp.
master secret key and the tracing key) to be the λ public keys (resp. the λ
different master secret keys and the tracing keys). The encryption algorithm
secret shares the message into λ shares, and encrypts the ith share using the
ith public key. The key generation algorithm computes λ different secret keys.
Finally, the tracing algorithm runs the bounded system’s trace algorithm,
one by one, until it finds a traitor. First, note that since the adversary is
polynomially bounded, if it queries for t keys, then there exists some i∗ such
that t ≤ 2i∗ < 2t. As a result, the trace is guaranteed to find a traitor in the
i∗th system, and hence it runs in time poly(2i
∗
) = poly(t). Second, since every
underlying bounded system’s false trace guarantee holds even if the adversary
queries for more keys than permitted, thus none of the premature sub-traces
result in a false trace. At a very high level, the central observation here that
allows us in avoiding the need for adaptive security is that: while tracing
13Due to similar reasons, it is essential that the running time of all algorithms (except
possibly the tracing algorithm) grows at most polylogarithmically with n.
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we simply perform the “tighest” fit search for finding the smallest polynomial
bound on keys corrupted and then carry out the tracing procedure rather than
tracing on an exponential sized space directly. Similar techniques of combining
different bounded adversary instances, and invoking the security of the instance
with just high enough security were used previously in [17, 61].
2.3 Some future directions
Our construction of Mixed FE relied on the LWE assumption and lever-
aged certain algebraic properties in that setting. An intriguing question is
whether there are other avenues for achieving Mixed FE. A natural path is to
build Mixed FE with a garbled circuits [118] backbone. If one starts with the
bounded key functional encryption scheme of Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan, and
Wee (GVW) [75] and flips [4, 35, 92] the semantics of message and function,
one can get a secret key functional encryption scheme that is secure for an
unbounded number of private keys and bounded number of ciphertexts. To
make it a Mixed FE system we would somehow connect a public key mode of
encryption to the scheme. One possible path is to use a “blinded” [34] form
of garbled circuits as the underlying 1-query scheme in the GVW transforma-
tion. (Building on [60, 64], blinded garbled circuits were recently used to give
anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) from new assumptions). It seems
possible that this approach could lead to a scheme with the accept indistin-
guishability property if no encryption oracle queries are allowed. However,
there appears to be technical difficulties in making a public key–generated ci-
58
phertext indistinguishable from a master secret key–generated ciphertext when
the attacker gets oracle queries. That being said, we believe that a garbled
circuit approach remains a plausible future direction.
We remark that even if a garbled circuit approach becomes possible,
the requirement for an ABE scheme supporting circuits will still indirectly
require the LWE assumption given the state of the art. In addition, we expect
that our LWE toolkit and underlying construction ideas will have future value
in any case.
Another interesting direction is whether there are other applications
that can leverage a functional encryption system that has a bimodal encryption
where the public key and master secret key support different spaces of messages
or functions. In our Mixed FE system the public key only supported the always
accept function, but there could conceivably be other variants of interest.
Finally, a natural open question is to construct traitor tracing schemes
with public traceability from LWE. Currently, it is unclear if achieving public
tracing is an easier task than building general public key functional encryption.
2.4 Additional related work
Weaker notions of traitor tracing Since the notion of traitor tracing
(TT) was first proposed [47], several relaxed variants have been studied in
order to achieve short ciphertexts. The first natural relaxation is the bounded
collusion setting, where we have an a priori bound k that is fixed during
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setup, and security is guaranteed only if the adversary gets at most k secret
keys. Collusion bounded systems can either be constructed via combinatorial
tools [47, 116, 48, 115, 106, 14] or be algebraic and constructed under different
cryptographic assumptions such as DDH [93, 19, 90, 94], bilinear DDH [41,
1, 65], and LWE [95]. Recently, Agrawal et al. [2] showed a transformation
from inner product functional encryption to collusion-bounded TT, resulting
in algebraic constructions based on various assumptions such as DCR, DDH,
and LWE. In all the above works, the size of the ciphertext grows with the
collusion bound.
The second relaxation is called threshold TT, introduced by [101, 48].
In a threshold TT scheme, a threshold δ ∈ [0, 1] is chosen during setup, and
the traceability guarantee only holds if the decoder box works with probability
at least δ. Boneh and Naor [24] showed a threshold TT scheme where the
ciphertexts have size O(λ) and the secret keys have size O(n2λ/δ2). While
this scheme achieves collusion resistance, the system must be configured with
a specific δ value, and once it is set, one will not necessarily be able to identify
a traitor from a box D that works with smaller probability. In practice, it can
be tricky to ascertain what threshold will actually be okay. This is because
the encrypted messages could have redundancy, so even a decoder box with
a small fraction of success might allow an attacker to learn the underlying
message.
Finally, in a recent work, Goyal et al. [79] introduced a new relaxation
called risky traitor tracing. In this notion, the scheme is fully collusion resistant
60
(and does not have the threshold restriction as above). Instead, the probability
of tracing a traitor, given a successful decoding box, can be substantially
smaller than 1. For instance, [79] showed a bilinear maps–based construction
where the ciphertext size grows as λ · k, but the trace algorithm has only a
k/n chance of catching a traitor. The authors show that this weaker notion is
actually enough to achieve strong hardness results for differential privacy [62,
63] and also argue that in a certain “continuous use” setting, the probability
of tracing can be amplified back up to one. However, in general settings, the
Goyal et al. tradeoff between the probability of catching a traitor and the size
of ciphertexts might be undesirable.
Connections to differential privacy Dwork et al. [63] showed that ex-
istence of collusion resistant traitor tracing schemes implies hardness results
for efficient differentially private [62] data sanitization. In particular, they
showed that if there exists a traitor tracing scheme with ciphertexts of size
s(λ, n), then there exist a database of size n and a query class Q of size 2s(λ,n)
such that it is hard to sanitize the database D for query class Q in a dif-
ferentially private manner. Combining our LWE-based construction with the
result of Dwork et al. , we get an LWE-based hardness result for differentially
private sanitization with query space of size 2poly(λ,logn). We note that Goyal
et al. [79] and Kowalczyk et al. [92] recently achieved better differential pri-
vacy impossibility results from the security of bilinear map assumptions and
one-way functions, respectively.
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Concurrent work. Concurrent to our work, Chen, Vaikuntanathan, and
Wee [43] also proposed a simplified variant of our row-removal and target
switching properties. They used these properties for constructing lockable
obfuscation schemes [80, 117] for nonpermutation branching programs. How-
ever, their properties are weaker than the ones we define/construct in this
work. In particular, their constructions do not allow the adversary to make
any preimage queries.
Combining ABE with other primitives. Our transformation from Mixed
FE to PLBE using ABE has some high-level similarities to the predicate en-
cryption scheme of Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan, and Wee [77] and the single-
key functional encryption scheme of Goldwasser et al. [74]. In both these cases,
we have specialized encryption schemes whose ciphertext serves as an attribute





Let PPT denote probabilistic polynomial time. We will use lowercase
bold letters for vectors (e.g., v) and uppercase bold letters for matrices (e.g.,
A), and we assume all vectors are row vectors. The jth row of a matrix A is
denoted by A[j]. For any integer q ≥ 2, we let Zq denote the ring of integers
modulo q. We represent Zq as integers in the range (−q/2, q/2]. For a vector
v, we let ‖v‖ denote its `2 norm and ‖v‖∞ denote its infinity norm. Similarly,
for matrices, ‖·‖ and ‖·‖∞ denote their `2 and infinity norms, respectively.
We denote the set of all positive integers up to n as [n] := {1, . . . , n}.
Throughout this paper, unless specified, all polynomials we consider are pos-
itive polynomials. Also, we represent each finite set on integers S ⊂ N as an
ordered set S = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, i.e., ij < ik for every 1 ≤ j < k ≤ n. For
any finite set S, x ← S denotes a uniformly random element x from the set
S. Similarly, for any distribution D, x← D denotes an element x drawn from
distribution D. The distribution Dn is used to represent a distribution over
vectors of n components, where each component is drawn independently from
the distribution D.
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For two distributions X, Y , over a finite domain Ω, the statistical dis-





ω∈Ω |X(ω) − Y (ω)|. A
family of distributions D1 = {D1(λ)}λ and D2 = {D2(λ)}λ, parameterized
by security parameter λ, are said to be statistically indistinguishable, repre-
sented by D1 ≈s D2, if there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that,
for all λ ∈ N, SD(D1(λ),D2(λ)) ≤ negl(λ). For a family of distributions
D = {D(λ)}λ over the integers, and integer bounds B = {B(λ)}λ, we say
that D is B-bounded if Pr[|x| ≤ B(λ) : x ← D(λ)] = 1. In words, a B-
bounded distribution is supported only on the range [−B,B]. Below we state
the “smudging” lemma as it appears in prior works.
Lemma 3.1.1 (Smudging Lemma [9, Lemma 2.1, paraphrased]). Let B1, B2
be two polynomials over the integers, and let D = {D(λ)}λ be any B1-bounded
distribution family. Let U = {U(λ)}λ and U(λ) denote the uniform distribu-
tion over integers [−B2(λ), B2(λ)]. The family of distributions D and U is
statistically indistinguishable, D+U ≈s U , if there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, B1(λ)/B2(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
3.2 Lattice preliminaries
An m-dimensional lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Rm.
Given positive integers n,m, q and a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , we let Λ⊥q (A) de-
note the lattice {x ∈ Zm : A · xT = 0T mod q}. For u ∈ Znq , we let Λuq (A)
denote the coset {x ∈ Zm : A · xT = uT mod q}.
64
Discrete Gaussians Let σ be any positive real number. The Gaussian
distribution Dσ with parameter σ is defined by the probability distribution
function ρσ(x) = exp(−π ‖x‖2 /σ2). For any set L ⊂ Rm, define ρσ(L) =∑
x∈L ρσ(x). The discrete Gaussian distribution DL,σ over L with parameter
σ is defined by the probability distribution function ρL,σ(x) = ρσ(x)/ρσ(L) for
all x ∈ L.
The following lemma (Lemma 4.4 of [97], [72]) shows that if the pa-
rameter σ of a discrete Gaussian distribution is small, then any vector drawn
from this distribution will be short (with high probability).




m · σ : x← DL,σ : A← Zn×mq ,L = Λ⊥q (A)] ≤ negl(n).
Truncated discrete Gaussians The truncated discrete Gaussian distribu-
tion over Zm with parameter σ, denoted by D̃Zm,σ, is the same as the discrete
Gaussian distribution DZm,σ except it outputs 0 whenever the `∞ norm ex-
ceeds
√
m ·σ. Note that, by definition, D̃Zm,σ is
√
m ·σ-bounded. Also, by the
above lemma we get that D̃Zm,σ ≈s DZm,σ.
3.2.1 Learning with errors
The learning with errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [107],
who showed that solving LWE on average is as hard as quantumly solving sev-
eral standard lattice-based problems in the worst case. The LWE assumption
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states that no polynomial time adversary can distinguish between the follow-
ing oracles. In one case, the oracle chooses a uniformly random secret s, and
for each query, it chooses a vector a uniformly at random, scalar e from a noise
distribution, and outputs (a, s · aT + e). In the second case, the oracle sim-
ply outputs a uniformly random vector a together with a uniformly random
scalar u. Regev showed that if there exists a polynomial time adversary that
can break the LWE assumption, then there exists a polynomial time quantum
algorithm that can solve some hard lattice problems in the worst case.
Several works also explored different variants of the LWE assumption,
where the secret vector s, public vectors a, and noise are drawn from different
distributions. In this work, we will be using two of these variants. First, we
will be using the LWE version with short secrets (also known as the normal
form), introduced by Applebaum et al. [8]. In this variant, the secret vector
s is also drawn from the noise distribution. Applebaum et al. showed that
this version is as hard as the LWE problem if the modulus is pe for some prime
p and integer e. This was later generalized to all moduli by Brakerski et al.
[33]. The second variant, which was proposed by Boneh et al. [23], allows the
public vectors a to be chosen from the noise distribution as well. Boneh et al.
showed that this version of LWE is as hard as standard LWE.
We will first present the LWE assumption in a general framework,1
1Canetti and Chen [39] proposed the general LWE problem. However, their version
requires the public vectors to be sampled from a uniform distribution, whereas we require
the public vectors to be sampled from nonuniform distributions. Also, it is possible to
generalize our version further. Here, we present the minimal generalization that suffices for
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which captures the standard LWE, LWE with short secrets, and LWE with
short public vectors. In this framework, we will have an explicit security
parameter λ, and the other parameters are allowed to grow as a function of
the security parameter.
Definition 3.2.1 (generalized learning with errors). Fix any polynomial n(·),
function q(·), secret distribution η(·), public vector distribution φ(·), and noise
distribution χ(·), where n : N → N, q : N → N and for each λ ∈ N, η(λ) and
φ(λ) are distributions over Zn(λ)q(λ) and χ(λ) is a distribution over Z. We say that
the generalized LWE assumption GLWEn,q,η,φ,χ holds if for any PPT adversary
A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, q = q(λ),
n = n(λ), η = η(λ), φ = φ(λ), and χ = χ(λ), Advn,q,η,φ,χGLWE,A (λ) ≤ negl(λ), where











and oracles Os1(), O2() are defined as follows: oracle O
s
1() has s ∈ Znq hardwired,
and on each query it chooses a← φ, e← χ and outputs
(
a, s · aT + e mod q
)
,
and oracle O2() (on each query) chooses a← φ, u← Zq and outputs (a, u).
We now present different variants of the LWE assumption and discuss
the parameters for which they are believed to be secure.
Assumption 1 (learning with errors). Let n : N→ N be a polynomial, and let
q : N → N, σ : N → R+ be functions. The LWEn,q,σ assumption states that




The following theorem shows that breaking LWE is as hard as solving
hard lattice problems. In particular, given the current state of the art of lattice
problems, the LWE assumption is believed to be true for any polynomial n(·)
and functions q(·), σ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, n = n(λ), q = q(λ), σ = σ(λ),
the following constraints are satisfied: 0 < σ < q < 2n, n · q/σ < 2nε (for any
constant ε < 1), and σ > 2
√
n.
Theorem 3.2.1 (LWE to worst-case lattice problem [107, 105, 33]). Fix any
polynomial n(·) and functions q(·), σ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, n = n(λ),
q = q(λ), σ = σ(λ), 0 < σ < q < 2n, and σ > 2
√
n. For every λ ∈ N,
let η = η(λ) and φ = φ(λ) denote the uniform distributions over Znq and
χ = χ(λ) ≡ DZ,σ. If there exist a PPT algorithm A and a nonnegligible
function εA(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, Advn,q,η,φ,χGLWE,A (λ) ≥ εA(λ), then there exist
a PPT algorithm B and a nonnegligible function εB(·) such that for all λ ∈ N
and all instances X of GapSVPn,n·q/σ, B can solve X with probability at least
εB(λ).
Assumption 2 (LWE with short secrets). Let n : N→ N be a polynomial, and
let q : N → N, σ : N → R+ be functions. The LWE-ssn,q,σ assumption states
that GLWEn,q,η,φ,χ holds, where φ(λ) is the uniform distributions over Zn(λ)q(λ) ,
η(λ) ≡ DZn(λ),√2σ(λ), and χ(λ) ≡ DZ,σ(λ).
The next theorem shows that breaking LWE with short secrets is as
hard as breaking (standard) LWE, provided 0 < σ(λ) < q(λ) < 2n(λ) and
σ(λ) > λ.
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Theorem 3.2.2 (LWE with short secrets [8, Lemma 2], [33, Lemma 2.12]). Fix
any polynomial n(·) and functions q(·), σ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, n = n(λ),
q = q(λ), σ = σ(λ), 0 < σ < q < 2n, and σ > λ.2 For every λ ∈ N, let η(λ) ≡
DZnq ,
√
2σ, let φ(λ) be the uniform distribution over Znq , and let χ(λ) ≡ DZ,σ. If
there exist a PPT algorithm A and a nonnegligible function εA(·) such that for
all λ ∈ N, Advn,q,η,φ,χGLWE,A (λ) ≥ εA(λ), then there exist a PPT algorithm B and a
nonnegligible function εB(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, Advn,q,φ,φ,χGLWE,B (λ) ≥ εB(λ).
Assumption 3 (LWE with short public vectors). Let n : N → N be a polyno-
mial, let q : N→ N, σ : N→ R+ be functions, and let {χ(λ)}λ∈N be the family
of distributions over Z. The LWE-spn,q,σ,χ assumption states that GLWEn,q,η,φ,χ
holds, where η(λ) is the uniform distributions over Zn(λ)q(λ) , φ(λ) ≡ DZn(λ),σ(λ).
The last theorem in this sequence shows a reduction from LWE with
short public vectors to (standard) LWE with a lower dimension.
Theorem 3.2.3 (LWE with short public vectors [23, Corollary 4.6]). Fix
any polynomials n(·), k(·) and functions q(·), σ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
n = n(λ), q = q(λ), k = k(λ), σ = σ(λ), 0 < σ < q < 2n, k ≥ 6n log q,
and σ ≥
√
n log q. For every λ ∈ N, let φ(λ) ≡ DZkq ,σ, and let η(λ), φ
′(λ)
denote the uniform distributions over Zkq and Znq , respectively. Now for any
distribution χ(λ) over Z, if there exist a PPT algorithm A and a nonnegligible
function εA(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, Advk,q,η,φ,χGLWE,A (λ) ≥ εA(λ), then there exist




a PPT algorithm B and a nonnegligible function εB(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
Advn,q,φ
′,φ′,χ
GLWE,B (λ) ≥ εB(λ).
3.2.2 Lattice trapdoors
Lattices with trapdoors are lattices that are indistinguishable from ran-
domly chosen lattices, but have certain “trapdoors” that allow efficient solu-
tions to hard lattice problems.
A trapdoor lattice sampler [6, 72] consists of algorithms TrapGen and
SamplePre with the following syntax and properties:
• TrapGen(1n, 1m, q) → (A, TA): The lattice generation algorithm is a
randomized algorithm that takes as input the matrix dimensions n,m,
modulus q, and outputs a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq together with a trapdoor
TA.
• SamplePre(A, TA, σ,u)→ s: The presampling algorithm takes as input a
matrix A, trapdoor TA, a vector u ∈ Znq , and a parameter σ ∈ R (which
determines the length of the output vectors).3 It outputs a vector s ∈ Zmq
such that A · sT = uT and ‖s‖ ≤
√
m · σ.
We require these algorithms to satisfy the following well-sampledness
properties. While these properties are similar in spirit to the ones in previous
3Note that the preimage sampling algorithm could be easily generalized to generate
preimages of matrices in Zn×kq (for any k) by independently running SamplePre algorithm
on each column of the matrix. Throughout this work, we overload the notation by directly
giving matrices U ∈ Zn×kq as inputs to the SamplePre algorithm.
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works on lattice trapdoors [6, 72, 96], there are a couple of differences. First,
we present these properties as a security game between a challenger and a
computationally bounded adversary.4 Second, we separate out the dimensions
of the matrix and the security parameter.
The first property (well-sampledness of matrix) states that the matrix
output by TrapGen should look like a uniformly random matrix.
Definition 3.2.2 (well-sampledness of matrix). Fix any function q : N→ N.
A pair of trapdoor generation algorithms T = (TrapGen, SamplePre) is said
to satisfy the q-well-sampledness of matrix property if for any stateful PPT
adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈
N, q = q(λ), prmatrix,qT,A (λ) = Pr[1 ← Expt
matrix,q
T,A (λ)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(λ), where
Exptmatrix,qT,A (λ) is defined in Figure 3.1.
Exptmatrix,qT,A (λ)
1. Adversary A receives input 1λ and sends 1n, 1m such that m >
n log q(λ) + λ.
2. Challenger chooses b ← {0, 1} and (A0, TA) ← TrapGen(1n, 1m, q)
and A1 ← Zn×mq . It sends Ab to the adversary.
3. A outputs its guess b′. The experiment outputs 1 iff b = b′.
Figure 3.1: Experiment Exptmatrix,qT,A
The next property states that the preimage of a uniformly random vec-
4In some cases, we can consider computationally unbounded adversaries if the inputs of
the adversary are polynomially bounded.
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tor/matrix is indistinguishable from a matrix with entries drawn from Gaus-
sian distribution.
Definition 3.2.3 (preimage sampling). Fix any functions q : N→ N and σ :
N → N. A pair of trapdoor generation algorithms T = (TrapGen, SamplePre)
is said to satisfy the (q, σ)-preimage sampling property if for any stateful PPT
adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
q = q(λ), σ = σ(λ), prpreimg,q,σT,A (λ) = Pr[1← Expt
preimg,q,σ
T,A (λ)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(λ),
where Exptpreimg,q,σT,A (λ) is defined in Figure 3.2.
Exptpreimg,q,σT,A (λ)
1. Adversary A receives input 1λ and sends 1n, 1m, 1k such that σ(λ) >√
n · log q · logm+ λ and m > n log q(λ) + λ.
2. Challenger chooses b ← {0, 1} and (A, TA) ← TrapGen(1n, 1m, q);
Z← Zn×kq , U0 ← SamplePre(A, TA, σ,Z) and U1 ← Dm×kZ,σ . It sends
(A,Ub) to the adversary.
3. A outputs its guess b′. The experiment outputs 1 iff b = b′.
Figure 3.2: Experiment Exptpreimg,q,σT,A
These properties are satisfied by the trapdoor-based preimage samplers
of [72, 96].
3.3 Branching programs
Branching programs are a model of computation used to capture space-
bounded computations [30, 13]. In this work, we will be working with leveled
branching programs.
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Definition 3.3.1 (leveled branching program). A leveled branching program
of length L, width w, and input space {0, 1}n consists of a sequence of 2L
functions πi,b : [w]→ [w] for 1 ≤ i ≤ L, b ∈ {0, 1}, an input selection function
inp : [L] → [n], an accepting state acc ∈ [w], and a rejection state rej ∈ [w].
The starting state st0 is set to be 1 without loss of generality. The branching
program evaluation on input x ∈ {0, 1}n proceeds as follows:
• For i = 1 to L,
– Let pos = inp(i) and b = xpos. Compute sti = πi,b(sti−1).
• If stL = acc, output 1. If stL = rej, output 0, else output ⊥.
Additionally, we also define a notion of “input-circling” (leveled) branch-
ing programs. In an input-circling branching program, the input bits are read
sequentially in ascending order (i.e., 1, . . . , n, 1, . . .). Thus, the input-selector
function inp is fixed. Additionally, each bit must be read the same number of
times. Formally, we describe this as follows.
Definition 3.3.2. A branching program BP =
(
{πi,b : [w]→ [w]}i∈[L],b∈{0,1} ,
acc ∈ [w], rej ∈ [w]
)
with input space {0, 1}n is said to be a input-circling
branching program if for all i ≤ L, inp(i) = ((i−1) mod n)+1, and L mod n =
0.
Any leveled branching program of length L and input space {0, 1}n can
be easily transformed to an input-circling branching program of length n · L.
Here, we work with classes of branching programs that all share the same
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input selector function inp(·) which is known during setup. The input selector
as described above is just one possibility, and we stick with it for simplicity.
Note that we do not require the transition functions πi,b to be permutations.
3.4 Public-key encryption and signatures
Public-key encryption A public key encryption scheme PKE with message
space M consists of three algorithms Setup, Enc and Dec with the following
syntax:
Setup(1λ)→ (pk, sk) The setup algorithm takes as input the security param-
eter 1λ and outputs a public key pk and secret key sk.
Enc(pk,m ∈ M) → ct The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key
pk and a message m ∈M and outputs a ciphertext ct.
Dec(sk, ct)→ x ∈M∪ {⊥} The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret
key sk, ciphertext ct and outputs x ∈M ∪ {⊥}.
Correctness For correctness, we require that for all security parameters λ,
(pk, sk)← Setup(1λ) and messages m ∈M, Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m)) = m.
Definition 3.4.1 (IND-CPA Security). A public key encryption scheme PKE =
(Setup,Enc,Dec) is said to be IND-CPA secure if for all security parameters λ,
stateful PPT adversaries A, Advind-cpaA,PKE (λ) is negligible in λ, where advantage
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of A is defined as
Advind-cpaA,PKE (λ) = Pr
[
A(ct) = b :
(pk, sk)← Setup(1λ); b← {0, 1}
(m0,m1)← A(pk); ct← Enc(pk,mb)
]
.
Signature schemes A signature scheme S = (Setup, Sign,Verify) with mes-
sage space M consists of three algorithms, as follows:
Setup(1λ) is a randomized algorithm that takes security parameter λ as input
and returns a pair of keys (sk, vk), where sk is the signing key and vk is
the verification key.
Sign(sk,m) is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes as input the signing
key sk, and a message m, and returns a signature σ.
Verify(vk,m, σ) is a determistic algorithm that takes as input the verification
key vk, a message m, and a signature σ, and outputs 1 (accepts) if
verification succeeds, and 0 (rejects) otherwise.
Correctness A signature scheme S must satisfy the following correctness
requirement: For all λ ∈ N, m ∈ M, and signing/verification keys (sk, vk) ←
Setup(1λ)
Verify (vk,m, Sign(sk,m)) = 1.
Definition 3.4.2. A signature scheme S = (Setup, Sign,Verify) is a secure
signature scheme if for every PPT attacker A there exists a negligible function
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Verify(vk,m∗, σ∗) = 1 :
(sk, vk)← Setup(1λ)
(m∗, σ∗) = ASign(sk,·)(1λ, vk)
]
,
and A should never have queried m∗ to Sign oracle.
3.5 Key-policy attribute-based encryption
A key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme ABE, for a
set of attribute spaces X = {Xκ}κ, predicate classes C = {Cκ}κ, and message
spaces M = {Mκ}κ, consists of four polytime algorithms (Setup,Enc,KeyGen,Dec)
with the following syntax:
• Setup(1λ, 1κ) → (pp,msk). The setup algorithm takes as input the se-
curity parameter λ and a functionality index κ. It outputs the public
parameters pp and the master secret key msk.
• Enc(pp, x,m) → ct. The encryption algorithm takes as input public
parameters pp, an attribute x ∈ Xκ, and a message m ∈Mκ. It outputs
a ciphertext ct.
• KeyGen(msk, C) → skC . The key generation algorithm takes as input
master secret key msk and a predicate C ∈ Cκ. It outputs a secret key
skC .
• Dec(skC , ct)→ m or ⊥. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret
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key skC and a ciphertext ct. It outputs either a message m ∈ Mκ or a
special symbol ⊥.
Correctness A KP-ABE scheme is said to be correct if there exist negligible
functions negl1(·), negl2(·) such that for all λ, κ ∈ N, for all x ∈ Xκ, C ∈ Cκ,
m ∈Mκ, the following holds:
C(x) = 1⇒ Pr
Dec(skC , ct) = m : (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);skC ← KeyGen(msk, C);
ct← Enc(pp, x,m)
 ≥ 1− negl1(λ),
C(x) = 0⇒ Pr
Dec(skC , ct) = ⊥ (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);skC ← KeyGen(msk, C);
ct← Enc(pp, x,m)
 ≥ 1− negl2(λ).
Security The standard notion of security for a KP-ABE scheme is that of
full or adaptive security. It is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.5.1. A KP-ABE scheme ABE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) is
said to be fully secure if for every stateful PPT adversary A there exists a
negligible function negl(·), such that for every λ ∈ N the following holds:
Pr
AKeyGen(msk,·)(ct) = b : 1κ ← A(1λ); (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);((m0,m1), x)← AKeyGen(msk,·)(pp);





where every predicate query C, made by adversary A to the KeyGen(msk, ·)
oracle, must satisfy the condition that C(x) = 0.
In this work, we only require the scheme to achieve selective security,
which is formally defined as follows.
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Definition 3.5.2. A KP-ABE scheme ABE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) is
said to be selectively secure if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists
a negligible function negl(·), such that for every λ ∈ N the following holds:
Pr
AKeyGen(msk,·)(ct) = b : (1κ, x)← A(1λ); (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);(m0,m1)← AKeyGen(msk,·)(pp);





where every predicate query C, made by adversary A to the KeyGen(msk, ·)
oracle, must satisfy the condition that C(x) = 0.
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Chapter 4
Traitor tracing and Mixed functional
encryption
In this chapter, we first present the syntax and security definitions for
traitor tracing schemes. We follow that by introducing the notion of mixed
functional encryption (Mixed FE) which is the most crucial component towards
building traitor tracing systems.
4.1 Traitor tracing
The notion of traitor tracing was introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [47].
In a TT scheme for n parties, the setup algorithm chooses a master secret key,
a public key, and n secret keys for the users. Encryption can be performed
using the public key, and each user can decrypt the ciphertext using his/her
secret key. There is also a trace algorithm that, given black box access to a
successful pirate decoding box, can catch the traitors who colluded to create
the pirate decoding box. Traditional definitions of traitor tracing [47, 25] re-
quired that the trace algorithm must catch a traitor if a pirate decoding box
can decrypt an encryption of a random ciphertext. In this work, we will be
using the indistinguishability-based definition introduced by Goyal et al. [79],
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which is itself based on the definition introduced by Nishimaki, Wichs, and
Zhandry [104]. In this definition, the trace algorithm must catch a traitor
even if the pirate decoder box can only distinguish between encryptions of two
adversarially chosen messages.
Public key traitor tracing A traitor tracing scheme T with message space
M = {Mλ}λ consists of four PPT algorithms, Setup,Enc,Dec, and Trace, with
the following syntax:
• Setup(1λ, 1n) → (msk, pk, (sk1, . . . , skn)) . The setup algorithm takes as
input the security parameter λ and number of users n and outputs a
master secret key msk, a public key pk, and n secret keys sk1, sk2, . . . , skn.
• Enc(pk,m ∈Mλ)→ ct. The encryption algorithm takes as input a public
key pk and message m ∈Mλ and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• Dec(sk, ct)→ y. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk
and ciphertext ct and outputs y ∈Mλ ∪ {⊥}.
• TraceD(msk, 1y,m0,m1)→ T. The trace algorithm has oracle access to a
program D; it takes as input a master secret key msk, parameter y (in
unary), and two messages m0,m1. It outputs a set T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Correctness Informally, a correctness requirement states that decrypting an
encryption of message m using any one of the valid secret keys must output
m. Formally, a TT scheme is said to be correct if there exists a negligible
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Dec(ski, ct) = m :




Security There are two security requirements for a TT scheme. First, it
is required that it satisfy IND-CPA security. Second, it is required that the
tracing algorithm must (almost always) correctly trace at least one key used
to create a pirate decoding box (whenever the pirate box successfully decrypts
with noticeable probability) and also should not falsely accuse any user of
cheating. The formal definitions are provided below.
Definition 4.1.1 (IND-CPA security). A TT scheme T = (Setup, Enc, Dec,
Trace) is IND-CPA secure if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr
A(ct) = b : 1n ← A(1λ); b← {0, 1};(msk, pk, (sk1, . . . , skn))← Setup(1λ, 1n);




Definition 4.1.2 (ind-secure traitor tracing). Let T = (Setup,Enc,Dec,Trace)
be a TT scheme. For any nonnegligible function ε(·) and PPT adversary A,
consider the experiment Expt-TTTA,ε(λ) defined in Figure 4.1.
Based on the above experiment, we now define the following (proba-
bilistic) events and the corresponding probabilities (which are functions of λ,
parameterized by A, ε):
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Experiment Expt-TTTA,ε(λ)
• 1n ← A(1λ).
• (msk, pk, (sk1, . . . , skn))← Setup(1λ, 1n).
• (D,m0,m1)← AO(·)(pk).
• T ← TraceD(msk, 11/ε(λ),m0,m1).
Here, O(·) is an oracle that has {ski}i∈[n] hardwired, takes as input an
index i ∈ [n], and outputs ski. Let S be the set of indices queried by A.
Figure 4.1: Experiment Expt-TT
• Good-Decoder: Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← Enc(pk,mb)] ≥ 1/2 + ε(λ).
Pr -G-DA,ε(λ) = Pr[Good-Decoder].
• Cor-Tr: T 6= ∅ ∧ T ⊆ S.
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Cor-Tr].
• Fal-Tr: T 6⊆ S.
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Fal-Tr].
A TT scheme T is said to be ind-secure if for every PPT adversary A,
polynomial q(·), and nonnegligible function ε(·), there exist negligible functions
negl1(·), negl2(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ) the following
hold:
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) ≤ negl1(λ), Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl2(λ).
Remark 4.1.1 (ind-secure tracing implies IND-CPA). We would like to point
out that the if a traitor tracing scheme satisfies ind-secure tracing property
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as described in Definition 4.1.2, then it also satisfies the IND-CPA security
requirement (Definition 4.1.1). This follows from a simple reduction. Sup-
pose that there exists a successful IND-CPA attacker A on the TT scheme T,
then we could use A to contradict the correct tracing requirement of the TT
scheme. The idea is simply to use the IND-CPA attacker A to play the secure
tracing game, and after the challenge phase when A outputs a pair of chal-
lenge messages m0 and m1, then the reduction algorithm outputs the attacker
A itself as its decoding box (i.e., the stateful attacker A which takes as input a
challenge ciphertext and outputs a guess bit is set as the decoding box). Now
since A wins the IND-CPA game with nonnegligible advantage, thus it is a
good decoder. Note that since the reduction algorithm does not query for any
secret keys (i.e., S = ∅), thus the probability that the event Cor-Tr occurs is
exactly 0. Therefore, by security of tracing, the probability that A is a good
decoder is at most negligible. Hence, IND-CPA security of T follows from the
ind-secure traitor tracing property.
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4.2 Mixed functional encryption
A regular functional encryption scheme [112, 26] consists of a setup, an
encryption, a key generation, and a decryption algorithm. The setup algorithm
takes the security parameter and functionality index as inputs, and outputs
public parameters and a master secret key. The encryption algorithm uses the
public parameters to encrypt a message, while the key generation algorithm
uses the master secret key to compute a secret key corresponding to a function.
The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext and a secret key, and
outputs the function evaluation on the message.
Here we introduce the notion of mixed Functional Encryption (Mixed
FE). A Mixed FE scheme is defined as a dual of the standard functional en-
cryption (i.e., ciphertext-policy) in which the secrets keys are associated with
a message, and ciphertexts are associated with (boolean) functions. Addition-
ally, in a Mixed FE system, there are two encryption algorithms: Enc and
SK-Enc. The normal encryption algorithm Enc takes as input only the pub-
lic parameters and outputs an encryption of a “canonical” always-accepting
function. The “secret key” encryption algorithm, on the other hand, takes as
input the master secret key and a function f and encrypts f . The decryption
algorithm in a Mixed FE system works similarly to that in standard func-
tional encryption; that is, it outputs the evaluation of encrypted function f
on the message m associated with the secret key. Below we provide a formal
definition.
Consider function classes F = {Fκ}κ and message spaces M = {Mκ}κ,
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where f : Mκ → {0, 1} for each f ∈ Fκ.1 A mixed FE scheme Mixed-FE, for
function classes F and message spaces M, consists of five polytime algorithms
(Setup,Enc, SK-Enc, KeyGen,Dec) with the following syntax:
• Setup(1λ, 1κ) → (pp,msk). The setup algorithm takes as input the se-
curity parameter λ and functionality index κ and outputs the public
parameters pp and the master secret key msk.
• Enc(pp) → ct. The normal encryption algorithm takes as input public
parameters pp and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• SK-Enc(msk, f)→ ct. The secret key encryption algorithm takes as input
master secret key msk and a function f ∈ Fκ. It outputs a ciphertext ct.
• KeyGen(msk,m) → skm. The key generation algorithm takes as input
master secret key msk and a message/input m ∈Mκ. It outputs a secret
key skm.
• Dec(skm, ct)→ {0, 1}. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret
key skm and a ciphertext ct, and it outputs a single bit.
Correctness A mixed FE scheme is said to be correct if there exists a negli-
gible function negl(·) such that for all λ, κ ∈ N and for every f ∈ Fκ, m ∈Mκ,
1The following definition could be easily generalized for multibit function classes, but for




Dec(skm, ct) = 1 : (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);skm ← KeyGen(msk,m);
ct← Enc(pp)
 ≥ 1− negl(λ),
Pr
Dec(skm, ct) = f(m) : (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);skm ← KeyGen(msk,m);
ct← SK-Enc(msk, f)
 ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Security Informally, for security we require that no PPT adversary should
be able to distinguish between secret key encryptions of two functions f0 and f1
if for every key in its possession, the output of f0, f1 is identical. Additionally,
we also require that it should be hard to distinguish between normal encryp-
tions and secret key encryptions of the special always-accepting function. In
this work, we are only interested in mixed FE schemes that guarantee security
against adversaries which make a bounded number of secret key encryption
queries. Below we formally define it.
Definition 4.2.1 (q-query function indistinguishability). Let q(·) be any fixed
polynomial. A mixed FE scheme Mixed-FE = (Setup, Enc, SK-Enc, KeyGen,
Dec) is said to satisfy q-query function indistinguishability security if for every
stateful PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·), such that
for every λ ∈ N the following holds:
Pr
AKeyGen(msk,·),SK-Enc(msk,·)(ct) = b : 1κ ← A(1λ); (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);(f (0), f (1))← AKeyGen(msk,·),SK-Enc(msk,·)(pp);







• A can make at most q(λ) queries to SK-Enc(msk, ·) oracle; and
• every secret key query m made by adversary A to the KeyGen(msk, ·)
oracle must satisfy the condition that f (0)(m) = f (1)(m).
We also define a restricted version of the function indistinguishability
game in which the adversary must declare its challenge functions (f (0), f (1))
at the beginning, and it must make all its q encryption queries before any of
its key generation queries.
Definition 4.2.2 (q-query restricted function indistinguishability). Let q(·)
be any fixed polynomial. A mixed FE scheme Mixed-FE = (Setup, Enc, SK-Enc,
KeyGen, Dec) is said to satisfy q-query selective function indistinguishability
security if for every stateful PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function
negl(·), such that for every λ ∈ N the following holds:
Pr
AKeyGen(msk,·),SK-Enc(msk,·)(pp, ct) = b : (1κ, f (0), f (1))← A(1λ);(pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);






• A can make at most q(λ) queries to the SK-Enc(msk, ·) oracle;
• every secret key query m made by adversary A to the KeyGen(msk, ·)
oracle must satisfy the condition that f (0)(m) = f (1)(m); and
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• A must make all (at most q(λ)) SK-Enc(msk, ·) oracle queries before
making any query to the KeyGen(msk, ·) oracle.
Definition 4.2.3 (q-query accept indistinguishability). Let q(·) be any fixed
polynomial. A mixed FE scheme Mixed-FE = (Setup, Enc, SK-Enc, KeyGen,
Dec) is said to satisfy q-query accept indistinguishability security if for every
stateful PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·), such that
for every λ ∈ N the following holds:
Pr
AKeyGen(msk,·),SK-Enc(msk,·)(ctb) = b :
1κ ← A(1λ); (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);
f ∗ ← AKeyGen(msk,·),SK-Enc(msk,·)(pp);







• A can make at most q queries to SK-Enc(msk, ·) oracle; and
• every secret key query m made by adversary A to the KeyGen(msk, ·)
oracle must satisfy the condition that f ∗(m) = 1.
Additionally, we also define a restricted notion of the accept indis-
tinguishability property for mixed FE schemes, in which the adversary must
declare its challenge function f ∗ at the beginning, and it must make all its q
encryption queries before any of its key generation queries, and it is restricted
to only making ciphertext queries for functions f such that all queried f ’s eval-
uate to 1 on all (secret key) queried messages m. Below we formally describe
it.
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Definition 4.2.4 (q-query restricted accept indistinguishability). Let q(·) be
any fixed polynomial. A mixed FE scheme Mixed-FE = (Setup, Enc, SK-Enc,
KeyGen, Dec) is said to satisfy q-query restricted accept indistinguishability
security if for every stateful PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function
negl(·), such that for every λ ∈ N the following holds:
Pr
AKeyGen(msk,·),SK-Enc(msk,·)(pp, ctb) = b :
(1κ, f ∗)← A(1λ);
(pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);







• A can make at most q(λ) queries to SK-Enc(msk, ·) oracle;
• every secret key query m made by adversary A to the KeyGen(msk, ·)
oracle must satisfy the condition that f ∗(m) = 1 as well as f(m) = 1 for
every ciphertext query f made by A to the SK-Enc(msk, ·) oracle; and
• A must make all (at most q(λ)) SK-Enc(msk, ·) oracle queries before
making any query to the KeyGen(msk, ·) oracle.
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Chapter 5
Traitor tracing from Mixed FE and ABE via
PLBE
In this chapter, we describe our approach towards building a traitor
tracing scheme. To that end, we first recall the notion of private linear broad-
cast encryption (PLBE) [25] as a useful intermediate primitive, and show how
to construct TT schemes from PLBE schemes that achieve 1-query security.
Our construction is divided into two components, where we first show how
to construct a TT scheme from PLBE schemes that achieve decoder-based
security. We follow that by showing that PLBE schemes that achieve 1-query
security also satisfy decoder-based security. Finally, we construct a 1-query
secure PLBE scheme from a key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE)
scheme and a 1 -query secure Mixed FE scheme, thereby constructing a TT
scheme using the same primitives.
5.1 Private linear broadcast encryption
Private linear broadcast encryption (PLBE) was introduced by Boneh,
Sahai, and Waters [25] as a framework for constructing TT schemes. There
are four algorithms in a PLBE scheme: Setup,Enc,Enc-index,Dec. The setup
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algorithm outputs a master secret key, public parameters, and n secret keys,
one for each user in the system. The public key encryption algorithm can be
used to encrypt messages, and ciphertexts can be decrypted using one of the
n secret keys via the decryption algorithm. In addition to these algorithms,
there is also a special trace-encryption algorithm. This algorithm, which
uses the master secret key, can be used to encrypt messages to any index
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. A secret key for user j can decrypt a ciphertext for index i
only if j > i.
Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [25] proposed three security definitions for
PLBE schemes. The first one requires that special encryptions to index 0 must
be indistinguishable from public key encryptions, even if the adversary has all
the secret keys. The next security requirement is that special encryptions
to index i − 1 must be indistinguishable from special encryptions to index
i if the adversary does not have a secret key for user i. Finally, the third
security property is that special encryption of message m0 to index n must
be indistinguishable from special encryption of message m1 to index n, even
if the adversary has all secret keys. However, as discussed in Section 2.1, the
BSW definitions of PLBE do not suffice for constructing TT schemes. Here,
we first provide the PLBE syntax, and then present the decoder-based and
query-based security definitions of PLBE.
Syntax A PLBE scheme PLBE = (Setup,Enc,Enc-index,Dec) for message
space M = {Mλ}λ has the following syntax:
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• Setup(1λ, 1n) → (msk, pp, (sk1, . . . , skn)) . The setup algorithm takes as
input the security parameter λ and number of users n and outputs public
parameters pp, master secret key msk, and n secret keys (sk1, sk2, . . . , skn).
• Enc(pp,m)→ ct. The encryption algorithm takes as input public param-
eters pp and message m ∈Mλ and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• Enc-index(msk,m, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}) → ct. The index-encryption algo-
rithm takes as input the master secret key msk, message m ∈ Mλ, and
index i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• Dec(sk, ct)→ y. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk
and ciphertext ct and outputs y ∈Mλ ∪ {⊥}.
Correctness A PLBE scheme is said to be correct if there exists a negligible
function µ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, n ∈ N, m ∈ Mλ, and i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the following hold:
Pr
[
Dec(skj, ct) = m :




i < j ⇒ Pr
[
Dec(skj, ct) = m :




i ≥ j ⇒ Pr
[
Dec(skj, ct) = ⊥ :




5.1.1 q-query PLBE security
In this section we extend the existing PLBE security definitions by
allowing the adversary to make a bounded number of index-encryption queries.
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Below we describe them in detail.
Definition 5.1.1 (q-query normal hiding security). Let q(·) be any fixed poly-
nomial. A PLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query normal hiding security if
for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for every λ ∈ N, pq,nrmlA (λ) ≤ 12 + negl(λ), where p
q,nrml
A (λ) is defined
as follows:
Pr










b← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pp,m);
ct1 ← Enc-index(msk,m, 0)
 ,
where A can make at most q(λ) queries to the Enc-index(msk, ·, 0) oracle. Note
that here A is only allowed to query for ciphertexts corresponding to index 0.
Definition 5.1.2 (q-query index hiding security). Let q(·) be any fixed poly-
nomial. A PLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query index hiding security if
for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for every λ ∈ N and every index i∗ ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, pq,indA (λ, i∗) ≤
1
2
+ negl(λ), where pq,indA (λ, i
∗) is defined as follows:
Pr










b← {0, 1}; ct← Enc-index(msk,m, i∗ + b)
 ,
where A can make at most q(λ) queries to the Enc-index(msk, ·, ·) oracle. Note
that here A can query the encryption oracle on arbitrary message-index pairs.
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Definition 5.1.3 (q-query message hiding security). Let q(·) be any fixed
polynomial. A PLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query message hiding security
if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for every λ ∈ N, pq,msgA (λ) ≤ 12 + negl(λ), where p
q,msg
A (λ) is defined
as follows:
Pr










b← {0, 1}; ct← Enc-index(msk,mb, n)
 ,
where A can make at most q(λ) queries to the Enc-index(msk, ·, ·) oracle. Note
that here A can query the encryption oracle on arbitrary message-index pairs.
5.1.2 Decoder-based PLBE security
In this section we introduce new decoder-based security definitions for
PLBE schemes. We start by formally defining the notion of good distinguishers
for PLBE schemes w.r.t. different encryption modes.
PLBE distinguishers For any γ ∈ [−1/2, 1/2], PPT algorithmD, λ, n ∈ N,
params = (pp,msk, (sk1, . . . , skn)) ← Setup(1λ, 1n), and message m ∈ Mλ, we
say D is γ-Distnrml,0params for m if
Pr
[
D(ctb) = b :
b← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pp,m);





where the probability is taken over the random coins used during encryption,
the random coins of D, and the choice of b.
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D(ctb) = b :
b← {0, 1};





Finally, we also define D to be γ-Distnparams for messages m0,m1 if
Pr
[







Definition 5.1.4 (decoder-based normal hiding security). A PLBE scheme is
said to satisfy decoder-based normal hiding security if for any PPT adversary
A, nonnegligible function γ(·), and polynomial q(·), there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying γ(λ) > 1/q(λ), pdec,nrmlA,γ,q (λ) ≤
negl(λ), where pdec,nrmlA,γ,q (λ) is defined as follows:
Pr






Definition 5.1.5 (decoder-based index hiding security). A PLBE scheme is
said to satisfy decoder-based index hiding security if for any PPT adversary
A, nonnegligible function γ(·), and polynomial q(·) there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying γ(λ) > 1/q(λ) and i∗ ∈
{0, . . . , n−1}, pdec,indA,γ,q (λ, i∗) ≤ negl(λ), where p
dec,ind
A,γ,q (λ, i
∗) is defined as follows:
Pr






Definition 5.1.6 (decoder-based message hiding security). A PLBE scheme is
said to satisfy decoder-based message hiding security if for any PPT adversary
95
A, nonnegligible function γ(·), and polynomial q(·) there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying γ(λ) > 1/q(λ), pdec,msgA,γ,q (λ) ≤
negl(λ), where pdec,msgA,γ,q (λ) is defined as follows:
Pr













5.2 Traitor tracing from decoder-based PLBE
Consider a PLBE scheme PLBE = (PLBE.Setup, PLBE.Enc, PLBE.Enc-index,
PLBE.Dec) with decoder-based security. We will use PLBE to construct a TT
scheme T = (Setup, Enc, Dec, Trace) as follows. The construction is identical to
the transformation in [25]; however, the security proof provided in [25] was not
correct. Concretely, to argue correctness of tracing they incorrectly leveraged
the indistinguishability-based security of the underlying PLBE scheme. We
show that the same transformation could be proven to satisfy correct tracing
if one starts with a PLBE scheme that achieves decoder-based security.
Setup(1λ, 1n): The setup algorithm samples parameters as (pp,msk, (sk1, . . . , skn))
← PLBE.Setup(1λ, 1n). The public parameters are pp, the master secret
key is msk, and the n secret keys are (sk1, . . . , skn).
Enc(pp,m): The encryption algorithm outputs ct← PLBE.Enc(pp,m).
Dec(sk, ct): The decryption algorithm outputs PLBE.Dec(sk, ct).
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TraceD(msk, 1y,m0,m1): Let ε = 1/y and W = λ · (n · y)2. For i = 0 to n,
the trace algorithm does the following:
1. It first sets counti = 0. For j = 1 to W , it does the following:
(a) It chooses a bit bi,j ← {0, 1} and sets cti,j ← Enc-index(msk,mb, i).
If D(cti,j) = bi,j, it sets counti = counti + 1.
2. It sets p̂i = counti/W .
The trace algorithm outputs every index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
p̂i−1 − p̂i ≥ ε/4n.
Correctness This follows directly from the first correctness property of the
PLBE scheme.
5.2.1 IND-CPA security
We would like to point out that the scheme is IND-CPA secure even if
PLBE only satisfies 0-query security. In other words, we do not need PLBE to
achieve stronger decoder-based security. Thus, the proof of IND-CPA security
is identical to that provided in [25]. Below we provide a high level sketch.
Theorem 5.2.1. Assuming the PLBE scheme PLBE = (Setup,Enc,Enc-index,Dec)
satisfies the security properties in Definitions 5.1.4, 5.1.5 and 5.1.6, the traitor
tracing scheme described above is IND-CPA secure (Definition 4.1.1).
Proof. We will construct a sequence of 2n + 2 hybrid experiments to prove
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IND-CPA security. The first experiment, Hybrid H0, is exactly the IND-CPA
game.
Hybrid H0 In this experiment, the challenger sends public parameters pp,
receives m0,m1 from A, and sends ct← Enc(pp,m0) to A.
Hybrid Hi,b (for i ≤ n, b ∈ {0, 1}) This experiment is identical to
the IND-CPA experiment, except that the adversary, after sending challenge
messages m0,m1, receives ct← Enc-index(msk, i,mb).
Hybrid H1 In this experiment, the challenger sends public parameters pp,
receives m0,m1 from A, and sends ct← Enc(pp,m1) to A.
For any PPT adversary A, let pA,x(·) be a function of λ that denotes
the probability of A outputting 0 in Hx. Note that pA,0−pA,1 is the advantage
of A in the IND-CPA security game.
Claim 5.2.1. Assuming PLBE satisfies Definition 5.1.4, for any PPT adver-
sary A, there exists a negligible function such that for all λ ∈ N and b ∈ {0, 1},
|pA,b − pA,0,b| ≤ negl(λ).
This follows from decoder-based indistinguishability of normal and 0-
index encryptions (Definition 5.1.4) of PLBE.
Claim 5.2.2. Assuming PLBE satisfies Definition 5.1.5, for any PPT adver-
sary A, there exists a negligible function such that for all λ ∈ N, b ∈ {0, 1},
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and i ∈ [n], pA,i−1,b − pA,i,b ≤ negl(λ).
This follows from the decoder-based index hiding security notion (Def-
inition 5.1.5) of PLBE.
Claim 5.2.3. Assuming PLBE satisfies Definition 5.1.6, for any PPT adver-
sary A, there exists a negligible function such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,n,0−pA,n,1 ≤
negl(λ).
This follows from the decoder-based message hiding security notion
(Definition 5.1.6) of PLBE.
From the above claims, it follows that pA,0 − pA,1 is bounded by a
negligible function.
5.2.2 Correctness of tracing
Next, we will show that the false trace probability is bounded by a
negligible function, and the correct trace probability is close to the probability
of A outputting an ε-successful decoding box.
First, we will introduce some notation. Given any pirate decoder box
D and messages m0,m1, for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, let
pDi = Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← Enc-index(msk, i,mb)],
where the probability is taken over random coins of decoder D as well as the
randomness used during encryption. Similarly, let pDnrml = Pr[D(ct) = b : b←
{0, 1}, ct← Enc(msk,mb)].
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False trace probability First, we show that the tracing algorithm never
falsely accuses any user. Formally, we prove the following.
Theorem 5.2.2. For every PPT adversary A, polynomial q(·), and nonneg-
ligible function ε(·), there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all
λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ),
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) ≤ negl(λ),
where Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(·) is as defined in Definition 4.1.2.
Proof. We will skip the dependence of ε(·) on λ for simplicity of notation.
Let S be the set of keys queried and D the decoder output by A. For






First, note that the probability of the event false trace can be rewritten
as follows by conditioning on the events defined above:
Pr[Fal-Tr] ≤ Pr[Fal-Tr | Diff-AdvD] +
∑
i∈{1,...,n}
Pr[i /∈ S ∧ Diff-AdvDi ].
We will show that each of these terms is bounded by a negligible func-
tion.
Lemma 5.2.1. For every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function
negl1(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
Pr[Fal-Tr | Diff-AdvD] ≤ negl1(λ).
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Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from Chernoff bounds. Let n be the
number of users chosen by the adversary A. Fix any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ S and
decode box D. Let us consider the probability that the output of Trace algo-
rithm includes i, given that Diff-AdvDi does not occur. Note that the tracing
algorithm includes i in the traitor set if the estimates p̂i−1 and p̂i differ by at
least ε/4n.
Let Xk,j denote the random variable that is 1 if D(ctk,j) = bk,j for
k ∈ {i − 1, i} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,W} (here the randomness is over the choice
of bk,j and the randomness used by Enc-index and D) and Zi,j = Xi−1,j −Xi,j.
Then (
∑W
j=1 Xk,j)/W = p̂k and µi = E [Zi,j] = pDi−1 − pDi .
Since the Zi’s are independent samples, using Chernoff bounds, we get
that Pr[
∑
j Zj/W > 2µi] ≤ 2−O(λ). Using this, we can write that for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \S, Pr[Fal-Tr∧ i ∈ T |Diff-AdvD] ≤ 2−O(λ), where T denotes the
set of indices output by Trace. Finally, using a union bound, we get that
Pr[Fal-Tr | Diff-AdvD] ≤ n · 2−O(λ) = negl1(λ).
Lemma 5.2.2. Assuming PLBE is a secure PLBE scheme satisfying the decoder-
based index hiding security property (Definition 5.1.5), for every PPT adver-
sary A, polynomial q(·), and nonnegligible function ε(·), there exists a negli-
gible function negl2(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ) and
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
Pr[i /∈ S ∧ Diff-AdvDi ] ≤ negl2(λ),
101
where n is the number of users, S is the set of key queries, and D is the decoder
box sent by A.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there exists a PPT adversary A, polyno-
mial q(·), and nonnegligible functions ε(·), δ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N sat-
isfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ), there exists an i∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that Pr[i∗ /∈
S ∧ Diff-AdvDi∗ ] ≥ δ(λ). Then we can use A to build a PPT reduction algo-
rithm B that breaks the index hiding security property of PLBE.
The reduction algorithm B first receives 1n from the adversary, which
it forwards to the challenger. It then receives the PLBE public parameters
pp from the challenger, which it sends to A. Next, it chooses an index
i ← {1, 2, . . . , n} and sends it to the PLBE challenger.1 It receives secret
keys sk1, . . . , ski−1, ski+1, . . . , skn. The adversary A queries for secret keys. If
A queries for i, B sends an empty decoding box to the PLBE challenger. Oth-
erwise, on receiving query j 6= i from A, it sends skj to A. After all queries, the
adversary sends a decoding box D and messages m0,m1 to B. The reduction
algorithm chooses a uniformly random bit b′ ← {0, 1} and sends D,mb′ to the
PLBE challenger.
Let pDj,b = Pr[D(ct) = b : ct ← Enc-index(msk, j,mb)], where the
probability is taken over the coins of decoder D and the encryption algorithm.
Recall that we have Pr[i∗ /∈ S ∧ Diff-Advi∗ ] ≥ δ(λ). Therefore, we can write
1In other words, the reduction algorithm randomly guesses the index hiding challenger

























Thus, we can also write that there exists a bit b such that
Pr
[







Now since the reduction algorithm B simply randomly guesses this bit b, thus
we have that with probability at least δ/2n, B outputs a decoding box D and a
message mb such that D can distinguish between encryptions of mb to indices
i− 1 and i with advantage at least ε/8n. Thus, the lemma follows.
From the above lemmas, it follows that the probability of false trace is
at most negl1(λ) + n · negl2(λ), and thus the theorem follows.
Correct trace probability Now we show that whenever the adversary out-
puts a good decoder, then with all but negligible probability the tracing algo-
rithm outputs a nonempty set T . Combining this with Theorem 5.2.2, we get
that the tracing algorithm correctly traces. Formally, we show the following.
Theorem 5.2.3. For every PPT adversary A, polynomial q(·), and nonneg-
ligible function ε(·), there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all
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λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ),
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl(λ),
where Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(·) and Pr -G-DA,ε(·) are as defined in Definition 4.1.2.
Proof. Let us start by analyzing the probability that the tracing algorithm
outputs a nonempty set T . First, we know that if event Good-Decoder occurs,
then pDnrml ≥ 1/2 + ε. Next, let S be the set of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
pDi−1 − pDi > ε/2n. Using Chernoff bounds, we get that
∀ i ∈ S, Pr
[
p̂Di−1 − p̂Di < ε/4n
]
≤ 2−O(λ) = negl1(λ). (5.1)
Note that by message hiding security of the underlying PLBE scheme, we
have that pDn ≤ 1/2 + negl2(λ) for some negligible function negl2(·). Also, by
indistinguishability of normal and index 0 ciphertexts, we have that pDnrml −
pD0 ≤ negl3(λ) for some negligible function negl3(·). Thus, pD0 − pDn ≥ ε −
negl2(λ) − negl3(λ) > ε/2. Given this, we can conclude that the set S as
defined above (i.e., for i ∈ S, pDi−1 − pDi > ε/2n) must be nonempty whenever
event Good-Decoder occurs. Combining this with Eq. (8.18), we get that
Pr[T 6= ∅] ≥ (1− negl1(λ)) · Pr -G-DA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl(λ).
Finally, combining with Theorem 5.2.2, we get that
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl(λ).
This concludes the proof.
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5.3 Decoder-based PLBE from 1-query secure PLBE
Let PLBE = (Setup,Enc,Enc-index,Dec) be a PLBE scheme that satis-
fies 1-query security. We will show that the same scheme also satisfies decoder-
based security.
Lemma 5.3.1. If PLBE satisfies 1-query normal hiding security (Definition 5.1.1),
then it also satisfies decoder-based normal hiding security (Definition 5.1.4).
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there exists a PPT adversary A, nonneg-
ligible function γ(·), polynomials q(·), r(·), and an infinite sequence of secu-
rity parameters Λ = {λi}i∈N such that for all λ ∈ Λ, γ(λ) > 1/q(λ) and
pdec,nrmlA,γ,q (λ) ≥ 1/r(λ). We will use A that plays the 1-query normal hiding
security game to build a PPT reduction algorithm B that plays the decoder-
based normal hiding security game as follows.
For any λ ∈ N, the reduction algorithm first receives 1n from A, which
it forwards to the challenger. It then receives pp and n secret keys sk1, . . . , skn
from the challenger, which it forwards to A. The adversary A outputs D and
m. The reduction algorithm then queries the challenger for an encryption of
m for index 0 (recall that the reduction algorithm is allowed one query). Let
the challenger’s response be ct1. It then computes ct0 ← Enc(pp,m). Next, it
sends challenge messagem and receives ct∗, which is either a normal encryption
of m or an encryption of m for index 0. The reduction algorithm chooses a
random bit β ← {0, 1} and checks if D(ctβ) = D(ct∗). If so, it outputs b′ = β;
otherwise it outputs b′ = 1− β as its guess.
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Let us now analyze B’s advantage. We need to show that there exist
polynomials qB(·) and an infinite sequence ΛB = {λi}i such that for all λ ∈ ΛB,
p1,nrmlB ≥ 1/2 + 1/qB(λ). Let ΛB = Λ and qB(·) = q2(·) · r(·)/2. Fix any
λ ∈ Λ, and let γ = γ(λ), q = q(λ), r = r(λ). Let b denote the 1-query
challenger’s choice (recall the challenger chooses b← {0, 1}; if b = 0, it sends
a normal encryption, else it sends an encryption to index 0). First, let us fix







D(ctb) = b :
b← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pp,m);






for some αparams,D,m ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]. Next, consider the following probability:
ρparams,D,m = Pr
b = b′ :
b← {0, 1}; β ← {0, 1};
ct∗0 ← Enc(pp,m); ct∗1 ← Enc-index(msk,m, 0);
ct0 ← Enc(pp,m); ct1 ← Enc-index(msk,m, 0);
b′ = β if D(ct∗b) = D(ctβ), else b
′ = 1− β
 .
Since the decoder D is run on ciphertexts ct∗b , ctβ independently, we could
rewrite the above probability as follows:
ρparams,D,m = Pr
[
D(ct∗b) = b :
b← {0, 1}; ct∗0 ← Enc(pp,m);




D(ctβ) = β :
β ← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pp,m);




D(ct∗b) 6= b :
b← {0, 1}; ct∗0 ← Enc(pp,m);




D(ctβ) 6= β :
β ← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pp,m);




D(ctb) = b :
b← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pp,m);





D(ctb) 6= b :
b← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pp,m);

















+ 2 · α2params,D,m.
Thus, we get that for any decoder D that is δ-Distnrml,0params for message m,
ρparams,D,m = 1/2 + 2 · α2params,D,m ≥ 1/2 + 2 · δ2.
Also, since α2params,D,m ≥ 0, we get that for every decoder D, ρparams,D,m ≥ 1/2.
Therefore, since the adversary A outputs a 1/q-Distnrml,0params box with probability
at least 1/r, we get that the reduction algorithm B’s winning probability p1,nrmlB,n





























This concludes our proof.
Lemma 5.3.2. If PLBE satisfies 1-query index hiding security (Definition 5.1.2),
then it also satisfies decoder-based index hiding security (Definition 5.1.5).
The proof of this lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 5.3.1, except
that the reduction algorithm queries for either a special encryption of m for
index i or a special encryption of m for index i+ 1 (depending on β ← {0, 1}).
Lemma 5.3.3. If PLBE satisfies 1-query message hiding security (Defini-
tion 5.1.3), then it also satisfies decoder-based message hiding security (Defi-
nition 5.1.6).
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The proof of this lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 5.3.1, except
that the reduction algorithm queries for either a special encryption of m0 for
index n or a special encryption of m1 for index n (depending on β ← {0, 1}).
5.4 Constructing PLBE from Mixed FE and ABE
In this section, we construct a private linear broadcast encryption
(PLBE) scheme from any key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE)
scheme and a Mixed FE scheme. Our construction inherits the message space
of the underlying KP-ABE scheme. Also, we show that if the underlying
ABE scheme is selectively secure, and the mixed FE scheme satisfies 1-query
restricted function and accept indistinguishability properties, then our PLBE
scheme satisfies 1-query normal, index, and message hiding security properties.
Outline The idea is to use the ABE system to encrypt a message with
attributes being set to either the “normal” ciphertext (i.e., encryption of the
canonical always-accepting function) or a special (secret key) ciphertext which
encrypts the comparison function depending on the type of PLBE encryption
operation being performed. Each user’s secret key will be an ABE private
key. Here the ABE private key is generated for the Mixed FE decryption
circuit in which a Mixed FE secret key, corresponding to the user’s index, is
hardwired. The high level intuition is that when the attribute is a normal
functional encryption ciphertext, then all keys decrypt it to 1; thus any user
with an appropriate ABE key could perform the decryption. Also, when the
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attribute is set to be a special ciphertext (that encrypts comparison with some
index i), then only those users whose indices are larger than the threshold i
set can perform the decryption. For proving security, we rely on the fact that
special ciphertexts are indistinguishable to any adversary that does not have
distinguishing secret keys. Below we provide a detailed overview.
The PLBE setup algorithm starts by sampling an ABE key pair (abe.pp, abe.msk)
and a mixed FE key pair (mixed.pp,mixed.msk). To generate the private key
for the ith user, it first generates a mixed FE secret key mixed.ski for message
i, and later computes an ABE key abe.ski for predicate Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·),
i.e., Mixed-FE decryption circuit with key mixed.ski hardwired. For PLBE nor-
mal encryption, one simply computes ciphertext ct as an encryption of message
m under attributes ctattr, where ctattr is a mixed FE normal ciphertext. For
encrypting a message to index i, the encryption algorithm works identically,
except now the attribute is set to be a special ciphertext corresponding to
function greater than i. Finally, the PLBE decryption is simply the ABE
decryption algorithm.
Now correctness follows directly from the correctness of ABE and func-
tional encryption schemes. For proving security, the main idea is as follows:
Suppose there exists an adversary that can distinguish between PLBE normal
ciphertexts and index 0 ciphertexts; then it can be used to distinguish between
mixed FE normal ciphertexts and secret key ciphertexts encrypting function
greater than 0 (note that this is an always-accepting function). In other words,
such an attack can be used to break the restricted accept indistinguishability
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property of the mixed FE scheme. Similarly, we can also reduce a success-
ful attack on the index hiding, or message hiding security to an attacker on
restricted function indistinguishability of mixed FE or ABE security, respec-
tively. Below we describe our construction PLBE = (Setup,Enc,Enc-index,Dec)
for message spaces {Mκ}κ in detail.
The following construction only achieves the statistical notion of cor-
rectness. In Chapter A, we provide an alternate construction that achieves
perfect correctness from the same assumptions.
5.4.1 Construction
Let ABE = (ABE.Setup,ABE.Enc,ABE.KeyGen,ABE.Dec) be a KP-ABE
scheme for a set of attribute spaces {Xκ}κ, predicate classes {Cκ}κ, and mes-
sage spaces {Mκ}κ, and let Mixed-FE = (Mixed.Setup, Mixed.Enc, Mixed.SK-Enc,
Mixed.KeyGen, Mixed.Dec) be a mixed FE scheme for function classes {Fκ}κ
and message space {Iκ}κ, with ciphertexts of length `(λ, κ). For every n, let
κ = κ(n) be the lexicographically smallest functionality index such that every
string of length log(n) can be uniquely represented in message space Iκ (i.e.,
{0, 1}log(n) ⊆ Iκ), and function class Fκ contains the “comparison” (>) opera-
tor. Also, let κ̃ = κ̃(λ, κ) be the lexicographically smallest functionality index
such that every string of length `(λ, κ) can be uniquely represented in attribute
class Xκ̃ (i.e., {0, 1}`(λ,κ) ⊆ Xκ̃), and Cκ̃ contains mixed FE decryption circuit





. The setup algorithm runs ABE.Setup
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and Mixed.Setup to generate ABE and mixed FE public parameters
and master secret key as (abe.pp, abe.msk) ← ABE.Setup(1λ, 1κ̃) and
(mixed.pp, mixed.msk)← Mixed.Setup(1λ, 1κ). Next, it runs Mixed.KeyGen
to generate n mixed FE secret keys mixed.ski as
∀ i ≤ n, mixed.ski ← Mixed.KeyGen(mixed.msk, i).
Let Cmixed.ski denote the circuit Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·), i.e., Mixed-FE
decryption circuit with key mixed.ski hardwired. Next, it computes n
ABE secret keys abe.ski as
∀ i ≤ n, abe.ski ← ABE.KeyGen(abe.msk, Cmixed.ski).
Finally, it sets pp = (abe.pp,mixed.pp), msk = (abe.msk,mixed.msk) and
ski = abe.ski for i ≤ n.
• Enc(pp,m)→ ct. Let pp = (abe.pp,mixed.pp). The encryption algorithm
first computes ctattr ← Mixed.Enc(mixed.pp). Next, it encrypts message
m as ct← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ctattr,m), and outputs ciphertext ct.
• Enc-index(msk,m, i)→ ct. Let msk = (abe.msk,mixed.msk) and let compi
denote the comparison function
?
> i, i.e., compi(x) = 1 iff x > i. The
encryption algorithm first computes ctattr ← Mixed.SK-Enc(mixed.msk,
compi). Next, it encrypts message m as ct ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ctattr,m)
and outputs ciphertext ct.
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• Dec(sk, ct) → m or ⊥ . The decryption algorithm runs ABE.Dec on ct
using key sk as y = ABE.Dec(sk, ct) and sets y as the output of decryp-
tion.
5.4.2 Correctness
For all λ, n ∈ N, message m ∈ Mλ, public parameters and master
secret keys (abe.pp, abe.msk) ← ABE.Setup(1λ, 1κ̃), (mixed.pp,mixed.msk) ←
Mixed.Setup(1λ, 1κ), the secret keys ski for i ≤ n are simply the ABE keys
abe.ski ← ABE.KeyGen(abe.msk, Cmixed.ski). For any index i ≤ n, consider the
following two cases:
1. Normal encryption. For any ciphertext computed as ct← ABE.Enc(abe.pp,
ctattr, m), where ctattr ← Mixed.Enc(mixed.pp), we know that with all but
negligible probability Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ctattr) = 1 by correctness of
the mixed FE scheme. In other words, Cmixed.ski(ctattr) = 1. Therefore,
by correctness of the ABE scheme, we get that with all but negligible
probability ABE.Dec(abe.ski, ct) = m.
2. Index encryption. For any index 0 ≤ j ≤ n and ciphertext ct com-
puted as ct← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ctattr,m), where ctattr ←Mixed.SK-Enc(mixed.msk,
compj), we know that with all but negligible probability
Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ctattr) =
{
1 if i > j,
0 otherwise
by correctness of the mixed FE scheme. In other words, Cmixed.ski(ctattr) =
compj(i) = (i > j). Therefore, by correctness of the ABE scheme, we
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have that with all but negligible probability ABE.Dec(abe.ski, ct) = m
for i > j and ⊥ otherwise.
Therefore, PLBE satisfies the PLBE correctness condition.
5.4.3 Security
We will now show that the scheme described above is 1-query secure
per Definitions Definition 5.1.1, Definition 5.1.2, and Definition 5.1.3. In other
words, it satisfies normal hiding, index hiding, and message hiding security
properties. Formally, we prove the following.
Theorem 5.4.1. If ABE = (ABE.Setup,ABE.Enc,ABE.KeyGen,ABE.Dec) is
a selectively secure ABE scheme for a set of attribute spaces {Xκ}κ, predi-
cate classes {Cκ}κ, and message spaces {Mκ}κ satisfying Definition 3.5.2, and
Mixed-FE = (Mixed.Setup, Mixed.Enc, Mixed.SK-Enc, Mixed.KeyGen, Mixed.Dec)
is a mixed FE scheme, for function classes {Fκ}κ and message spaces {Iκ}κ,
satisfying 1-query restricted function indistinguishability (Definition 4.2.2) and
1-query restricted accept indistinguishability (Definition 4.2.4) properties, then
PLBE = (Setup, Enc, Enc-index, Dec) is a secure PLBE scheme, for mes-
sages spaces {Mκ}κ, satisfying 1-query normal, index, and message hiding
security properties per Definitions Definition 5.1.1, Definition 5.1.2, and Defi-
nition 5.1.3, respectively.
Our proof is divided into three components/lemmas, one for each PLBE
security property. Let A be any PPT adversary that wins the normal/index/message
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hiding game with nonnegligible advantage. We argue that such an adversary
must break the security of at least one underlying primitive.
Normal hiding security
Lemma 5.4.1. If Mixed-FE = (Mixed.Setup,Mixed.Enc, Mixed.SK-Enc, Mixed.Dec,
Mixed.KeyGen) is a mixed FE scheme satisfying the 1-query restricted accept
indistinguishability (Definition 4.2.4) property, then PLBE = (Setup,Enc, Dec,
Enc-index) is a PLBE scheme satisfying the 1-query normal hiding security
property per Definition 5.1.1.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that A’s advantage in a 1-
query normal hiding security game is nonnegligible. We construct an algorithm
B that can distinguish normal encryptions from secret key encryptions, there-
fore breaking the 1-query restricted accept indistinguishability security of the
mixed FE scheme.
The reduction algorithm B receives 1n from A. It sets κ, κ̃ as in the
construction and sends κ as the functionality index and comp0 (i.e., com-
parison with 0) as its challenge function to the mixed FE challenger. The
challenger generates a key pair (mixed.pp,mixed.msk) and sends mixed.pp as
the public parameters and challenge ciphertext ct∗attr to B. Next, B makes
an encryption query for function comp0. Let the challenger’s response be
ciphertext ctattr. B then queries the challenger on n messages i (≤ n) for cor-
responding mixed FE secret keys and receives back keys mixed.ski for i ≤ n.
It then chooses an ABE key pair (abe.pp, abe.msk) ← ABE.Setup(1λ, 1κ̃) and
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computes n ABE keys as abe.ski ← ABE.KeyGen(abe.msk, Cmixed.ski). Next, it
sends (abe.pp,mixed.pp) and {abe.ski}i≤n as the PLBE public parameters and
secret keys to A. After receiving all the keys, A sends its challenge message
m∗ to B, and it can also make a single encryption query for message m on
index 0. Here A is allowed to make the encryption query either before or after
challenge query. The reduction algorithm B responds to each query as follows:
B encrypts message m as ct ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ctattr,m) and sends ct to A
as its response to the encryption query. Also, it computes ciphertext ct∗ as
ct∗ ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ct∗attr,m∗) and sends ct∗ as the challenge ciphertext to
A. Note that A could instead have sent its challenge query before sending
the index encryption query. Also, B does not need to query the mixed FE
challenger for answering any query at this point as it already has ciphertexts
ctattr, ct
∗
attr. Finally, A sends its guess b to B, and B forwards b as its own
guess.
First, note that both A and B are allowed to make at most 1 index
encryption and polynomially many secret key encryption queries, respectively.
Also, note that B sends its secret key encryption query as well as its challenge
query before making making key generation queries; thus B is an admissible
adversary in the 1-query restricted accept indistinguishability game. Since A
is only allowed to make encryption queries to index 0 (in the 1-query normal
hiding security game), thus B queries the mixed FE challenger on functions
comp0 which are always accepting functions and therefore admissible queries
per the restricted accept indistinguishability game. Next, for each query made
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by A, B queries the mixed FE challenger exactly once, and thus all the queries
are honestly and exactly answered. Finally, note that if the mixed FE chal-
lenger computed ct∗attr as a normal functional encryption ciphertext, then B
computes ct∗ as a normal PLBE ciphertext; otherwise it computes ct∗ as a
PLBE ciphertext for index 0. Thus, B perfectly simulates the 1-query normal
hiding security game for A. As a result, if A’s advantage is nonnegligible,
then B breaks the 1-query restricted accept indistinguishability security with
nonnegligible advantage. This completes the proof.
Index hiding security
Lemma 5.4.2. If Mixed-FE = (Mixed.Setup,Mixed.Enc,Mixed.SK-Enc, Mixed.Dec,
Mixed.KeyGen) is a mixed FE scheme satisfying the 1-query restricted function
indistinguishability (Definition 4.2.2) property, then PLBE = (Setup,Enc, Dec,
Enc-index) is a PLBE scheme satisfying the 1-query index hiding security prop-
erty per Definition 5.1.2.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 5.4.1, with the
additional modification that the reduction algorithm now guesses the indices
i, i∗ on which the PLBE adversary makes its encryption query and challenge
query, respectively, and the reduction algorithm aborts if its guess is incor-
rect. This leads to a polynomial loss (≈ 1/n2) in the reduction algorithm’s
advantage.2
2Due to the fact that the reduction algorithm has to guess the index, we can only extend
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Suppose there exists an adversary A such that A’s advantage in the 1-
query index hiding security game is nonnegligible. We construct an algorithm
B that can distinguish between two secret key encryptions, therefore breaking
the 1-query restricted function indistinguishability security of the mixed FE
scheme.
The reduction algorithm B receives 1n from A. It sets κ, κ̃ as in
the construction. Next, it guesses the challenge index i∗ ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
and query index i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.3 It sends κ as the functionality index and
(compi∗ , compi∗+1) (i.e., comparison with i
∗ and i∗+1) as its challenge functions
to the mixed FE challenger. The challenger generates a key pair (mixed.pp,mixed.msk)
and sends mixed.pp as the public parameters and challenge ciphertext ct∗attr
to B. Next, B makes an encryption query for function compi. Let the
challenger’s response be ciphertext ctattr. B then queries the challenger on
n − 1 messages j(∈ [n] \ {i∗ + 1}) for corresponding mixed FE secret keys
and receives back keys mixed.skj for each j. It then chooses an ABE key
pair (abe.pp, abe.msk)← ABE.Setup(1λ, 1κ̃) and computes n− 1 ABE keys as
abe.skj ← ABE.KeyGen(abe.msk, Cmixed.skj). Next, it sends (abe.pp,mixed.pp)
and {abe.skj}j∈[n]\{i∗+1} as the PLBE public parameters and secret keys to A.
After receiving all the keys, A sends its challenge message m∗ to B, and it can
the current analysis to prove q-query PLBE (adaptive) security assuming q-query mixed FE
(restricted) security for constant q. However, we would like to point out that one could
prove q-query PLBE selective security directly from q-query mixed FE (restricted) security
without any security loss.
3Basically, the reduction algorithm guesses two things: First, it guesses the index hiding
challenger with which A interacts and wins with nonnegligible probability; second, it guesses
the index on which adversary A queries the PLBE challenger for index encryption.
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also make an encryption query for message m on index ĩ. Here A is allowed to
make the encryption query either before or after the challenge query. The re-
duction algorithm B proceeds as follows. If i 6= ĩ, B aborts and sends a random
bit as its guess to the mixed FE challenger. Otherwise, it responds to each
query as follows. B encrypts message m as ct ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ctattr,m)
and sends ct to A as its response to the encryption query. Also, it computes
ciphertext ct∗ as ct∗ ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ct∗attr,m∗) and sends ct∗ as the chal-
lenge ciphertext to A. Note that A could instead have sent its challenge query
before sending the index encryption query. Also, B does not need to query
the mixed FE challenger for answering any query at this point as it already
has ciphertexts ctattr, ct
∗
attr. Finally, A sends its guess b to B, and B forwards
b as its own guess.
First, note that both A and B are allowed to make at most 1 index
encryption and polynomially many secret key encryption queries, respectively.
Also, note that B sends its secret key encryption query as well as its challenge
query before making making key generation queries; thus B is an admissible
adversary in the 1-query restricted function indistinguishability game. Next,
for each query made by A, B queries the mixed FE challenger exactly once, and
thus all the queries are honestly and exactly answered. Finally, note that if the
mixed FE challenger computed ct∗attr as a secret key FE ciphertext for function
compi∗ , then B computes ct
∗ as a PLBE ciphertext for index i∗; otherwise it
computes ct∗ as a PLBE ciphertext for index i∗+1. Thus, B perfectly simulates
the 1-query index hiding security game for A. Also, since B randomly guesses
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the challenge index i∗ as well as query index i, therefore with at least 1/n(n+1)
probability B’s guess will be correct; thus if A’s advantage is (nonnegligible)
ε, then B breaks 1-query restricted function indistinguishability security with
(nonnegligible) advantage ε/n(n+ 1). This completes the proof.
Message hiding security
Lemma 5.4.3. If ABE = (ABE.Setup,ABE.Enc,ABE.KeyGen,ABE.Dec) is a
selectively secure ABE scheme per Definition 3.5.2, then PLBE = (Setup, Enc,
Dec, Enc-index) is a PLBE scheme satisfying the 1-query message hiding se-
curity property per Definition 5.1.3.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that A’s advantage in the
1-query message hiding security game is nonnegligible. We construct an al-
gorithm B that can distinguish between ABE encryptions of two different
messages, therefore breaking the security of the ABE scheme.
The reduction algorithm receives 1n from A. It sets the parameters
κ, κ̃ as in the construction, and starts by choosing mixed FE parameters
as (mixed.pp,mixed.msk) ← Mixed.Setup(1λ, 1κ). It then computes ct∗attr ←
Mixed.SK-Enc(mixed.msk, compn) and sends to the ABE challenger 1
κ̃ and
ct∗attr as its challenge attribute. The ABE challenger generates a key pair
(abe.pp, abe.sk) and sends abe.pp to B. For i ≤ n, B generates mixed FE
secret keys as mixed.ski ← Mixed.KeyGen(mixed.msk, i) and sends Cmixed.ski as
a predicate query to the ABE challenger and receives back secret key abe.ski.
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Next, it sends (abe.pp,mixed.pp) and {abe.ski}i≤n as the PLBE public param-
eters and secret keys to A. After receiving all the keys, A makes a single
index encryption query (m, j) to B. B answers it by computing ciphertexts
ctattr ← Mixed.SK-Enc(mixed.msk, compj) and ct ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp, ctattr,m)
and sends ct to A as its response. A also sends two challenge messages (m∗0,m
∗
1)
to B. B then forwards (m∗0,m
∗
1) as its challenge messages to ABE challenger.
Next, B forwards the challenge ciphertext ct∗ it receives from ABE challenger
to A. Note that A could instead have sent its challenge query before sending
the index encryption query. In that case, the reduction algorithm simply an-
swers that first. Finally, A sends its guess b to B, and B forwards b as its own
guess.
First, note that the challenge attribute ct∗attr on each predicate (Cmixed.ski)
queried made by B evaluates to 0, with all but negligible probability. This
follows from the correctness condition of the mixed FE system as ct∗attr en-
crypts function compn and for all i ≤ n, compn(i) = 0, and thus decrypting
ct∗attr using mixed.ski outputs 0. With all-but-negligible probability, reduction
algorithm B is therefore an admissible adversary in the ABE security game.
Thus, B perfectly simulates the 1-query4 message hiding security game for A.
As a result, if A’s advantage is nonnegligible, then B breaks ABE security
with nonnegligible advantage. This completes the proof.
4We would like to point out that the current construction actually gives a PLBE scheme
that satisfies the q-query message hiding security property for arbitrary q, i.e., the number
of queries need not be bounded, as long as the ABE scheme is not q-query selectively secure.
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Chapter 6
A new LWE toolkit
In Chapter 3, we defined the notion of lattice trapdoors along with
certain well-sampledness properties. Recall that using lattice trapdoors, it is
easy to compute a preimage U of any matrix Z with respect to a matrix A
given the trapdoor information generated while sampling A. For any matrix U
sampled as above, we say U targets A to matrix Z. Now the well-sampledness
properties (at a high level) state that a matrix sampled using the TrapGen
algorithm looks uniformly random when not given the trapdoor information,
and a preimage matrix that targets to a random matrix looks like a matrix
with entries drawn from a Gaussian distribution.
In this chapter, we introduce certain enhanced security properties for
lattice trapdoors that will be useful later in proving security of our Mixed
FE system. We also provide a generic construction of lattice trapdoors that
achieves these enhanced properties from any lattice trapdoor scheme that sat-
isfies the well-sampledness properties described above. At a very high level,
the enhanced security properties state the following: (1) For any matrix A
that is sampled using the TrapGen algorithm, all those rows of A which are
only used to target random rows look like random rows themselves (when not
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given the trapdoor information). (2) Two preimage matrices U0,U1 that tar-
get a matrix A to different matrices Z0,Z1 should look indistinguishable to
any adversary even when the adversary is given those rows of A where Z0,Z1
are identical. We point out that due to technical constraints in the proof of
property (2) we chose to define the enhanced properties w.r.t. matrices instead
of vectors.
6.1 Enhanced lattice trapdoors
Let (EnTrapGen,EnSamplePre) be a pair of randomized algorithms with
the following syntax:
EnTrapGen(1n, 1m, q)→ (A, TA). The trapdoor generation algorithm takes as
input n,m, q and outputs a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq together with a trapdoor
TA.
EnSamplePre(A, TA, σ, z) → u. The preimage sampling algorithm takes as
input a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq together with its trapdoor TA, a target vector




We require these algorithms to satisfy the following properties. These
1As before, the preimage sampling algorithm could be easily generalized to generate
preimages of matrices instead of vectors by independently running the EnSamplePre algo-
rithm on each column of the matrix. Throughout this work, we overload the notation by
directly giving matrices U ∈ Zn×kq (for any k) as inputs to the SamplePre algorithm.
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properties are captured via security games between a challenger and a com-
putationally bounded adversary.
Notation First, we introduce some more notation. We start by defining
a matrix rearrangement procedure Arrange which takes as input dimensions
n1, n2,m, and two matrices A ∈ Zn1×mq ,B ∈ Zn2×mq , and an ordered set S ⊆
[n1 + n2] of size n1, and it outputs a larger combined matrix C ∈ Z(n1+n2)×mq .
Concretely, C = Arrange(1n1 , 1n2 , 1m,A,B, S). The rearrangement procedure
is defined as follows.
Let S = {i1, i2, . . . , in1}, where ij < ik for every 1 ≤ j < k ≤ n1.








denote the (ordered) com-
plement of set S. Now matrix C is obtained by appending rows of matrices A
and B as follows: for j ∈ [n1], C[ij] = A[j], and for j ∈ [n2], C[i′j] = B[j]. For
simplicity of notation, we drop the dimensions n1, n2,m as explicit inputs to
Arrange procedure throughout this section whenever clear from the context.
Additionally, we define a matrix restriction procedure Restrict which
takes as input dimensions n,m, and matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and an ordered set
S ⊆ [n] of size `, and it outputs a smaller matrix C ∈ Z`×mq . Concretely,
C = Restrict(1n, 1m,A, S). The restriction procedure is defined as follows.
Let S = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, where ij < ik for every 1 ≤ j < k ≤ `. Now
matrix C is obtained by removing rows of matrix A which do not lie in set S.
Formally, for j ∈ [`], C[j] = A[ij]. As before, for simplicity of notation, we
drop the dimensions n,m as inputs whenever clear from the context.
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6.1.1 Row removal property
The first property we introduce is called the row removal property.
It is defined via an interactive security game between the challenger and an
adversary. In the game, the adversary specifies matrix dimensions n,m, a set
of k (≤ n) indices, which represent the “target” set, and the adversary must
distinguish between the following scenarios.
In the first scenario, the challenger chooses an n×m matrix A with a
trapdoor, and sends A to the adversary. The adversary then participates in
a query phase. For each query, the adversary sends a set of k target vectors.
The challenger responds by outputting a matrix U such that for each index i
in the target set, U maps the ith row of A to one of the target vectors. The
matrix U maps the remaining rows of A to uniformly random vectors.
In the second scenario, the challenger chooses a k×m matrix A with a
trapdoor, extends A to dimension n×m by attaching uniformly random rows,
and sends this extended matrix to the adversary. Next, the adversary sends
queries, each query consisting of k target vectors. The challenger outputs a
matrix U such that U maps the ith row of A to the ith target vector.2
Definition 6.1.1 (row removal property). Fix any function q : N → N and
parameter σ : N → R+. A pair of trapdoor generation algorithms LT =
(EnTrapGen, EnSamplePre) is said to satisfy the (q, σ)-row removal property if
2Although one might observe some weak resemblance between our row removal property
and lattice trapdoor properties used in [5, 21], we would like to point out that after a closer
inspection we observe that our row removal property is different.
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for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that
for all λ ∈ N, q = q(λ), σ = σ(λ)




≤ 1/2 + negl(λ),
where Exptrow−rem,q,σLT,A (·) is as defined in Fig. 6.1.
Exptrow−rem,q,σLT,A (λ)
1. Setup Phase. The adversary A, after receiving as input the security
parameter λ, sends dimensions 1n, 1m and a set S ⊆ [n] of size k,
such that m > 2n log q + 2λ and σ >
√
n · log q · logm + λ, to the
challenger.a The challenger chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and
proceeds as follows:
(a) If b = 0, then it samples two matrices B,P as (B, TB) ←
EnTrapGen(1k, 1m, q), P ← Z(n−k)×mq . Next, it sets A =
Arrange(B,P, S) and sends A to the adversary.
(b) Otherwise, if b = 1, then it chooses matrix A as (A, TA) ←
EnTrapGen(1n, 1m, q) and sends A to the adversary.
2. Query Phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preim-
age queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Zk×tq . The challenger
responds to each query as follows.
(a) If b = 0, it samples matrix U as U← EnSamplePre(B, TB, σ,C)
and sends U to the adversary.
(b) Otherwise if b = 1, it chooses a random matrix Q as Q ←
Z(n−k)×tq and sets matrix D as D = Arrange(C,Q, S). Next, it
samples matrix U as U← EnSamplePre(A, TA, σ,D) and sends
U to the adversary.
3. A sends its guess b′. The experiment outputs 1 iff b = b′.
aThe parameter constraints could be taken out of the security games, but for
technical reasons we include them as part of the definition itself.
Figure 6.1: Experiment Exptrow−rem,q,σLT,A
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A weaker row removal property is one where, in each query, the ad-
versary is restricted to choosing a set S of size n − 1 during setup phase,
and now during query phase it must make preimage queries of the form
(1t,C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq ). A different way to represent the set S in this case is by a
single index i ∈ [n] such that {i} = [n] \ S. We call this property the single
row removal property. In our construction, we will first show a scheme that
satisfies the single row removal property and then, via a simple hybrid argu-
ment, we show that the single row removal property implies the row removal
property.
6.1.2 Target switching property
Next, we introduce the target switching property. For any target Z,
if we choose a matrix B with a trapdoor and output only the preimage of Z
with respect to B, then this preimage looks like a random low-norm matrix.
The target switching property is an extension of this property and is captured
via a security game between a challenger and an adversary. In this game, the
challenger specifies the matrix dimensions n,m and a set S ⊆ [n] of size k. The
challenger chooses an n×m matrix B and sends the rows of B corresponding
to the set S. It also chooses a challenge bit b which is used in the query phase.
Next, the adversary is allowed polynomially many queries. In each
query, the adversary specifies two matrices, Z0,Z1, such that for every index
i ∈ S, the ith rows of Z0 and Z1 are identical. The challenger outputs a matrix
U such that for every i ∈ S, U maps the ith row of B to the ith row of Z0
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(which is equal to the ith row of Z1). For the remaining indices i /∈ S, U
approximately maps the ith row of A to the ith row of Zb. Intuitively, since
the adversary does not have the rows indexed by S, the challenger can switch
the targets from rows of Z0 to Z1.
Definition 6.1.2 (target switching property). Fix any function q : N → N,
noise distribution family {χ(λ)}λ∈N, and parameter σ : N → R+. A pair
of trapdoor generation algorithms LT = (EnTrapGen,EnSamplePre) is said to
satisfy the (q, χ, σ)-target switching property if for any PPT adversary A, there
exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, q = q(λ), χ = χ(λ),
σ = σ(λ),




≤ 1/2 + negl(λ),
where Exptswitch,q,χ,σLT,A (·) is as defined in Fig. 6.2.
As before, we will introduce a weaker notion called the single target
switching property, where in each query the adversary is restricted to out-
putting only a single index i ∈ [n], and Z0 and Z1 must agree on all indices
j 6= i. We will first show that our construction satisfies the single target
switching property, and then, via a hybrid argument, we show that single
target switching implies the target switching property.
6.2 Our construction of enhanced lattice trapdoors
Let q : N→ N, σ : N→ R+ be functions, and let LT = (TrapGen, SamplePre)
be a pair of algorithms that satisfy q-well-sampledness of matrix (Defini-
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Exptswitch,q,χ,σLT,A (·)
1. Setup Phase. The adversary A, after receiving as input the security
parameter λ, sends dimensions 1n, 1m, set S ⊆ [n] of size k, such
that m > 2n log q + 12λ · log q and σ >
√
n · log q · logm + λ, to
the challenger.a The challenger chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
proceeds as follows:
(a) It samples matrix A as (A, TA)← EnTrapGen(1n, 1m, q).
(b) Next, it sets B = Restrict(A, S) and sends B to the adversary.
2. Query Phase. The adversary makes polynomially many queries
of the form (1t,Z0,Z1), where Z0,Z1 ∈ Zn×tq and Restrict(Z0, S) =
Restrict(Z1, S). The challenger responds to each query as follows:
(a) It chooses matrix E as E ← χ(n−k)×t and sets F =
Arrange(0k×t,E, S).
(b) Next, it samples matrix U as U← EnSamplePre(A, TA, σ,Zb +
E) and sends U to the adversary.
3. A sends its guess b′, and the experiment outputs 1 iff b = b′.
aThe parameter constraints could be taken out of the security games, but for
technical reasons we include them as part of the definition itself.
Figure 6.2: Exptswitch,q,χ,σLT,A (·)
tion 3.2.2), (q, σ)-preimage sampling (Definition 3.2.3). We will construct
enhanced lattice trapdoors LTen = (EnTrapGen, EnSamplePre) using LT as fol-
lows. The construction is reminiscent of the trapdoor extension algorithms of
[3, 40].
EnTrapGen(1n, 1m, q)→ (A, TA). The trapdoor generation algorithm samples
two matrices, A1,A2, of dimensions n×dm/2e and n×bm/2c as follows:
(A1, TA1)← TrapGen(1n, 1dm/2e, q),
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(A2, TA2)← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q).
It appends both these matrices columnwise to obtain a larger matrix as
A = [A1 |A2], and it sets the trapdoor TA to be the combined trapdoor
information TA = (TA1 , TA2).
EnSamplePre(A, TA,Z, σ) → U. The preimage sampling algorithm takes as
input A = [A1 |A2], trapdoor TA = (TA1 , TA2), parameter σ, and matrix
Z ∈ Zn×kq . It chooses a uniformly random matrix W ← Zn×kq and sets
Y = Z−W. Next, it computes matrices U1 ∈ Zdm/2e×kq ,U2 ∈ Zbm/2c×kq
as
U1 ← SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W),
U2 ← SamplePre(A2, TA2 , σ,Y).
Finally, it computes the final output matrix U ∈ Zm×kq by rowwise ap-






Correctness Correctness follows directly from the correctness of LT.
6.3 Proving security of LTen
We will now prove that our enhanced trapdoor sampling scheme sat-
isfies the preimage sampling, row removal, and target switching properties.
First, we show that it satisfies the preimage sampling property if the underly-
ing trapdoor scheme satisfies the preimage sampling property.
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Theorem 6.3.1. Fix any functions q : N → N and σ : N → R+. If LT
satisfies (q, σ)-preimage sampling (Definition 3.2.3), then LTen also satisfies
(q, σ)-preimage sampling.
Proof Sketch. This follows directly from our construction. The preimage sam-
pling requires that the preimage of a uniformly random matrix Z looks like a
Gaussian sample with parameter σ. In our construction, the preimage of a ran-
dom matrix Z consists of preimages of W and Z−W, where W is uniformly
random. Since Z is random, so is Z −W. As a result, using the preimage
sampling property of LT, we can argue that these two preimages look like two





6.3.1 Row removal property
Now we prove that our trapdoor sampling scheme satisfies the row
removal property. Formally, we prove the following.
Theorem 6.3.2. Fix any functions q : N → N and σ : N → R+. If LT satis-
fies (q, σ)-preimage sampling (Definition 3.2.3) and q-well-sampledness of the
matrix (Definition 3.2.2), then LTen also satisfies the (q, σ)-single row removal
property (Definition 6.1.1).
Proof. Our proof follows from a sequence of hybrid experiments. We start
by defining a sequence of hybrid experiments such that the first and last ex-
periments correspond to the original row removal security game when the
challenger chooses its challenge bit b to be 0 and 1, respectively. To complete
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the proof we show that the adversary’s advantage must be negligible between
any two consecutive hybrids.
We now define hybrids Hx for x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 12}. In all the hybrid
experiments below, we set q = q(λ) and σ = σ(λ).
Hybrid H0 This corresponds to the original game (per Definition 6.1.1, with
the single row removal restriction) with b = 0.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It first chooses matrices (B1, TB1) ← TrapGen(1n−1, 1dm/2e, q), (B2,
TB2) ← TrapGen(1n−1, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p ← Zmq and sets matrix A ∈ Zn×mq as
A = Arrange(B,p, [n] \ {i}).
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It chooses W← Z(n−1)×tq and samples U1 ← SamplePre(B1, TB1 , σ,W).
(b) Next, it sets Y = C − B1 · U1 (which is equal to C −W) and
computes U2 ← SamplePre(B2, TB2 , σ,Y).
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3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H1 In this experiment, the challenger chooses U1 to be a random
Gaussian matrix with parameter σ for each query.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It first chooses matrices (B1, TB1) ← TrapGen(1n−1, 1dm/2e, q), (B2,
TB2) ← TrapGen(1n−1, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p ← Zmq and sets matrix A ∈ Zn×mq as
A = Arrange(B,p, [n] \ {i}).
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It samples U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
(b) Next, it sets Y = C−B1 ·U1 and computes U2 ← SamplePre(B2,
TB2 , σ, Y).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
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Hybrid H2 In this hybrid, the challenger chooses B1 uniformly at random,
instead of choosing it using TrapGen. At this point, note that the left half of
A is a uniformly random matrix.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It first chooses B1 ← Z(n−1)×dm/2eq , (B2, TB2) ← TrapGen(1n−1,
1bm/2c, q). It sets B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p ← Zmq and sets matrix A ∈ Zn×mq as
A = Arrange(B,p, [n] \ {i}).
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It samples U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
(b) Next, it sets Y = C−B1 ·U1 and computes U2 ← SamplePre(B2,
TB2 , σ, Y).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
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Hybrid H3 This hybrid involves syntactic changes. The challenger chooses
A1 ← Zn×dm/2eq and derives B1 by removing the ith row of A1.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It first chooses A1 ← Zn×dm/2eq , (B2, TB2)← TrapGen(1n−1, 1bm/2c, q).
It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}) and B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p2 ← Z
bm/2c
q and sets A2 = Arrange(B2,p2,
[n] \ {i}), A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It samples U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
(b) Next, it sets Y = C−B1 ·U1 and computes U2 ← SamplePre(B2,
TB2 , σ, Y).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H4 In this hybrid, the challenger chooses the left half of A using
TrapGen.
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1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:





← TrapGen(1n−1, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}) and
B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p2 ← Z
bm/2c
q and sets A2 = Arrange(B2,p2,
[n] \ {i}), A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It samples U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
(b) Next, it sets Y = C−B1 ·U1 and computes U2 ← SamplePre(B2,
TB2 , σ, Y).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H5 In this hybrid, the challenger chooses U1 using SamplePre for
each query.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
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← TrapGen(1n−1, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}) and
B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p2 ← Z
bm/2c
q and sets A2 = Arrange(B2,p2,
[n] \ {i}), A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It chooses W′ ← Zn×tq , sets W = Restrict(W′, [n]\{i}), and samples
U1 ← SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W′).
(b) Next, it sets Y = C−B1 ·U1 and computes U2 ← SamplePre(B2,
TB2 , σ, Y).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H6 This hybrid represents a syntactic change, in which the chal-
lenger, for each query, chooses Y as a uniformly random matrix, and sets
W = C−Y = C−B2 ·U2.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
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← TrapGen(1n−1, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}) and
B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p2 ← Z
bm/2c
q and sets A2 = Arrange(B2,p2,
[n] \ {i}), A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It chooses Y ← Z(n−1)×tq and samples U2 ← SamplePre(B2, TB2 , σ,Y).
(b) Next, it sets W = C−B2 ·U2 (which is equal to C−Y), chooses
a uniformly random vector w← Ztq, sets W′ = Arrange(W,w, [n]\
{i}), and computes U1 ← SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W′).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H7 In this hybrid experiment, the challenger chooses U2 from a
Gaussian distribution with parameter σ.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
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← TrapGen(1n−1, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}) and
B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p2 ← Z
bm/2c
q and sets A2 = Arrange(B2,p2,
[n] \ {i}), A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It samples U2 ← Dbm/2c×tZ,σ .
(b) Next, it sets W = C−B2 ·U2, chooses a uniformly random vector
w ← Ztq, sets W′ = Arrange(W,w, [n] \ {i}), and computes U1 ←
SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W
′).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H8 In this hybrid, the challenger chooses matrix B2 uniformly at
random. Note that this means A2 is uniformly random in this hybrid.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
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, B2 ← Z(n−1)×bm/2cq . It
sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}) and B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It also chooses a vector p2 ← Z
bm/2c
q and sets A2 = Arrange(B2,p2,
[n] \ {i}), A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It samples U2 ← Dbm/2c×tZ,σ .
(b) Next, it sets W = C−B2 ·U2, chooses a uniformly random vector
w ← Ztq, sets W′ = Arrange(W,w, [n] \ {i}), and computes U1 ←
SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W
′).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H9 In this hybrid, the matrix A2 is chosen using TrapGen.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:





← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}),
B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\ {i}), and B = [B1 |B2].
139
(b) It sets A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It samples U2 ← Dbm/2c×tZ,σ .
(b) Next, it sets W = C−B2 ·U2, chooses a uniformly random vector
w ← Ztq, sets W′ = Arrange(W,w, [n] \ {i}), and computes U1 ←
SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W
′).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H10 In this hybrid, the challenger chooses U2 using SamplePre for
each query.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:





← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}),
B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\ {i}), and B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It sets A = [A1 |A2].
140
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It chooses Y′ ← Zn×tq and samples U2 ← SamplePre(A2, TA2 , σ,Y′).
(b) Next, it sets W = C−B2 ·U2, chooses a uniformly random vector
w ← Ztq, sets W′ = Arrange(W,w, [n] \ {i}), and computes U1 ←
SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W
′).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H11 This hybrid represents a syntactic change in which the ith row
of matrix W′ is set as a difference of random vector c and the ith row of
A2 ·U2 instead of being sampled uniformly at random directly.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:





← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}),
B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\ {i}), and B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It sets A = [A1 |A2].
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(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It chooses Y′ ← Zn×tq and samples U2 ← SamplePre(A2, TA2 , σ,Y′).
(b) Next, it chooses a random vector c ← Ztq, sets C′ = Arrange(C, c,
[n]\{i}), sets W′ = C′−A2·U2, and computes U1 ← SamplePre(A1,
TA1 , σ, W
′).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Hybrid H12 This hybrid represents a syntactic change. It corresponds to
the security game in Definition 6.1.1 with b = 1.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:





← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q). It sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n] \ {i}),
B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\ {i}), and B = [B1 |B2].
(b) It sets A = [A1 |A2].
(c) Finally, it sends A to A.
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2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preimage
queries of the form (1t,C), where C ∈ Z(n−1)×tq . The challenger responds
to each query as follows:
(a) It chooses W′ ← Zn×tq and computes U1 ← SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W).
(b) Next, it chooses a random vector c ← Ztq, sets C′ = Arrange(C, c,
[n] \ {i}), sets Y′ = C′ −A1 ·U1 (which is equal to C′ −W′), and
computes U2 ← SamplePre(A2, TA2 , σ, Y′).






3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
Analysis We will now show that any PPT adversary has at most negligible
advantage in distinguishing any two consecutive hybrids. For any adversary
A, let pA,i : N → [0, 1] denote the function such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,i(λ)
is the probability that A, on input 1λ, outputs 1 in hybrid experiment Hi.
From the definition of the hybrid experiments, it follows that for all λ ∈
N, pA,0(λ) − pA,12(λ) = 2prrow−rem,q,σLTen,A (λ) − 1. Therefore, to show that LTen
satisfies the (q, σ)-row removal property, it suffices to show that for all A
and i ∈ [12], there exist negligible functions negli such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,i−1(λ)− pA,i(λ) ≤ negli(λ).
Lemma 6.3.1. Assuming LT satisfies (q, σ)-preimage sampling, for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function negl1(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,0(λ)− pA,1(λ) ≤ negl1(λ).
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Proof. Suppose there exist an adversary A and a nonnegligible function η(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,0(λ)− pA,1(λ) ≥ η(λ). Moreover, let sA denote the
number of queries made by A, and let tA denote a bound on the number of
columns in queried matrix C (note that the reduction algorithm is allowed to
depend on the adversary, and therefore it knows sA and tA corresponding to
A).3 Then we can construct a reduction algorithm B such that prpreimg,q,σLT,B (λ) ≥
η(λ) for all λ ∈ N.
The reduction algorithm receives n,m, index i ∈ [n] from A such that
m > 2n log q+2λ and σ >
√
n · log q · logm+λ. It forwards 1n−1, 1dm/2e, 1sA·tA
to the challenger.4 It receives B1 ∈ Z(n−1)×dm/2eq and Ũ ∈ Zdm/2e×(sA·tA)q . Note
that the trapdoor for B1 is not used in hybrid H1. The reduction algorithm
chooses (B2, TB2) using TrapGen, computes A as in H0 (and H1), and sends
A to A. The challenger also partitions Ũ =
[
Ũ1 | . . . | ŨsA
]
, where each
Ũj ∈ Zdm/2e×tAq .
Next, the adversary sends queries. For the i∗th query, the adver-
sary sends (1t,C) for some t ≤ tA. The reduction algorithm sets U1 to
be the first t columns of Ũi∗ . It computes Y = C − B1 · U1 and U2 ←
SamplePre(B2, TB2 , σ,Y). It sets U as in H0/H1 and sends U to A.
3Throughout this section, we construct the nonuniform reduction algorithm, as our re-
duction algorithms depends on the number of queries made by the adversary as well as the
size of the matrices in each query. However, we would like to point out that the reduction
could be made uniform by simply guessing both of these bounds. This would result in a
polynomial loss in the reduction algorithm’s advantage.
4Note that the reduction algorithm chooses admissible parameters, since dm/2e >
n log q+λ > (n− 1) log q+λ and σ >
√
n · log q · logm+λ >
√
(n− 1) · log q · logm/2 +λ.
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Finally, after all queries, if A outputs 1, B guesses that Ũ is sampled
using SamplePre; otherwise it guesses that Ũ is a random Gaussian matrix
sampled with parameter σ.
Note that depending on whether Ũ is sampled using SamplePre or sam-
pled from Gaussian distribution, B simulates either H0 or H1 perfectly. As a
result, B’s advantage in the preimage sampling game is at least η(λ).
Lemma 6.3.2. Assuming LT satisfies q-well-sampledness of matrix, for any
adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl2(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,1(λ)− pA,2(λ) ≤ negl2(λ).
Proof. Suppose there exist an adversary A and a nonnegligible function η(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,1(λ) − pA,2(λ) ≥ η(λ). Then we can construct a
reduction algorithm B such that prmatrix,q,σLT,B (λ) ≥ η(λ) for all λ ∈ N.
The reduction algorithm receives 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n] from A. It for-
wards 1n−1, 1dm/2e to the challenger.5 It receives B1. The reduction algorithm
chooses (B2, TB2) using TrapGen, sets A as in H1 (and H2), and sends A to
A.
Next, the adversary sends queries. For each query C, the challenger
chooses U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ and computes Y = C−B1·U1 and U2 ← SamplePre(B2, TB2 , σ,Y).
It chooses p, sets U as in H1/H2, and sends U to A.
5Note that the reduction algorithm chooses admissible parameters, since dm/2e >
n log q + λ > (n− 1) log q + λ.
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After all the queries, if A outputs 1, B guesses that B1 is sampled
using TrapGen; otherwise it guesses that B1 is a uniformly random matrix.
Note that, depending on whether B1 is sampled using TrapGen or sampled
uniformly at random, B simulates either H1 or H2 perfectly. As a result, B’s
advantage in the matrix well-sampledness game is at least η(λ).
Lemma 6.3.3. For any adversary A, pA,2(λ) = pA,3(λ).
Since the only changes from H2 to H3 are syntactical, it follows that
any adversary has identical behavior in both hybrids.
Lemma 6.3.4. Assuming LT satisfies q-well-sampledness of matrix, for any
PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl4(·) such that for all
λ ∈ N, pA,3(λ)− pA,4(λ) ≤ negl4(λ).
This proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.3.2, except that the
reduction algorithm must send 1n, 1dm/2e instead of 1n−1, 1dm/2e.
Lemma 6.3.5. Assuming LT satisfies (q, σ)-preimage sampling, for any PPT
adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl5(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,4(λ)− pA,5(λ) ≤ negl5(λ).
This proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.3.1, except that the
reduction algorithm must send 1n, 1dm/2e, 1sA·tA instead of 1n−1, 1dm/2e, 1sA·tA .
Lemma 6.3.6. For any adversary A, pA,5(λ) = pA,6(λ).
Note that the distributions in H5 and H6 are identical. In hybrid H5,
the challenger chooses W′ ← Zn×mq , derives W from W′ by removing the ith
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row, and sets Y = C −W. In hybrid H6, it chooses Y ← Z(n−1)×mq , sets
W = C − Y, and sets W′ to be a matrix extended from W by inserting a
random vector at row i. The distribution of (W,W′,Y) is identical in both
hybrid experiments.
Lemma 6.3.7. Assuming LT satisfies (q, σ)-preimage sampling, for any PPT
adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl7(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,6(λ)− pA,7(λ) ≤ negl7(λ).
This proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.3.1, except that the
reduction algorithm must send 1n−1, 1bm/2c, 1sA·tA instead of 1n−1, 1dm/2e, 1sA·tA .
It uses the challenger’s response for setting B2,U2 and chooses the remaining
components by itself.
Lemma 6.3.8. Assuming LT satisfies q-well-sampledness of matrix, for any
PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl8(·) such that for all
λ ∈ N, pA,7(λ)− pA,8(λ) ≤ negl8(λ).
This proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.3.2, except that the
reduction algorithm must send 1n−1, 1bm/2c instead of 1n−1, 1dm/2e. It uses the
challenger’s response for setting B2 and chooses the remaining components by
itself.
Lemma 6.3.9. Assuming LT satisfies q-well-sampledness of matrix, for any
adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl9(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,8(λ)− pA,9(λ) ≤ negl9(λ).
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This proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.3.2, except that the
reduction algorithm must send 1n, 1bm/2c instead of 1n−1, 1dm/2e. It uses the
challenger’s response for setting A2 and chooses the remaining components by
itself.
Lemma 6.3.10. Assuming LT satisfies (q, σ)-preimage sampling, for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function negl10(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,9(λ)− pA,10(λ) ≤ negl10(λ).
This proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.3.1, except that the
reduction algorithm must send 1n, 1bm/2c instead of 1n−1, 1dm/2e. It uses the
challenger’s response for setting A2,U2 and chooses the remaining components
by itself.
Lemma 6.3.11. For any adversary A, pA,10(λ) = pA,11(λ).
In hybrid experiment H10, the challenger chooses Y
′ ← Zn×mq and
derives Y′ by removing the ith row. It sets W = C−Y, chooses a uniformly
random vector w ← Zmq , and constructs W′ from W and w. In hybrid H11,
the challenger chooses Y′ uniformly at random, extends C′ from C by inserting
a random vector at the ith row, and sets W′ = C′−Y′. As a result, (Y′,W′)
are identically distributed in both hybrids. The remaining components in the
hybrids either are identical or can be derived from Y′,W′.
Lemma 6.3.12. For any adversary A, pA,11(λ) = pA,12(λ).
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Note that the distributions in H11 and H12 are identical. The proof is
identical to that of Lemma 6.3.6.
Using the above lemmas, it follows that the advantage of an adversary
in the row removal experiment is at most negl(λ).
Theorem 6.3.3. Fix any function q : N→ N, σ : N→ R+. Assuming LTen =
(EnTrapGen,EnSamplePre) satisfies the (q, σ)-single row removal property, LTen
also satisfies the (q, σ)-row removal property.
Proof. This proof follows via a simple hybrid argument, where we gradually
remove the nontargeted rows from A one by one. Suppose A outputs set S of
size k. We will define n− k + 1 hybrids H1, . . . , Hn−k+1 as follows.
Hybrid Hi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − k In hybrid Hi, the challenger does the
following:
1. Let (1n, 1m, S ⊆ [n])← A(1λ), and let S = {i1, . . . , ik}, S = {i′1, . . . , i′n−k}.
Let Si = S∪{i′1, . . . , i′i} = {̃i1, . . . , ĩk+i} and Si = [n]\Si =
{
ĩ′1, . . . , ĩ′n−k−i
}
.
2. It chooses (B, TB)← EnTrapGen(1k+i, 1m, q), P← Z(n−k−i)×mq .
3. It sets A ∈ Zn×mq , where A[̃ij] = B[j] for all j ≤ k+ i, and A[ĩ′j] = P[j]
for all j ≤ n− k − i, and it sends A to A.
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4. Next, the adversary sends queries. For each query {cj}j∈S, the challenger
first chooses cj ← Ztq for each j ∈ Si \ S, and sets C ∈ Z
(k+i)×t
q , where
C[j] = cĩj for all j ≤ k + i.
5. Next, it chooses U← EnSamplePre(B, TB,C, σ) and sends (A,U).
6. Finally, after all queries, the adversary A outputs a bit b′.
Note that H0 and Hn−k correspond to b = 0 and b = 1 in the row
removal experiment. For any adversary A, let pA,i(λ) denote the probability
of A outputting 1 in hybrid Hi. We will show that for any adversary A, there
exists a negligible function negl(·) such that pA,i(λ) and pA,i+1 differ by at most
negl(λ).
Lemma 6.3.13. Fix any index i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − k − 1}. Assuming LTen
satisfies the single row removal property, for any PPT adversary A, there
exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,i(λ)−pA,i+1(λ) ≤
negl(λ).
Proof. Suppose there exist an adversary A and a nonnegligible function η(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,i(λ) − pA,i+1(λ) ≥ η(λ). We can use A to build
a reduction algorithm B that can break the single row removal property with
advantage η(·).
The reduction algorithm first receives 1n, 1m, S = {i1, . . . , ik}. It defines
Si+1 = S ∪ {i′1, . . . , i′i+1} = {̃i1, . . . , ĩk+i+1}, and lets indx ∈ [k + i + 1] be
the index such that ĩindx = i
′
i+1. The reduction algorithm sends 1
k+i+1, 1m
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and indx.6 It receives B from the challenger. The reduction algorithm sets
A ∈ Zn×mq such that for each j ≤ k + i + 1, A[̃ij] = B[j], and the remaining
rows are chosen uniformly at random.
For each query {cj}j∈S, the reduction algorithm chooses vectors {ci′1 , . . . , ci′i}
uniformly at random from Ztq and sends {cĩj}j∈[k+i+1],j 6=indx to the challenger.
The challenger sends U to the reduction algorithm. The reduction algorithm
forwards U to A. Finally, after all the queries, B outputs the adversary’s final
output bit.
Clearly, the reduction algorithm simulates either Hi or Hi+1, depend-
ing on the challenger’s output, and therefore the advantage of B is pA,i(λ) −
pA,i+1(λ).
6.3.2 Target switching property
Now we prove that our trapdoor sampling scheme satisfies the target
switching property. Formally, we prove the following.
Theorem 6.3.4. Fix any functions q : N → N and σ : N → R+, and error
distribution family {χ(λ)}λ. If LT satisfies q-well-distributedness of matrix
(Definition 3.2.2), (q, σ)-well-distributedness of preimage (Definition 3.2.3),
and LWE-sp(d,q,σ,χ) holds (LWE with short public vectors; Assumption 3) where
6Note that the reduction algorithm chooses admissible parameters, since m > n log q +
λ > (k + i+ 1) log q + λ and σ >
√
n · log q · logm+ λ >
√
(k + i+ 1) · log q · logm+ λ.
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d(λ) = 6λ log q(λ), then LTen satisfies the (q, σ, χ)-single target switching prop-
erty.
Proof. To prove the above theorem, we first define a sequence of hybrid games
where the first game is the single target switching security game, and in the
last game the adversary’s advantage is exactly 0. Later we show that the
adversary’s advantage in any two consecutive hybrid games is negligible. For
simplicity of notation, we will let d = d(λ), q = q(λ), σ = σ(λ), and χ = χ(λ).
Hybrid H0 This corresponds to the single target switching security game.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It chooses matrices (A1, TA1)← TrapGen(1n, 1dm/2e, q) and (A2, TA2)
← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q). It also chooses a random bit b← {0, 1}.
(b) Next, it sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n]\{i}), B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\{i}),
and sends [B1 |B2] to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preim-
age queries of the form (1t,Z0,Z1), where Z0,Z1 ∈ Zn×tq such that
Restrict(Z0,
[n] \ {i}) = Restrict(Z1, [n] \ {i}). The challenger responds to each query
as follows:
(a) It chooses W← Zn×tq and computes U1 ← SamplePre(A1, TA1 , σ,W).
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(b) It also samples vector e← χt and sets E = Arrange(0(n−1)×t, e, [n]\
{i}).
(c) Next, it sets Y = Zb−A1 ·U1 + E (which is equal to Zb−W + E)
and computes U2 ← SamplePre(A2, TA2 , σ,Y).






3. A outputs its guess b′.
Hybrid H1 In this hybrid experiment, the challenger sets U1 to be a Gaus-
sian matrix for each query.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It chooses matrices (A1, TA1)← TrapGen(1n, 1dm/2e, q) and (A2, TA2)
← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q). It also chooses a random bit b← {0, 1}.
(b) Next, it sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n]\{i}), B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\{i})
and sends [B1 |B2] to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preim-
age queries of the form (1t,Z0,Z1), where Z0,Z1 ∈ Zn×tq such that
Restrict(Z0,
[n] \ {i}) = Restrict(Z1, [n] \ {i}). The challenger responds to each query
as follows:
(a) It computes U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
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(b) It also samples vector e← χt and sets E = Arrange(0(n−1)×t, e, [n]\
{i}).
(c) Next, it sets Y = Zb−A1·U1+E and computes U2← SamplePre(A2,
TA2 , σ, Y).






3. A outputs its guess b′.
Hybrid H2 In this hybrid experiment, the challenger sets A1 to be a uni-
formly random matrix (that is, sampled without a trapdoor).
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It chooses A1 ← Zn×dm/2eq and (A2, TA2) ← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q).
It also chooses a random bit b← {0, 1}.
(b) Next, it sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n]\{i}), B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\{i})
and sends [B1 |B2] to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preim-
age queries of the form (1t,Z0,Z1), where Z0,Z1 ∈ Zn×tq such that
Restrict(Z0,
[n] \ {i}) = Restrict(Z1, [n] \ {i}). The challenger responds to each query
as follows:
(a) It computes U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
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(b) It also samples vector e← χt and sets E = Arrange(0(n−1)×t, e, [n]\
{i}).
(c) Next, it sets Y = Zb−A1·U1+E and computes U2← SamplePre(A2,
TA2 , σ, Y).






3. A outputs its guess b′.
Hybrid H3 This hybrid is a syntactic change. Here, we express Y in terms
of B1 and the ith row of A1. Note that the ith row of A1 is used only for
computing the ith row of Y.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It chooses A1 ← Zn×dm/2eq and (A2, TA2) ← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q).
It also chooses a random bit b← {0, 1}.
(b) Next, it sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n]\{i}), B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\{i})
and sends [B1 |B2] to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preim-
age queries of the form (1t,Z0,Z1), where Z0,Z1 ∈ Zn×tq such that
Restrict(Z0,
[n] \ {i}) = Restrict(Z1, [n] \ {i}). The challenger responds to each query
as follows:
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(a) It computes U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
(b) It also samples vector e← χt and sets Z′b = Restrict(Zb, [n] \ {i}).
(c) Next, it sets Y′ = Z′b−B1 ·U1, y = Zb[i]−A1[i] ·U1 + e, and Y =
Arrange(Y′,y, [n] \ {i}). It then computes U2 ← SamplePre(A2,
TA2 , σ, Y).






3. A outputs its guess b′.
Hybrid H4 In this hybrid experiment, the challenger sets the ith row of Y
to be a uniformly random vector.
1. Setup phase. The adversary A sends 1n, 1m, index i ∈ [n]. The chal-
lenger proceeds as follows:
(a) It chooses A1 ← Zn×dm/2eq and (A2, TA2) ← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q).
It also chooses a random bit b← {0, 1}.
(b) Next, it sets B1 = Restrict(A1, [n]\{i}), B2 = Restrict(A2, [n]\{i})
and sends [B1 |B2] to A.
2. Query phase. The adversary makes a polynomial number of preim-
age queries of the form (1t,Z0,Z1), where Z0,Z1 ∈ Zn×tq such that
Restrict(Z0,
[n] \ {i}) = Restrict(Z1, [n] \ {i}). The challenger responds to each query
as follows:
156
(a) It computes U1 ← Ddm/2e×tZ,σ .
(b) It sets Z′b = Restrict(Zb, [n] \ {i}).
(c) Next, it sets Y′ = Z′b−B1·U1, y← Ztq, and Y = Arrange(Y′,y, [n]\
{i}). It then computes U2 ← SamplePre(A2, TA2 , σ,Y).






3. A outputs its guess b′.
Analysis We will now analyze the adversary’s advantage in the single tar-
get switching experiment. Let pA,l(λ) denote the probability of A guessing
correctly (i.e., b′ = b) at the end of hybrid experiment Hl. We will show that
for every PPT adversary A and l ∈ [4] there exist negligible functions negll(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, pA,l−1 − pA,l ≤ negli(λ).
Lemma 6.3.14. Assuming LT satisfies (q, σ)-preimage sampling, for any ad-
versary A there exists a negligible function negl1(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,0 − pA,1 ≤ negl1(λ).
The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.3.1.
Lemma 6.3.15. Assuming LT satisfies q-well-sampledness of matrix, for any
adversary A there exists a negligible function negl2(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
pA,1 − pA,2 ≤ negl2(λ).
The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.3.2.
Lemma 6.3.16. For any adversary A, pA,2 = pA,3.
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Note that the only differences in H2 and H3 are syntactic changes with
respect to matrix Y. As a result, the distributions in the two hybrids are
identical.
Lemma 6.3.17. If LWE-sp(d,q,σ,χ) holds (Assumption 3) where d(λ) = 6λ log q(λ),
then for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl4(·) such
that for all λ ∈ N, pA,3 − pA,4 ≤ negl4(λ).
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there exist an adversary A and a nonnegligi-
ble function η(·) such that pA,3 − pA,4 ≥ η(λ) for all λ ∈ N. We will construct
a reduction algorithm B such that AdvLWE-sp,d,q,σ,χB (λ) ≥ η(λ) for all λ ∈ N.
The reduction algorithm first receives 1n, 1m, i ∈ [n],Z0,Z1 from the
adversary A (such that m > 2n log q + 12λ log q). The reduction algorithm
chooses B1 ← Z(n−1)×mq , (A2, TA2) ← TrapGen(1n, 1bm/2c, q) and derives B2
from A2 by removing the ith row. It defines B = [B1 |B2] and sends it to the
adversary. It also chooses a random bit b← {0, 1}.
Next, the reduction algorithm receives queries from the adversary, and
it uses the LWE-sp challenger to define matrices U1 and y. For each query, the
adversary sends two matrices, Z0,Z1 ∈ Zn×tq , such that all their rows are equal,
except the ith one. The reduction algorithm queries the LWE-sp challenger for
t queries and receives {(ar, ur)}r∈[t], where ar ∈ Zdq for each r ∈ [t]. It chooses
ãr ← Ddm/2e−dZq ,σ for each r ∈ [m], s̃ ← Z
dm/2e−d
q .7 Next, it sets U1 ∈ Zdm/2e×mq
7Since m > 2n log q + 12λ · log q and d = 6λ log q, thus dm/2e − d ≥ 0. Here we would
like to point out that in our target switching security game the adversary is allowed to
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to be a matrix whose rth column is [a | ãr]T for each r ∈ [m]. It sets y ∈ Zmq ,
where yr = Zb[i]r − ur − s̃ · ãTr .
Once y and U1 are determined, the reduction algorithm can compute
U2 using B1,U1,Zb, TA2 . It sets B and U as in H3/H4 and sends U to A.
Finally, after all the queries, the adversary outputs a bit b′. If b = b′,
the reduction algorithm guesses 0 (i.e., ur is an LWE sample); otherwise it
guesses 1 (i.e., ur is a uniformly random element).
Now note that if the LWE-sp challenger uses oracle O2(), then the re-
duction algorithm simulates H4; otherwise it simulates H3. Therefore, the
advantage of B is at least pA,3 − pA,4.
Using the above lemmas, it follows that any PPT adversary has an
advantage at most negl(λ) in the single target switching security game, since
in the last hybrid game (H4) the challenger’s response is independent of bit b
and thus any adversary advantage is exactly 0.
Theorem 6.3.5. Fix any function q : N → N, σ : N → R+ and distribution
family {χ(λ)}λ. Assuming LTen satisfies the (q, σ, χ)-single target switching
property, LTen also satisfies the (q, σ, χ)-target switching property.
The proof of this theorem follows from a hybrid argument similar to
that in the proof of Theorem 6.3.3.
choose the dimensions m,n; as stated in our LWE assumption framework, however, the
lattice dimensions are not chosen by the adversary. Due to this definitional inconsistency,
as a reduction algorithm we always choose to attack the LWE problem for dimensions
d(λ) = 6λ log q(λ). This could be avoided by adapting the existing definitions.
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Chapter 7
Constructing 1-query mixed functional
encryption
In this chapter, we describe our construction of mixed FE for input-
circling branching programs with polynomial width and length. Concretely,
Mκ = {0, 1}k and Fκ denotes the class of input-circling branching programs
with input space {0, 1}k, width w, and length ` = k · L, where κ = (k, w, L).
In other words, every branching program reads each input bit L times in
a circular fashion. Before describing our construction, we introduce some
shorthand notation that we will use throughout this section.
7.1 Notation
Consider a set of 4`λ matrices {B(j,β)i,b }i∈[`],j∈[λ],β,b∈{0,1} and w` matrices
{Pi,v}i∈[`],v∈[w], where each individual matrix lies in Z
n×m
q . For i ∈ [`], let Di
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The matrix Di consists of matrices B
(j,β)
i,b arranged
per adjoining well-defined ordering. Concretely,
let (i, j, β, b) be the indices of any B matrix. The
ordering we define is that
(i, j1, β1, b1) ≺ (i, j2, β2, b2) ⇐⇒

j1 < j2, or
j1 = j2 ∧ β1 < β2, or
j1 = j2 ∧ β1 = β2
∧b1 < b2.
Thus, per our ordering (i, 1, 0, 0), (i, 1, 0, 1),
(i, 1, 1, 0), (i, 1, 1, 1), . . . , (i, λ, 1, 1) is an increas-
ing sequence of indices. Similarly, we can define
an ordering for matrices Pi,v for v ∈ [w] (i.e.,
(i, v1) ≺ (i, v2) ⇐⇒ v1 < v2).
In words, matrix Di is defined by rowwise appending matrices {B(j,β)i,b }j∈[λ],β,b∈{0,1}
and {Pi,v}v∈[w] in an increasing order per the ordering “≺” defined above. We

















to represent the matrix generated by rowwise appending matrices {B(j,β)i,b }(j,β,b)∈S1
and {Pi,v}v∈S2 in an increasing order per the ordering “≺”.
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7.2 Construction
In this section, we present our Mixed FE scheme. First, we provide the
parameter constraints required by our correctness and security proof. For func-
tionality indices (k, w, L) (where k denotes the input length, and w, ` (= k ·L)
are the width and length of branching programs), the setup algorithm chooses
parameters n,m, q, σ and noise distributions χbig, χlast, χappr, χpre, χs, χlwe as fol-
lows.
Fix any ε < 1. Let χ1, χ2 be a B1-bounded discrete Gaussian distri-
bution with parameter σ such that B1 =
√
m · σ. Also, for any B > 0, let
UB denote the uniform distribution on Z∩ [−B,B], i.e., integers between ±B.
The setup algorithm chooses parameters n,m, σ, q and sets noise distributions
χbig, χlast, χappr, χpre, χs, χlwe with the following constraints. Also, we will use
different versions of LWE, with different noise distributions.
- χs = χappr = χpre = χ1 (for enhanced trapdoor sampling);
- n = poly(λ), χlwe = χ1, and q ≤ 2n
ε
(for LWE security: LWEn,q,χlwe ,
LWE-ssn,q,χlwe , LWE-sp6n log q,q,σpre,χappr);
- m > 2(4λ+ w) · n · log q + 12n · log q (for enhanced trapdoor sampling);
- σ >
√
(4λ+ w) · n · log q · logm+ λ (for enhanced trapdoor sampling);
- χbig = Uσbig and χlast = Uσlast , where σbig = σ · 2λ, σlast = (m · σ)` · 2λ
(for smudging/security);
- σpre = σ, (m · (σbig + σpre))` · (m · (σlast + σpre)) ≤ q/16 (for correctness);
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- σs = σ,
√
n · σs · (m · (σpre + σappr))` ≤ q/16 (for correctness).
First, note that it is not necessary to have distributions χlwe, χappr, χpre be the
same distribution. Keeping all these to be different distributions will only
affect the underlying assumptions to which we reduce security. One possible
setting of parameters is as follows: n = (2λ · `)1/ε, m = n1+2ε ·w, q = 2nε , and
σ = n ·
√
w.
We will now describe our Mixed FE construction.
• Setup(1λ, (1k, 1w, 1L)) → (pp,msk). The setup algorithm takes as input
the security parameter λ, message length k, branching program width
w, and number of times it reads each bit L.1 It chooses an LWE modu-
lus q, dimensions n,m, and also distributions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast as
described above. Let ` = k ·L and ñ = (4λ+w)n. It runs the EnTrapGen
algorithm ` times as follows:
∀ i ∈ [`], (Mi, Ti)← EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q).
For each i ∈ [`], it interprets matrix Mi as 4λ+w matrices with dimen-





1Note that here we slightly deviate from our definition as we have 3 separate functionality
parameters instead of a single index. This could simply be handled by extending the mixed
FE definition to multiple indices.
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Also, it samples 4`λmatrices {C(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b uniformly at random as C
(j,β)
i,b ←
Zn×mq for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, it sets the public parame-
ters and the master secret key as










, {Pi,v}i∈[`],v∈[w] , {Ti}i∈[`]
)
.
• KeyGen(msk, x ∈ {0, 1}k) → sk. The key generation algorithm takes as










, {Pi,v}i∈[`],v∈[w] , {Ti}i∈[`]
)
.
It chooses a secret vector s̃ of length n as s̃ ← χns and λ − 1 random
vectors y(j) of length m as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ−1]. Next, it sets vector
y(λ) as




The key generation algorithm then chooses 2`λ secret vectors {s(j,β)i }i,j,β
and 2(` + 1)λ error vectors {e(j,β)i }i,j,β of length n and m, respectively,
as
∀ i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β ∈ {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β ∈ {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ j ∈ [λ], β ∈ {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last.
Let x̃ = xL, i.e., x̃ is a k · L-bit string obtained by appending string x
to itself L times. Next, it computes 2(` + 1)λ key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as
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follows:










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1.












• Enc(pp) → ct. The encryption algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre). It first chooses a λ-bit string
tag← {0, 1}λ and 2` random short matrices {Ui,b}i,b as
∀ i ∈ [`], b ∈ {0, 1}, Ui,b ← χm×mpre .






• SK-Enc(msk,BP) → ct. The secret key encryption algorithm takes as




























for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈ {0, 1} as follows:

























” to denote the operation of uni-
formly sampling a dimension n × m matrix in Zq. Note that here the
sampling is performed uniformly and independently each time. Next,
the algorithm samples w matrices {P`+1,v}v∈[w] for the top level and 2w`
error matrices {Ei,v, Ẽi,v}i∈[`],v∈[w] as follows:
∀ v ∈ [w], P`+1,v =
{




∀ i ∈ [`], v ∈ [w], Ei,v ← χn×mappr , Ẽi,v ← χn×mappr .
The algorithm then sets 2w` matrices {Qi,v, Q̃i,v}i∈[`],v∈[w] as follows:
∀ i ∈ [`], v ∈ [w], Qi,v = Pi+1,πi,0(v) + Ei,v,
Q̃i,v = Pi+1,πi,1(v) + Ẽi,v.
Next, for i ∈ [`], we use matrices Mi,Wi,W̃i to represent the following























Now, the secret key encryption algorithm runs the EnSamplePre to com-
pute 2` short matrices {Ui,b}i,b as
∀ i ∈ [`],
Ui,0 ← EnSamplePre(Mi, Ti, σpre,Wi),
Ui,1 ← EnSamplePre(Mi, Ti, σpre,W̃i).






• Dec(sk, ct) → {0, 1}. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret
















We will assume the algorithm knows the LWE modulus q (i.e., for in-
stance, the public parameters could be included in the secret keys). Let
x̃ = xL, i.e., x̃ is a k · L-bit string obtained by appending string x to















Finally, if ‖z‖ ≤ q/8, it outputs 0; otherwise it outputs 1.
Theorem 7.2.1. Assuming the trapdoor scheme LTen satisfies the (q, σpre)-
well-sampledness of the preimage, the (q, σpre)-row removal property, the (q, χlwe, σpre)-
target switching property, assuming that assumptions LWEn,q,χlwe, LWE-ssn,q,χlwe,
and LWE-sp6n log q,σpre,χappr hold (where n,m, q, σpre, χlwe, χappr are defined as in
the construction), for any PPT adversary A that outputs (1k, 1w, 1L) such that
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the parameter constraints as provided in the construction are satisfied, then
there exist negligible functions negl1(·), negl2(·) such that for every λ ∈ N, A’s
advantage in the 1-query restricted function indistinguishability security (see
Definition 4.2.2) and 1-query restricted accept indistinguishability (see Defini-
tion 4.2.4) is at most negl1(λ) and negl2(λ), respectively.
Remark 7.2.1 (extending to r-query security). We would like to point out that
the above construction can be naturally extended to achieve r-query security
for any a priori fixed polynomial r. To understand the modification, we will
look ahead to the security proof. Specifically, we will focus on the importance
of the λ-bit string tag chosen during encryption. During the proof, we cru-
cially rely on the tag strings tag and tag∗ (the first chosen for answering the
encryption query, and the second used to answer the challenge query) being
distinct at at least one index. Since they are chosen uniformly at random
each time, thus we know that tag 6= tag∗ with probability 1 − 1
2λ
. Now if
the challenger has to answer r encryption queries instead of just 1, then the
modification we consider is to increase the alphabet size of tags such that
the tag strings chosen during all encryption queries and the challenge query
are distinct at at least one index. (Note that this would also mean that we
will have to likewise increase the number of underlying matrices chosen and
extend the trapdoor sampling procedure appropriately.) More formally, we
will now sample tag strings as a uniformly random 2r2-ary string of length-λ
(i.e., tag ← {1, . . . , 2r2}λ). With this modification we can argue that, with
all but negligible probability over the choice of tag strings tag1, . . . , tagr and
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tag∗, there exists an index i ≤ λ such that the ith elements in all these tag
strings are (pairwise) distinct. With this guarantee, the current proof could
be extended to argue r-query security.
7.3 Correctness
We will prove that the mixed FE scheme described above satisfies the
correctness property. Our correctness proof is divided into two parts. First,
we show that if ct is a mixed FE encryption of branching program BP, then
given any secret key skx, the decryption algorithm outputs BP(x) with all-but-
negligible probability. Second, we show that if ct is a normal FE ciphertext,
then given any secret key skx, the decryption algorithm outputs 1 with all-
but-negligible probability.
Lemma 7.3.1. For every λ, k, w, L ∈ N, for every length k · L and width
w input-circling branching program BP with input space {0, 1}k, input x ∈
{0, 1}k, the following holds:
Pr
[
Dec(skx, ct) = BP(x) :
(pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, (1k, 1w, 1L));
skx ← KeyGen(msk, x); ct← SK-Enc(msk,BP)
]
≥ 1− negl2(λ),
where negl2(·) is a negligible function.
Proof. Here and throughout, whenever we say matrices/terms corresponding
to (j, β)th strands, then we mean the corresponding matrix/term with the
superscript (j, β). Also, when we refer to the matrices/terms along the strands
169
selected by some tag string tag, then we mean all those matrices/terms with
superscripts (j, tagj) for j ∈ [λ].





for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ [w]. Here all matrices B(j,β)i,b ,Pi,v for
any particular value i (i.e., any fixed level) are sampled along with trapdoor
information. Now for any input x ∈ {0, 1}k, the key generation algorithm
chooses vectors y(j), s̃ such that s̃ is short and
∑
j y
(j) = s̃ · P1,1. It also
samples secret vectors s
(j,β)
i and error vectors e
(j,β)
i and computes the secret
key components t
(j,β)
i in the special way as described in the construction. Now
the mixed FE encryption algorithm samples a λ-bit tag string tag, and it uses
the trapdoor information to target B
(j,β)
i,b matrices to their corresponding C
(j,β)
i,b
matrices only along the strands selected by the tag string tag. Additionally,
it also targets the program matrices Pi,v at each level to their counterparts
in the next level per the branching program state transition function. For
proving correctness we simply show that the final program matrix reached
after decryption is either short or random depending upon outcome of the




i,b matrices get canceled at each step, and the
error terms are appropriately bounded.
We start by introducing some notation useful for the correctness proof.






















if i = `+ 1:
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the error-free secret key components, i.e., secret key vectors without











α=γ Uα,x̃α : the partial sum computed during
decryption after using the first i components of the secret key along only














α=1 Uα,x̃α if i ≤ `,
y(j) ·
∏`
α=1 Uα,x̃α if i = `+ 1:
the expected sum during decryption in absence of errors after using the

























α=1 Uα,x̃α : the matrix denoting partial branching program






blinding component, and short secret s̃ multiplied.
Observe that the decryption algorithm computes ∆`+1 and tests whether it is
close to zero or not. We start by proving that for all i, j, the error term err
(j)
i
is small and bounded. This would help us in arguing that for every i, erri is
also small, thereby giving us that matrices ∆`+1 and ∆̃`+1 are very close to
each other as well. Combining this with the fact that ∆̃`+1 is either a random
matrix or a short matrix, depending upon the output BP(x), we get that the
sum ∆`+1 computed by the decryption algorithm is close to zero if BP(x) = 0;
otherwise it is a random vector with large entries.
171
Claim 7.3.1. There exists a negligible function negl(·) such that
∀ i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ],
∥∥∥err(j)i ∥∥∥ ≤ (m · (σbig + σpre))i ,
∀ j ∈ [λ],
∥∥∥err(j)`+1∥∥∥ ≤ (m · (σbig + σpre))` · (m · (σlast + σpre))
with probability 1− negl(λ).
Proof. We prove the above claim by inducting on the levels i. Our proof is
insensitive to the choice of strand index j; thus for the purposes of this proof,
it could be fixed to an arbitrary value.












1 , where e
(j,tagj)
1 is a short error vector drawn from χ
m








+ y(j) by definition. Thus, we get that∥∥∥err(j)1 ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥∆(j)1 − ∆̃(j)1 ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥e(j,tagj)1 ∥∥∥ ≤ √m · σbig
with all-but-negligible probability. This completes the proof of the base case.
For the induction step, we assume that the above claim holds for i∗ and show
that it holds for i∗ + 1 as well.

































































i∗+1 with the above equations,













∥∥∥err(j)i∗+1∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥e(j,tagj)i∗+1 ∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥err(j)i∗ ∥∥∥ · ‖Ui∗,x̃i∗‖
≤
√
m · σ∗ + (m · (σbig + σpre))i
∗
· (m · σpre)
≤ (m · (σbig + σpre))i
∗
· (m · (σ∗ + σpre)) ,
where σ∗ = σbig if i
∗ < `; otherwise σ∗ = σlast. This completes the proof of the
above claim.
From the above claim, we get that for every j ∈ [λ],
∥∥err(j)`+1∥∥ ≤ (m ·
(σbig +σpre))
` · (m · (σlast +σpre)). Thus, by the triangle inequality we can claim
that (with all-but-negligible probability)
‖err`+1‖ ≤ λ · (m · (σbig + σpre))` · (m · (σlast + σpre)) ≤ q/16.
Next, we show that Γi is close to Pi+1,sti . In other words, the partial branching
program evaluation is correct.
Claim 7.3.2. For all i ∈ {0, . . . , `}, ‖Γi −Pi+1,sti‖ ≤ (m · (σpre + σappr))
i with
probability 1− negl(λ), where negl(·) is a negligible function.
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Proof. We prove the above claim by inducting on the levels i.
Base case (i = 0) Note that Γ0 is simply equal to P1,1 as starting state
st0 = 1. Thus, we get that
‖Γ0 −P1,st0‖ = 0.
This completes the proof of the base case. For the induction step, we assume
that the above lemma holds for i∗ − 1 and show that it holds for i∗ as well.
Induction step We know that Γi∗ = Γi∗−1 · Ui∗,x̃i∗ . Recall that, per our
construction, Ui∗,x̃i∗ targets Pi∗,sti∗−1 to Pi∗+1,sti∗ + Err1, where Err1 is an
n×m matrix sampled uniformly from χn×mappr . Concretely, this gives that
Pi∗,sti∗−1 ·Ui∗,x̃i∗ = Pi∗+1,sti∗ + Err1, where ‖Err1‖ ≤ m · σappr.
By our inductive hypothesis, we have that Γi∗−1 = Pi∗,sti∗−1 + Err2, where
‖Err2‖ ≤ (m · (σpre + σappr))i






= Pi∗+1,sti∗ + (Err1 + Err2 ·Ui∗,x̃i∗ ) .
Now we have that
‖Err1 + Err2 ·Ui∗,x̃i∗‖ ≤ m · σappr + (m · (σpre + σappr))
i∗−1 ·m · σpre
≤ (m · (σpre + σappr))i
∗
.
Thus, the claim follows.
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From the above claim, we get that (with all-but-negligible probability)
‖Γ`−P`+1,st`‖ ≤ (m · (σpre + σappr))
`. Next, we show that ∆̃`+1 has low norm
if the output of branching program is 0; otherwise it is not upper-bounded
with all-but-negligible probability.
Claim 7.3.3. There exists a negligible function negl(·) such that∥∥∥∆̃`+1∥∥∥ = {≤ q/16 if BP(x) = 0,≥ q/4 if BP(x) = 1
with probability 1− negl(λ).
















= s̃ · P1,1, this gives that ∆̃`+1 = s̃ · P1,1 ·
∏`
α=1 Uα,x̃α
= s̃ · Γ`. Using Claim 7.3.2, we get that Γ` = P`+1,st` + Err, where ‖Err‖ ≤
(m · (σpre + σappr))`. Also, we know that P`+1,rej = 0n×m, and P`+1,acc is a
uniformly random n × m matrix. Thus, we get that with all-but-negligible
probability
BP(x) = 0⇒
∥∥∥∆̃`+1∥∥∥ = ‖s̃ · Err‖ ≤ ‖s̃‖ · (m · (σpre + σappr))`
≤
√
n · σs · (m · (σpre + σappr))` ≤ q/16,
BP(x) = 1⇒
∥∥∥∆̃`+1∥∥∥ = ‖s̃ ·P`+1,acc + s̃ · Err‖ ≥ ‖s̃ ·P`+1,acc‖ − q/16 ≥ q/4,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that s̃ · P`+1,acc is a uniformly
random vector. This completes the proof of the above claim.
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By the triangle inequality, we know that∥∥∥∆̃`+1∥∥∥− ‖err`+1‖ ≤ ‖∆`+1‖ ≤ ∥∥∥∆̃`+1∥∥∥+ ‖err`+1‖ .
Combining this with the above claims, we can conclude that with all-but-
negligible probability
BP(x) = 0⇒ ‖∆`+1‖ ≤ q/16 + q/16 ≤ q/8,
BP(x) = 1⇒
∥∥∥∆̃`+1∥∥∥ ≥ q/4− q/16 > q/8.
Thus, for any input x and branching program BP, the mixed FE encryption
algorithm is correct with all-but-negligible probability. This concludes the
proof of Lemma 7.3.1.
Lemma 7.3.2. For every λ, k, w, L ∈ N, for every length k · L and width
w input-circling branching program BP with input space {0, 1}k, input x ∈
{0, 1}k, the following holds:
Pr
[
Dec(skx, ct) = 1 :
(pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, (1k, 1w, 1L));
skx ← KeyGen(msk, x); ct← Enc(pp)
]
≥ 1− negl1(λ),
where negl1(·) is a negligible function.
Proof. Recall that the output of a normal encryption algorithm is simply in-
dependently drawn 2` short Gaussian matrices {Ui,b}. Now the decryption






































From our construction we know that for any j,
t
(j,tagj)
` ·U`,x̃` + t
(j,tagj)




`−1,x̃`−1 ·U`,x̃` + e
(j,tagj)
























a uniformly random matrix. Also, secret vector s
(j,tagj)
` is a length n random


















appears in any other term in sum vector z, thus
the distribution of z is that of a uniformly random vector over the choice of
coins used during setup, key generation, and encryption. Since we know that
the `2-norm of a random vector in Zmq is at least q/8 with all-but-negligible
probability, therefore the claim follows.
7.4 Security proof
We now prove that the mixed FE scheme described in Section 7.2 sat-
isfies the 1-query restricted function indistinguishability as well as the 1-query
restricted accept indistinguishability security properties. Our proof is divided
into two components where we first prove function indistinguishability, and
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later prove accept indistinguishability. Both proofs proceed via a sequence of
hybrid games.
7.4.1 1-query restricted function indistinguishability
Below we provide a sequence of hybrid games that we later use to argue
function indistinguishability security.
Game 0 This corresponds to the original 1-query restricted function indistin-
guishability security game.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ+ w)n.
2. Next, it samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈
{0, 1}.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
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• Challenge phase. The challenger chooses a random bit γ ← {0, 1} and





i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}
, acc(γ) ∈ [w], rej(γ) ∈ [w]
)
,
S∗ = [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2.
The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)
as






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger chooses a λ-bit string tag← {0, 1}λ
and responds as follows:
(a) Let S = [`] × [λ] × {0, 1}2. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine


















- Tag tag, Level α, Set S ⊆ [`] × [λ] × {0, 1}2, Matrices
{B(j,β)i,b ,C
(j,β)
i,b }(i,j,β,b)∈S , {Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w], Trapdoors {Ti}i∈[`];
- BP =
(




Execution: Let Sα denote the following set:
Sα =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 such that (α, j, β, b) ∈ S
}
.
Sample matrices {D(j,β)b , D̃
(j,β)
b }(j,β,b)∈Sα as





















Sample 2w error matrices as Ev ← χn×mappr , Ẽv ← χn×mappr for v ∈ [w]. Also, if
α = `, sample w matrices {P`+1,v}v∈[w] for the top level as
∀ v ∈ [w], P`+1,v =
{










∀ v ∈ [w],
Qv = Pα+1,πα,0(v) + Ev,
Q̃v = Pα+1,πα,1(v) + Ẽv.
(Execution continues in Fig. 7.2.)
Figure 7.1: Routine Mixed-SubEnc






























Run the EnSamplePre to compute matrices {U0,U1} as
U0 ← EnSamplePre(M, Tα, σpre,W),
U1 ← EnSamplePre(M, Tα, σpre,W̃).
Figure 7.2: Routine Mixed-SubEnc
2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ− 1]. Next, it sets vector y(λ) as








∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,




(c) Let x̃ = xL. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 , i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Game 1 This is identical to the previous game, except the challenger now
chooses both tags tag∗ and tag at the beginning during the setup phase, and
it aborts if tag∗ = tag.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall ` = k ·L and ñ = (4λ+w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit strings
tag∗, tag← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the adversary
wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below.
2. Next, it samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q).
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3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈
{0, 1}.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}
, acc(γ) ∈ [w], rej(γ) ∈ [w]
)
,
S∗ = [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2.
The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)

















{Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w] , {Ti}i∈[`] ,BP
(γ)
 .









• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
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(a) Let S = [`] × [λ] × {0, 1}2. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine



















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ− 1]. Next, it sets vector y(λ) as








∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last.
(c) Let x̃ = xL. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:











+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 , i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Notation In all the following hybrid games, let j∗ denote the smallest index
in {1, . . . , λ} such that tag∗j∗ 6= tagj∗ , i.e., j∗ = min
{
j ∈ [λ] : tag∗j 6= tagj
}
.
Since the challenger aborts whenever tag∗ = tag, thus j∗ always exists when-
ever the challenger does not abort. Additionally, let β∗ = tag∗j∗ .
Game 2 This is identical to the previous game, except the challenger, while
answering a secret key query, now puts the s̃ ·P1,1 component in y(j
∗) instead
of y(λ), and the rest are sampled uniformly at random.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below.
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2. Next, it samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈
{0, 1}.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}
, acc(γ) ∈ [w], rej(γ) ∈ [w]
)
,
S∗ = [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2.
The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)
as





























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
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1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = [`] × [λ] × {0, 1}2. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine



















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}. Next, it sets vector y(j
∗) as
y(j








∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,




(c) Let x̃ = xL. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 , i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Next, we have a sequence of 4` hybrid experiments, Game 3.i∗. {1, 2, 3, 4}
for i∗ = 1 to `.




i,b matrices for the j
∗th
strands and levels i < i∗ are not sampled (at all) along with other level i
matrices (i.e., (j∗, β∗) and (j∗, 1−β∗) strands); ciphertext components for lev-
els i < i∗ are used to target only the remaining matrices; i.e., the ciphertext
matrices do not target B
(j,β)
i,b matrices for j = j
∗ and i < i∗ to some prespecified
C
(j,β)
i,b or random matrices. Also, the first i
∗− 1 components in each secret key
are set to be uniformly random vectors, and the next component is hardwired
such that correctness holds, and also some smudgeable noise is introduced into
these components. Below we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
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1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i < i∗, S(i) = ([λ] \ {j∗})× {0, 1}2,




ñ− 4n for i < i∗,
ñ for i ≥ i∗.
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}





The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)

















{Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w] , {Ti}i∈[`] ,BP
(γ)
 .









• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows.
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(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, β) ∈ [i∗ − 1]× {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
i ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, ẽ(j
∗,β)
i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP(γ) after i∗ − 1 steps, respectively. Also, let
Γ, ỹ, and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,



































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Game 3.i∗.2 This is identical to the previous game, except the (i∗ + 1)th key
component in the j∗th strands is also hardwired. Below we describe it in
detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall ` = k ·L and ñ = (4λ+w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit strings
tag∗, tag← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the adversary
wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let S(i) denote
the following sets:
∀ i < i∗, S(i) = ([λ] \ {j∗})× {0, 1}2,
192




ñ− 4n for i < i∗,
ñ for i ≥ i∗.
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)

















{Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w] , {Ti}i∈[`] ,BP
(γ)
 .






• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, β) ∈ [i∗ − 1]× {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
i ← Zmq ,
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∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, ẽ(j
∗,β)
i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP(γ) after i∗ − 1 steps, respectively. Also, let
Γ, ỹ, and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Also, for β ∈ {0, 1}, let B(j
∗,β)
`+1,x̃`+1





































Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,








































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.





strands j = j∗ and levels i = i∗ are not sampled along with other level i∗
matrices, but instead they are sampled uniformly at random. Also, ciphertext
components for level i∗ are used to target only the remaining matrices. Below
we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i < i∗ + 1, S(i) = ([λ] \ {j∗})× {0, 1}2,
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ñ− 4n for i < i∗ + 1,
ñ for i ≥ i∗ + 1.
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q),





3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)

















{Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w] , {Ti}i∈[`] ,BP
(γ)
 .










• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, β) ∈ [i∗ − 1]× {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
i ← Zmq ,
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∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, ẽ(j
∗,β)
i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP(γ) after i∗ − 1 steps, respectively. Also, let
Γ, ỹ, and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Also, for β ∈ {0, 1}, let B(j
∗,β)
`+1,x̃`+1





































Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,









































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Game 3.i∗.4 This is identical to the previous game, except the i∗th level key
component in the j∗th strands is a uniformly random n length vector; i.e., all
first i∗ level components in the j∗th strand are random elements. Also, we no




i,b for strands j = j
∗ and levels i = i∗ at
all. Below we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
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adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i < i∗ + 1, S(i) = ([λ] \ {j∗})× {0, 1}2,




ñ− 4n for i < i∗ + 1,
ñ for i ≥ i∗ + 1.
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)
201

















{Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w] , {Ti}i∈[`] ,BP
(γ)
 .









• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.
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∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, β) ∈ [i∗]× {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
i ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, ẽ(j
∗,β)
i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP(γ) after i∗ − 1 steps, respectively. Also, let
Γ, ỹ, and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Also, for β ∈ {0, 1}, let B(j
∗,β)
`+1,x̃`+1
= 0n×m. Next, it computes










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,

































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Game 4 This is identical to the previous game, i.e., Game 3.`.4. For ease of
exposition, we describe it in detail below.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) = ([λ] \ {j∗})× {0, 1}2.
Also, let ñi = ñ− 4n for all i ∈ [`].
Set Ŝ =
{




2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)

















{Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w] , {Ti}i∈[`] ,BP
(γ)
 .









• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
205
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.







∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, β) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
i ← Zmq .




`+1 denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP(γ) after ` steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ,
and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:





∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For v ∈ [w], let P(β
∗)
`+1,v be the top level matrices chosen while
computing the challenge ciphertext. Similarly, let P
(1−β∗)
`+1,v be
the top level matrices chosen while computing the query ci-
phertext. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows.










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,









































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Next, we have a sequence of ` hybrid experiments, Game 4.i∗ for i∗ = 1
to `.
Game 4.i∗ This is identical to the previous game, except the challenger uses the
routine Mixed-SubEnc∗ to generate the first i∗ components of both the challenge
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as well as the query ciphertext. This routine is similar to Mixed-SubEnc, except
that Mixed-SubEnc∗ outputs ciphertext components that map the {Pi∗,v}v∈[w]






• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) = ([λ] \ {j∗})× {0, 1}2.
Also, let ñi = ñ− 4n for all i ∈ [`].
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
208
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc and Mixed-SubEnc∗ routines
(described in Figs. 7.1 and 7.3) as


















































• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key











(i,j,β,b)∈S , {Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w], Trapdoors {Ti}i∈[`].
Output: Matrices {U0,U1}.
Execution: Let Sα denote the following set:
Sα =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 such that (α, j, β, b) ∈ S
}
.
Sample matrices {D(j,β)b , D̃
(j,β)
b }(j,β,b)∈Sα as



























∀ v ∈ [w],
Qv ← Zn×mq ,
Q̃v ← Zn×mq .
(Execution continues in Fig. 7.4.)
Figure 7.3: Routine Mixed-SubEnc∗
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc and Mixed-SubEnc∗ rou-
tines (described in Figs. 7.1 and 7.3) as
∀ α ∈ [i∗],
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Mixed-SubEnc∗ (continued)























Run the EnSamplePre to compute matrices {U0,U1} as
U0 ← EnSamplePre(M, Tα, σpre,W),
U1 ← EnSamplePre(M, Tα, σpre,W̃).



































2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
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(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.







∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, β) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
i ← Zmq .




`+1 denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP(γ) after ` steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ,
and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For v ∈ [w], let P(β
∗)
`+1,v be the top level matrices chosen while
computing the challenge ciphertext. Similarly, let P
(1−β∗)
`+1,v be
the top level matrices chosen while computing the query ci-
phertext.2 Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows.





is not sampled during Mixed-SubEnc∗. For
that experiment, we will assume these matrices are chosen for the first key query and used
for all remaining keys.
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+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,








































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
Game 5 This is identical to the previous game, i.e., Game 4.`. For ease of
exposition, we describe it in detail below.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L) and
descriptions of two branching programs (BP(0),BP(1)) to the challenger.
Then the challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
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adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) = ([λ] \ {j∗})× {0, 1}2.
Also, let ñi = ñ− 4n for all i ∈ [`].
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.






i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1}




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc∗ routine (described in Fig. 7.3)





























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc∗ routine (described in
Fig. 7.3) as follows. For all α ∈ [`],
({Uα,0,Uα,1})← Mixed-SubEnc∗










2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.







∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, β) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
i ← Zmq .
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`+1 denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP(γ) after ` steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ,
and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For the first key query, it samples matrices P
(β)
`+1,v for v ∈












Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,








































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′, and wins if γ′ = γ.
3Recall, as defined in Game 4.(` + 1), that these matrices are sampled only for the first
key query, and all remaining key queries use the same matrices.
216
7.4.2 Indistinguishability of hybrid games in Section 7.4.1
We will now show that the hybrid experiments described above are
computationally indistinguishable. For any PPT adversary A, let AdvA,x(·)
denote the advantage of A in Game x.
Lemma 7.4.1. There exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any
adversary A and λ ∈ N, AdvA,0(λ)− AdvA,1(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 0 and Game 1 is that the challenger
aborts if tag∗ = tag. The probability of this event is 2−λ, and it is independent
of the adversary’s choice of (k, w, L) and BP(0),BP(1) in the setup phase. As a
result, for any adversary A, AdvA,0(λ)− AdvA,1(λ) ≤ 2−λ.
Lemma 7.4.2. For any adversary A and λ ∈ N, AdvA,1(λ) = AdvA,2(λ).
Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is with respect to the
keys. In Game 1, for each key query, the challenger chooses λ − 1 uniformly




In Game 2, the challenger chooses y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗} and sets
y(j
∗) = s̃ ·P1,1 −
∑
j∈[λ]\{j∗} y
(j). Fix all y(j) for j /∈ {j∗, λ} and s̃ ·P1,1. Then






∗) ← Zmq ;











y(λ) ← Zmq ;
y(j






This implies that the distributions in Game 1 and Game 2 are identical.
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Lemma 7.4.3. For any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,2(λ)− AdvA,3.1.1(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. Let us first consider the differences between Game 2 and Game 3.1.1.
The setup and challenge phases are identical in both games. The post-challenge
ciphertext query is also handled identically in both games. The only difference
in the two games is with respect to the key queries. In particular, for each
key query x, the key components {t(j
∗,β)
1 }β∈{0,1} are computed differently in
the two games. In Game 2, the challenger sets t
(j∗,β)








1 , while in Game 3.1.1, it sets t
(j∗,β)










1 . Using the smudging lemma (Lemma 3.1.1), since
σbig/σlwe ≥ 2λ, we can argue that there exists a negligible function neglsmud(·)





























1 ← χmbig for β ∈ {0, 1};
ẽ
(j∗,β)
1 ← χmlwe for β ∈ {0, 1}
}
.
As a result, if an adversary A makes qkeys(λ) key queries, then for any
λ ∈ N, AdvA,2(λ)− AdvA,3.1.1(λ) ≤ qkeys(λ) · (2m · neglsmud(λ)).
Lemma 7.4.4. For any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.1(λ)− AdvA,3.i∗.2(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The main difference in these two games is in the key generation phase.








are computed differently in
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+ s̃ · E. In
the second equality, ẽ
(j∗,β)
i∗+1 ← χlwe, s̃ ← χns , E is sampled by Mixed-SubEnc
































(note that this is how t̃
(j∗,β)
i∗ is defined in Game 3.i
∗.2).
To prove this lemma, we will use the following fact, which follows from
the smudging lemma (Lemma 3.1.1). Here, we use the fact that if e and U
have entries bounded by σpre · poly(λ), then e ·U can be “drowned” by a noise
vector e′ drawn from a noise distribution with parameter σpre · 2λ.
Fact 7.4.1. Let χbig, χs, χappr, χlwe be families of distributions over Z as defined
in the construction. For any polynomials n(·),m(·), there exists a negligible
function negl′(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, n = n(λ), m = m(λ), χbig = χbig(λ),
χs = χs(λ), χappr = χappr(λ), χlwe = χlwe(λ), and matrix U ∈ Zm×mq such that




e : e← χmbig
}
; D2 =
e1 + e2 + e3 :
e1 ← χmbig; s← χns ; E← χn×mappr ;





As a result, if an adversary A makes qkeys(λ) key queries, then for any
λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.1(λ)− AdvA,3.i∗.2(λ) ≤ 2qkeys(λ) · negl′(λ).
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Lemma 7.4.5. Assuming the trapdoor generation algorithms LTen satisfy the
(q, σpre)-row removal property, for any PPT adversary A, there exists a neg-
ligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, i∗ ∈ [`], AdvA,3.i∗.2(λ) −
AdvA,3.i∗.3(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. First, let us consider the differences between Game 3.i∗.2 and Game 3.i∗.3.
1. Set S(i
∗): In Game 3.i∗.2, the challenger sets S(i
∗) = [λ]×{0, 1}2, while in
Game 3.i∗.3, S(i
∗) = ([λ]\{j∗})×{0, 1}2 (tag∗, tag are chosen at the start
of the security game, so j∗ is well defined here). Also, ñi∗ = ñ = (4λ+w)n
in Game 3.i∗.2, while ñi∗ = ñ− 4n in Game 3.i∗.3.
2. {B(j,β)i,b }i=i∗ matrices: In Game 3.i∗.2, the challenger chooses (Mi∗ , Ti∗)←
EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q), while in Game 3.i∗.3, the challenger chooses (Mi∗ , Ti∗)
← EnTrapGen(1ñ−4n, 1m, q). As a result, in Game 3.i∗.2, it derives all
matrices {B(j,β)i∗,b }(j,β,b)∈[λ]×{0,1}2 from Mi∗ . In Game 3.i∗.3, the challenger
chooses {B(j
∗,β)
i∗,b }b,β∈{0,1} uniformly at random, while the remaining are
derived from Mi∗ .
3. Ciphertexts: Since the set S(i
∗) is different in both games, the challenge
and query ciphertexts are constructed differently in both games.
Let us now discuss why the row removal property is applicable here.






. In Game 3.i∗.2, each














random matrix. To see why, let us suppose tag∗j∗ = β




i∗,0 ·U∗i∗,0 = C
(j∗,β∗)
i∗,0 , the rest are mapped to random matrices;
• B(j
∗,β∗)
i∗,1 ·U∗i∗,1 = C
(j∗,β∗)
i∗,1 , the rest are mapped to random matrices;
• B(j
∗,1−β∗)
i∗,0 ·Ui∗,0 = C
(j∗,1−β∗)
i∗,0 , the rest are mapped to random matrices;
• B(j
∗,1−β∗)
i∗,1 ·Ui∗,1 = C
(j∗,1−β∗)
i∗,1 , the rest are mapped to random matrices.
Also, it is important to note that the {C(j
∗,β)
i∗,b }b,β∈{0,1} are not used for respond-
ing to key generation queries. Therefore, we can use the row removal property
to remove the rows corresponding to B
(j∗,b)
i∗,β from the level i
∗ matrices.
Suppose, on the contrary, that there exist an adversary A and a nonneg-
ligible function η(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.2(λ)−AdvA,3.i∗.3(λ) ≥ η(λ).
We will use this adversary to build a reduction algorithm B that breaks the
(q, σpre)-row removal property of LTen.
The reduction algorithm first receives functionality index (k, w, L) from
A. Depending on the functionality index, the reduction algorithm sets ` = k·L,
n, m, ñ = (4λ + w)n as in Game 3.i∗.2 (and Game 3.i∗.3) and sends these
parameters to A.
The reduction algorithm chooses tag∗, tag and defines j∗ as the first in-
dex where the two tags differ. For all i 6= i∗, B defines sets S(i) and samples ma-
trices (with trapdoors) {{B(j,b)i,β }(j,β,b)∈S(i) , {Pi,v}v∈[w] , Ti}i 6=i∗ as in Game 3.i
∗.2
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(and Game 3.i∗.3). The reduction algorithm defines a set SB which represents
the set of rows that are removed in the transition between the two games.
Formally, the reduction algorithm defines the sets




{n(j − 1) + 1, n(j − 1) + 2, . . . , nj}.
It sends 1ñ, 1m, SB to the row removal property challenger. It receives A from





The reduction algorithm also chooses (4λ+w−4) matrices {C(j,β)i,b }i 6=i∗,j 6=j∗
uniformly at random from Zn×mq .
Next, it receives the challenge programs BP(0),BP(1). It chooses γ ←
{0, 1}. For all i 6= i∗, it computes (U∗i,0,U∗i,1) components by itself (this step
is identical in both games). For i = i∗, it uses the row removal property






























v∈[w], {Q̃i,v}v∈[w] as in Fig. 7.1 and sets matrices



















It sends them as queries to the row removal challenger (note that C
(j∗,β)
i∗,b is not
required for defining W and W̃). The challenger responds by sending U∗i∗,0







to the adversary. The ciphertext query is handled similarly, and the reduction
algorithm receives {(Ui,0,Ui,1)}i∈[`], which it forwards to A (the remaining
ciphertext components can be computed by the reduction algorithm).
Next, the adversary sends polynomially many key queries. Note that
the keys are generated in an identical manner in both games. Moreover, these
keys can be generated without having {C(j
∗,β)
i∗,b }b,β and the trapdoor for Mi∗ .
Finally, the adversary sends its guess, which the reduction algorithm
forwards to the row removal property challenger. Clearly, if the row removal
challenger chooses b = 0, then the reduction algorithm perfectly simulates
Game 3.i∗.3. If the challenger chooses b = 1, then the reduction algorithm



















to a uniformly random matrix).
Therefore, the reduction algorithm has advantage at least η(·).
Lemma 7.4.6. Assuming the (n, q, σlwe)-LWE assumption holds, for any PPT
adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
i∗ ∈ [`], AdvA,3.i∗.3(λ)− AdvA,3.i∗.4(λ) ≤ negl(λ).

































i∗ . In Game 3.i
∗.4, t̃
(j∗,β)
i∗ ← Zmq . Let qkeys = qkeys(λ) denote
the number of keys queried by A(1λ). To prove that these two games are
computationally indistinguishable, we will define qkeys hybrid experiments.
Hybrid Ho,0 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys} In this hybrid, for the first o keys,
the t̃
(j∗,0)
i∗ components are sampled uniformly at random in the first o queries,
while the t̃
(j∗,1)
i∗ components are sampled as in Game 3.i
∗.3. For the remaining
qkeys− o key queries, the keys are generated as in Game 3.i∗.3 in the remaining
queries.
Hybrid Ho,1 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys} In this hybrid, for all keys, the
t̃
(j∗,0)
i∗ components are sampled uniformly at random. For the first o queries,
the t̃
(j∗,1)
i∗ components are sampled uniformly at random, while the remaining
are sampled as in Game 3.i∗.3.
Clearly, H0,0 corresponds to Game 3.i
∗.3, Hqkeys,1 is identical to Game 3.i
∗.4,
and Hqkeys,0 ≡ H0,1. Let aA,i,b(λ) denote the advantage of A in Hi,b.
Claim 7.4.1. Assuming the (n, q, σlwe)-LWE assumption, for any PPT adver-
sary A making qkeys(·) key queries, there exists a negligible function no,0(·) such
that for all λ ∈ N, qkeys = qkeys(λ) and all indices o ∈ [qkeys], aA,o−1,0 − aA,o,0 ≤
no,0(λ).
Proof. Suppose there exist an adversary making qkeys key queries, and a non-
negligible function η(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, there exists an index o ∈ [qkeys]
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such that aA,o−1,0−aA,o,0 ≥ η(λ). We will use A to build a reduction algorithm
B that breaks the (n, q, σlwe)-LWE assumption.
The reduction algorithm first receives (1k, 1w, 1L) from A. It sets ñ =
(4λ+w) ·n. The reduction algorithm queries the LWE challenger m times and
receives {(ai, ui)}i≤m. It sets a matrix A = [aT1 aT2 . . . aTm] (that is, A ∈ Zn×mq )
and u = [u1u2 . . . um] (that is, u ∈ Zmq ).
The reduction algorithm then chooses two tags, tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ,
and let j∗ be the first index where they differ. Next, the reduction algorithm
defines set S(i) for each i, set Ŝ, matrices {B(j,β)i,b }(i,j,β,b)∈Ŝ, {Pi,v}i∈[`],v∈[w] and
{Ti}i∈[`] as in Game 3.i∗.3 (and Game 3.i∗.4). Note that (i∗, j∗, β, b) /∈ Ŝ for
b, β ∈ {0, 1}. The reduction algorithm chooses B(j
∗,1)
i∗,b ← Zn×mq for b ∈ {0, 1}.
It sends the public parameters to A.
The adversary sends two challenge functions, BP(0),BP(1), and a cipher-
text query BP. Note that in Game 3.i∗.3 (and Game 3.i∗.4), the challenge and
query ciphertext are computed identically, and the reduction algorithm has all
the matrices/trapdoors required for computing the ciphertext components.
Next, after receiving the challenge ciphertext and the query ciphertext,
the adversary queries for secret keys. For the first o − 1 secret keys, the
reduction algorithm responds as in Ho−1,0 (which is identical to the response
in Ho,0). In particular, to handle these key queries, the reduction algorithm
does not require B
(j∗,b)
i∗,β , since in both hybrids t̃
(j∗,β)
i∗ ← Zmq . For the oth
query, the reduction algorithm receives x ∈ {0, 1}k. It sets x̃ by repeating
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the input L times, and sets B
(j∗,0)
i∗,x̃i∗



































i∗ as in Ho−1,0 (and Ho,0). All the remaining key queries are
handled identically in Ho−1,0 and Ho,0, and the reduction algorithm has all the
matrices required to compute them (in particular, after responding to the oth
query, all {B(j
∗,β)
i∗,b }(b,β)∈{0,1}2 are well defined).
Finally, the adversary sends its guess, and the reduction algorithm for-
wards it to the LWE challenger. Clearly, if u is a uniformly random vector,
then so is the t̃
(j∗,0)
i∗ component for the oth query, and therefore B perfectly
simulates Ho,0. If t̃
(j∗,0)





i∗ , then the reduction algorithm
implicitly sets s
(j∗,0)
i∗ = s. Also, note that s
(j∗,0)
i∗ is chosen afresh for each key
query, and hence s will not be required anywhere else in simulating Ho−1,0.
Therefore the reduction algorithm perfectly simulates Ho−1,0. As a result, it
breaks the LWE assumption with advantage η.
Claim 7.4.2. Assuming the (n, q, σlwe)-LWE assumption holds, for any PPT
adversary A making qkeys(·) key queries, there exists a negligible function no,1(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, qkeys = qkeys(λ) and all indices o ∈ [qkeys], aA,o−1,1 −
aA,o,1 ≤ no,1(λ).
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This proof is identical to the proof of Claim 7.4.1.
Using the above claims, it follows that for any PPT adversary, there
exists a negligible function negl3.i∗.4 such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.3(λ) −
AdvA,3.i∗.4(λ) ≤ negl3.i∗.4(λ).
Lemma 7.4.7. For any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl3.(i∗+1).1(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.4(λ) − AdvA,3.(i∗+1).1(λ) ≤
negl3.(i∗+1).1(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 3.i∗.4 and Game 3.(i∗ + 1).1 is that








are computed differently. In
particular, in Game 3.(i∗ + 1).1, the term t̃
(j∗,β)
i∗+1 has an additional term ẽ
(j∗,β)
i∗+1
which is drawn from the χmlwe distribution.
The proof of this lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 7.4.3 by
setting negl3.(i∗+1).1(·) = qkeys(·) · (2m ·neglsmud(·)) (recall that neglsmud(·) is the
negligible function given by Lemma 3.1.1).
Next, we will look at Game 4.i for i ∈ [`]. For notational convenience,
we refer to Game 4 as Game 4.0. First, recall that Game 4.0 is identical to







(for the challenge ciphertext) and (U1,0,U1,1) (for the
ciphertext query). In particular, it is not used in the key generation phase.







and (Ui,0,Ui,1). This observation is useful for the following
lemma.
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Lemma 7.4.8. Assuming LTen satisfies the (q, χappr, σpre)-target switching prop-
erty, then for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl4.i∗(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N and i∗ ∈ [`], AdvA,4.(i∗−1) − AdvA,4.i∗ ≤ negl4.i∗(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 4.(i∗ − 1) and Game 4.i∗ is with re-






(in the challenge ciphertext) and (Ui∗,0,Ui∗,1)
(in the ciphertext query). In Game 4.(i∗− 1), these matrices are computed us-
ing Mixed-SubEnc, while they are computed using Mixed-SubEnc∗ in Game 4.i∗.
Recall that the only difference between the Mixed-SubEnc and Mixed-SubEnc∗
ciphertext components is that the Mixed-SubEnc∗ outputs map the {Pi∗,v}v∈[w]





as in Mixed-SubEnc). An important point to note is that the {Pi∗,v}v∈[w] ma-
trices are not used anywhere else in both games. In particular, note that





Suppose there exist an adversary A and a nonnegligible function η(·)
such that Adv4.i∗−1(λ) − Adv4.i∗(λ) ≥ η(λ). We will construct a reduction al-
gorithm that breaks the target switching property with advantage η(·).
Setup phase. The reduction algorithm first performs the following
steps from the setup phase, which are common for both Game 4.(i∗ − 1) and
Game 4.i∗. It defines ñi, S
(i) for all i ∈ [`], chooses tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ,
and defines j∗ as the first index where tag∗ and tag differ. Next, it defines
{{B(j,β)i,b }(j,β,b)∈S(i) , {Pi,v}v∈[w] , Ti}i 6=i∗ as in Game 4.(i
∗ − 1). It also defines Ŝ
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and chooses {C(j,β)i,b }(i,j,β,b)∈Ŝ as in Game 4.(i∗ − 1).
The reduction algorithm sets k̃ = ñi − w · n and queries the target
switching property challenger by sending 1ñi , 1m and setting SB = [k̃]. It










Challenge phase. The reduction algorithm receives BP(1), BP(2).







Mixed-SubEnc∗ (as in Game 4.(i∗ − 1) and Game 4.i∗). Note in particular that
{Pi∗,v}v∈[w] are not used for computing these matrices. It then sends its tar-
get switching property query matrices Z∗0,b,Z
∗
























It receives U∗i∗,b from the challenger.
Query phase. The ciphertext query is handled similarly to the chal-
lenge ciphertext. The key queries are handled identically in both Game 4.(i∗−
1) and Game 4.i∗.
Lemma 7.4.9. For any adversary A, AdvA,5 = 0.
Proof. We will argue that any adversary A has advantage 0 in Game 5. First,
note that the challenge phase uses Mixed-SubEnc∗. As a result, it does not have
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any information about the choice γ ← {0, 1}. Next, in the key query phase,





, which might depend on
γ. However, the important point here is that for each key query x, both






are independent of γ. As a result, the adversary has zero advantage in Game 5.
7.4.3 1-query restricted accept indistinguishability
In order to prove restricted accept indistinguishability security, we take
a slightly different approach. First, we show that our construction achieves
complete accept indistinguishability security, which is defined as follows.
Definition 7.4.1 (q-query complete accept indistinguishability). Let q(·) be
any fixed polynomial. A mixed FE scheme Mixed-FE = (Setup, Enc, SK-Enc,
KeyGen, Dec) is said to satisfy q-query complete accept indistinguishability
security if there exist algorithms SK-Enc∗,KeyGen∗ such that for every stateful
PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·), such that for every
λ ∈ N the following holds:
Pr
AOb1(·),Ob2(·)(pp, ctb) = b :
(1κ, f ∗)← A(1λ);
(pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);
b← {0, 1}; ct1 ← SK-Enc(msk, f ∗);
ct0 ← Enc(pp)
 ≤ 12 + negl(λ),
where
• oracle O01(·) = KeyGen∗(pp, ·), O11(·) = KeyGen(msk, ·),
O02(·) = SK-Enc∗(pp, ·), O12(·) = SK-Enc(msk, ·);
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• A can make at most q(λ) queries to the Ob2(·) oracle;
• every secret key query m made by adversary A to the Ob1(·) oracle must
satisfy the condition that f ∗(m) = 1 as well as f(m) = 1 for every
ciphertext query f made by A to the Ob2(·) oracle; and
• A must make all (at most q(λ)) Ob2(·) oracle queries before making any
query to the Ob1(·) oracle.
At a high level, this states that if the adversary only queries for keys
for inputs m and ciphertexts for functions f such that f(m) = 1 on all com-
binations, then there exist special encryption and key generation algorithms
(SK-Enc∗,KeyGen∗) such that they only take public parameters as inputs, and
the adversary cannot distinguish between correctly computed keys and cipher-
texts from these (simulated) special keys and ciphertexts.
Below we provide a sequence of hybrid games that we later use to argue
complete accept indistinguishability security. To complete the argument, later
(in Section 7.4.5) we simply argue that complete accept indistinguishability
implies restricted accept indistinguishability.
Game 0 This corresponds to the original 1-query restricted accept indistin-
guishability security game in which the challenger encrypts the challenge branch-
ing program BP∗ sent by the adversary.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
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and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ+ w)n.
2. Next, it samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈
{0, 1}.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.




π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc
∗ ∈ [w], rej∗ ∈ [w]
)
,
S∗ = [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2.
The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)

















{Pi,v}(i,v)∈[`]×[w] , {Ti}i∈[`] ,BP
∗
 .










• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger chooses a λ-bit string tag← {0, 1}λ
and responds as follows:
(a) Let S = [`] × [λ] × {0, 1}2. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ− 1]. Next, it sets vector y(λ) as








∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
233
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last.
(c) Let x̃ = xL. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Game 1 This is identical to the previous game, except the challenger now
chooses both tags tag∗ and tag at the beginning during the setup phase, and
it aborts if tag∗ = tag.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below.
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2. Next, it samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈
{0, 1}.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc
∗ ∈ [w], rej∗ ∈ [w]
)
,
S∗ = [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2.
The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
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1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = [`] × [λ] × {0, 1}2. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ− 1]. Next, it sets vector y(λ) as








∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,




(c) Let x̃ = xL. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Notation In all the following hybrid games, let diff denote the set of indices
j such that tag∗j 6= tagj. Similarly, let comm denote the set of indices j such
that tag∗j = tagj. Concretely, in all the following hybrids, sets diff and comm










Additionally, let j∗ denote the smallest index in diff (i.e., j∗ = minj∈diff j), and
let β∗ = tag∗j∗ . Note that since the challenger aborts whenever tag
∗ = tag,
thus j∗, β∗ always exist whenever the challenger does not abort. Also, we will
use d̂iff to denote the set diff excluding index j∗, i.e., d̂iff = diff \ {j∗}.
Game 2 This is identical to the previous game, except the challenger, while
answering a secret key query, now puts the s̃ ·P1,1 component in y(j
∗) instead
of y(λ), and the rest are sampled uniformly at random.
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• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below.
2. Next, it samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for i ∈ [`], j ∈ [λ], β, b ∈
{0, 1}.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc
∗ ∈ [w], rej∗ ∈ [w]
)
,
S∗ = [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2.
The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)
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• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = [`] × [λ] × {0, 1}2. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
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as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}. Next, it sets vector y(j
∗) as
y(j








∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last.
(c) Let x̃ = xL. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Next, we have a sequence of 4` hybrid experiments, Game 3.i∗. {1, 2, 3, 4}
for i∗ = 1 to `.




i,b matrices for all diff strands
and levels i < i∗ are not sampled (at all) along with other level i matrices;
ciphertext components for levels i < i∗ are used to target only the remaining
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matrices; i.e., the ciphertext matrices do not target B
(j,β)
i,b matrices for j ∈ diff
and i < i∗ to some prespecified C
(j,β)
i,b or random matrices. Also, the first
i∗ − 1 components in each secret key are set to be uniformly random vectors,
and the next component is hardwired such that correctness holds, and some
smudgeable noise is also introduced in these components. Below we describe
it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i < i∗, S(i) = comm× {0, 1}2,




ñ− |diff| · 4n for i < i∗,
ñ for i ≥ i∗.
Set Ŝ =
{




2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
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(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [i∗ − 1]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ diff × {0, 1}, ẽ(j,β)i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after i∗−1 steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ,
and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:





∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,





























































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
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Game 3.i∗.2 This is identical to the previous game, except the (i∗ + 1)th key
component in all diff strands is also hardwired. Below we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i < i∗, S(i) = comm× {0, 1}2,




ñ− |diff| · 4n for i < i∗,
ñ for i ≥ i∗.
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
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4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in





















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [i∗ − 1]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ diff × {0, 1}, ẽ(j,β)i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after i∗−1 steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ,
and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.




































































Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,


































































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.





strands and levels i = i∗ are not sampled along with other level i∗ matrices, but
instead they are sampled uniformly at random. Also, ciphertext components
for level i∗ are used to target only the remaining matrices. Below we describe
it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall ` = k ·L and ñ = (4λ+w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit strings
tag∗, tag← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the adversary
wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let S(i) denote
the following sets:
∀ i < i∗ + 1, S(i) = comm× {0, 1}2,
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ñ− |diff| · 4n for i < i∗ + 1,
ñ for i ≥ i∗ + 1.
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q),
∀ (j, β, b) ∈ diff × {0, 1}2, B(j,β)i∗,b ← Z
n×m
q .
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)































• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [i∗ − 1]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
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∀ (j, β) ∈ diff × {0, 1}, ẽ(j,β)i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after i∗−1 steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ,
and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.



































































Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,






































































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Game 3.i∗.4 This is identical to the previous game, except the i∗th level key
component in diff strands is a uniformly random n length vector, i.e., all first
i∗ level components in diff strands are random elements. Also, we no longer




i,b for diff strands and levels i = i
∗ at all. Below
we describe it in detail.
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• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i < i∗ + 1, S(i) = comm× {0, 1}2,




ñ− |diff| · 4n for i < i∗ + 1,
ñ for i ≥ i∗ + 1.
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
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• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in





















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [i∗]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ diff × {0, 1}, ẽ(j,β)i∗ ← χmlwe.




i∗ denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after i∗−1 steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ,
and U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Also, for (j, β) ∈ diff × {0, 1}, let B(j,β)`+1,x̃`+1 = 0
n×m. Next,
it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows. For all tuples
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+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,





















































































`+1 if i = `+ 1.





• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Game 4 This is similar to Game 3.`.4, except that the terms t
(j∗,β)
`+1 have an
additional small error ẽ
(j∗,β)




• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) = comm× {0, 1}2.
Also, let ñi = ñ− |diff| · 4n for all i ∈ [`].
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc





The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
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(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,









`+1 denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after ` steps, respectively. Also, let Γ, ỹ, and
U
(β)
i,b denote the following:




∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For v ∈ [w], let P(β
∗)
`+1,v be the top level matrices chosen while
computing the challenge ciphertext. Similarly, let P
(1−β∗)
`+1,v be
the top level matrices chosen while computing the query ci-
phertext. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows.










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,
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• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Game 5 This is identical to the previous game, except the (` + 1)th key com-
ponents in the special strand (i.e., j∗th strand) are random elements. We
describe this in detail below.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
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Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) = comm× {0, 1}2.
Also, let ñi = ñ− |diff| · 4n for all i ∈ [`].
Set Ŝ =
{
(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)
}
.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)































• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,




∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq .




`+1 denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after ` steps, respectively. Also, let Γ and
U
(β)
i,b denote the following:
Γ = [`+ 1]× comm× {0, 1},
∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For v ∈ [w], let P(β
∗)
`+1,v be the top level matrices chosen while
computing the challenge ciphertext. Similarly, let P
(1−β∗)
`+1,v be
the top level matrices chosen while computing the query ci-
phertext. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows.










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,











































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Next, we have a sequence of ` hybrid experiments, Game 5.i∗ for i∗ = 1
to `.





for j ∈ comm, β = 1− tagj strands (i.e., strands in which B
(j,β)
i,b were targeting
random matrices themselves) and levels i ≤ i∗ are not sampled along with
other level i ≤ i∗ matrices, but instead they are sampled uniformly at random.
Also, ciphertext components for levels i ≤ i∗ are used to target only the
remaining matrices. Below we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ≤ i∗, S(i) =
{








(2 · |comm|+ w)n for i ≤ i∗,
ñ− |diff| · 4n for i > i∗.
Set Ŝ = {(i, j, β, b) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)}.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q),
∀ (i, j, β, b) ∈ ([i∗]× comm× {0, 1}2) \ Ŝ, B(j,β)i,b ← Z
n×m
q .
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)



























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
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∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq .




`+1 denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after ` steps, respectively. Also, let Γ and
U
(β)
i,b denote the following:
Γ = [`+ 1]× comm× {0, 1},
∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For v ∈ [w], let P(β
∗)
`+1,v be the top level matrices chosen while
computing the challenge ciphertext. Similarly, let P
(1−β∗)
`+1,v be
the top level matrices chosen while computing the query ci-
phertext. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows.










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,











































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Next, we have a sequence of ` hybrid experiments, Game 6.i∗ for i∗ = 2
to `+ 1.
Game 6.i∗ This is identical to the previous game (i.e., Game 5.`), except in




i,b matrices uniformly at
random, the key components for levels i ≤ i∗ are random elements. Below we
describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 : j ∈ comm ∧ β = tagj
}
.
Also, let ñi = (2·|comm|+w)n for all i ∈ [`], and set Ŝ = {(i, j, β, b) ∈
[`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)}.
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2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q),
∀ (i, j, β, b) ∈ ([`]× comm× {0, 1}2) \ Ŝ, B(j,β)i,b ← Z
n×m
q .
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
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1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (i, j) ∈ [i∗]× comm, t̃(j,1−tagj)i ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq .
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`+1 denote the state of branching
programs BP, BP∗ after ` steps, respectively. Also, let Γ and
U
(β)
i,b denote the following:
Γ = ([`+ 1] \ [i∗])× comm× {0, 1} ∪
{
(i∗, j, β) : j ∈ comm, β = tagj
}
,
∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For v ∈ [w], let P(β
∗)
`+1,v be the top level matrices chosen while
computing the challenge ciphertext. Similarly, let P
(1−β∗)
`+1,v be
the top level matrices chosen while computing the query ci-
phertext. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows.










+ y(j) + e
(j,β)
















`+1 if i = `+ 1,
















































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Next, we have a sequence of ` + 1 hybrid experiments, Game 7.i∗ for
i∗ = 1 to `+ 1.
Game 7.i∗ This is identical to the previous game (i.e., Game 6.(`+ 1)), except





EnTrapGen, the key components for levels i ≤ i∗ are random elements. Also,




i,b at all, which were sampled
uniformly at random in the previous game. Below we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 : j ∈ comm ∧ β = tagj
}
.
Also, let ñi = (2·|comm|+w)n for all i ∈ [`], and set Ŝ = {(i, j, β, b) ∈
[`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)}.
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2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
274
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses a secret vector as s̃← χns and λ− 1 random vectors
as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ [λ] \ {j∗}.









∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, s(j,β)i ← Znq ,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× diff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (i, j) ∈ [`+ 1]× comm, t̃(j,1−tagj)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (i, j) ∈ [i∗]× comm, t̃(j,tagj)i ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq .




`+1 denote the state of branching




i,b denote the following:
Γ =
{
(i, j, β) ∈ ([`+ 1] \ [i∗])× comm× {0, 1} : β = tagj
}
,
∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
For v ∈ [w], let P(β
∗)
`+1,v be the top level matrices chosen while
computing the challenge ciphertext. Similarly, let P
(1−β∗)
`+1,v be
the top level matrices chosen while computing the query ci-
phertext. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:

























`+1 if i = `+ 1,
















































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Game 8 This is identical to the previous game (i.e., Game 7.(`+ 1)). For ease
of exposition, we describe it in detail below.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 : j ∈ comm ∧ β = tagj
}
.
Also, let ñi = (2·|comm|+w)n for all i ∈ [`], and set Ŝ = {(i, j, β, b) ∈
[`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)}.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
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4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in





















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows.
(a) It chooses |diff| − 1 random vectors as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ d̂iff.







∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ comm× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)`+1 ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq .
(c) Let x̃ = xL, and let U
(β)
i,b denote the following:
∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:
















































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Next, we have a sequence of ` hybrid experiments, Game 8.i∗ for i∗ = 1
to `.
Game 8.i∗ This is identical to the previous game, except now the challenger
samples the first i∗ ciphertext components (both challenge and queried) as
random Gaussian matrices. Below we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 : j ∈ comm ∧ β = tagj
}
.
Also, let ñi = (2·|comm|+w)n for all i ∈ [`], and set Ŝ = {(i, j, β, b) ∈
[`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)}.
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2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. Let
BP∗ =
({
π∗i,b : [w]→ [w]
}
i∈[`],b∈{0,1} , acc




The challenger then runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in Fig. 7.1)
as
∀ (α, b) ∈ [i∗]× {0, 1}, U∗α,b ← χm×mpre .






























• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
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1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) Let S = Ŝ. It runs the Mixed-SubEnc routine (described in
Fig. 7.1) as
∀ (α, b) ∈ [i∗]× {0, 1}, Uα,b ← χm×mpre .




















2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses |diff| − 1 random vectors as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ d̂iff.







∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ comm× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)`+1 ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq .
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(c) Let x̃ = xL, and let U
(β)
i,b denote the following:
∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:















































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Game 9 This is identical to the previous game (i.e., Game 8.`), except the
last secret key components in all d̂iff strands also include an additional noise
term which is much smaller than the overall noise added in those components.
Below we describe it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
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1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 : j ∈ comm ∧ β = tagj
}
.
Also, let ñi = (2·|comm|+w)n for all i ∈ [`], and set Ŝ = {(i, j, β, b) ∈
[`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)}.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. The challenger generates ciphertext components as
∀ (i, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}, U∗i,b ← χm×mpre .









• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
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1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) It generates ciphertext components as
∀ (i, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}, Ui,b ← χm×mpre .





2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses |diff| − 1 random vectors as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ d̂iff.







∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ comm× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)`+1 ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ d̂iff × {0, 1}, ẽ(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
lwe.
(c) Let x̃ = xL, and let U
(β)
i,b denote the following:
∀ (i, β, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}2, U(β)i,b =
{
U∗i,b if β = β
∗,
Ui,b if β = 1− β∗.
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Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:




















































• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
Game 10 This is identical to the previous game, except the last secret key
components in all d̂iff strands are random vectors as well. Below we describe
it in detail.
• Setup phase. The adversary sends the functionality index (k, w, L)
and description of branching program BP∗ to the challenger. Then the
challenger proceeds as follows:
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1. It chooses an LWE modulus q, dimensions n,m, and also distribu-
tions χbig, χs, χappr, χpre, χlast, χlwe as described in the construction.
Recall that ` = k · L and ñ = (4λ + w)n. It also chooses two λ-bit
strings tag∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ. If tag∗ = tag, then it aborts and the
adversary wins. Otherwise, the challenger continues as below. Let
S(i) denote the following sets:
∀ i ∈ [`], S(i) =
{
(j, β, b) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}2 : j ∈ comm ∧ β = tagj
}
.
Also, let ñi = (2·|comm|+w)n for all i ∈ [`], and set Ŝ = {(i, j, β, b) ∈
[`]× [λ]× {0, 1}2 : (j, β, b) ∈ S(i)}.
2. It samples {B(j,β)i,b }i,j,β,b, {Pi,v}i,v matrices as




← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
3. It then samples matrices C
(j,β)
i,b ← Zn×mq for (i, j, β, b) ∈ Ŝ.
4. Finally, it sends the public parameters pp = (λ, n,m, q, k, w, L, χpre)
to the adversary.
• Challenge phase. The challenger generates ciphertext components as
∀ (i, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}, U∗i,b ← χm×mpre .









• Post-challenge phase. The adversary is allowed to make at most 1
secret key encryption query, followed by polynomially many secret key
queries. The challenger responds to each query as below.
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1. Ciphertext query. The adversary sends a branching program BP
for encryption. The challenger responds as follows:
(a) It generates ciphertext components as
∀ (i, b) ∈ [`]× {0, 1}, Ui,b ← χm×mpre .





2. Secret key queries. The adversary queries the challenger on poly-
nomially many messages for corresponding secret keys. For each
queried string x, the challenger responds as follows:
(a) It chooses |diff| − 1 random vectors as y(j) ← Zmq for j ∈ d̂iff.







∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)i ← χmbig,
∀ (j, β) ∈ [λ]× {0, 1}, e(j,β)`+1 ← χ
m
last,
∀ (i, j, β) ∈ [`]× [λ]× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)i ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ comm× {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)`+1 ← Zmq ,
∀ β ∈ {0, 1}, t̃(j
∗,β)
`+1 ← Zmq ,
∀ (j, β) ∈ d̂iff × {0, 1}, t̃(j,β)`+1 ← Zmq .
(c) Let x̃ = xL. Next, it computes key vectors {t(j,β)i }i,j,β as follows:




























• Guess. The adversary finally sends the guess γ′.
7.4.4 Indistinguishability of hybrid games in Section 7.4.3
Now we show that the hybrid experiments described in Section 7.4.3
are computationally indistinguishable. For any PPT adversary A, let pA,x(·)
denote the probability that adversary A outputs γ′ = 1 in Game x.
Lemma 7.4.10. There exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any
adversary A and λ ∈ N, pA,0(λ)− pA,1(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The proof of this lemma is identical to that of Lemma 7.4.1.
Lemma 7.4.11. For any adversary A and λ ∈ N, pA,1(λ) = pA,2(λ).
Proof. The proof of this lemma is identical to that of Lemma 7.4.2.
Lemma 7.4.12. For any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,2(λ)− AdvA,3.1.1(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. First, let us list the differences between Game 2 and Game 3.1.1. The
setup, challenge phase, and ciphertext query are handled in an identical man-
ner. The key queries, however, are handled differently. For each key query x,
the challenger outputs {t(j,β)i }(i,j,β)∈[`]×[λ]×{0,1} as the secret key. The compo-
nents {t(j,β)1 }j∈diff,β∈{0,1} are computed differently in Game 2 and Game 3.1.1.
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In particular, in Game 3.1.1, the challenger adds an additional error term
ẽ
(j,β)
1 ← χmlwe in t
(j,β)
1 .
The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.4.3, (and
uses the smudging lemma, Lemma 3.1.1). Therefore, AdvA,2(λ)−AdvA,3.1.1(λ) ≤
qkeys(λ) · (2 · |diff| · neglsmud(λ)) ≤ qkeys(λ) · (2λ · neglsmud(λ)), and the lemma
follows by setting negl3.1.1 = (2λ · neglsmud).
Lemma 7.4.13. For any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N and i∗ ∈ [`], AdvA,3.i∗.1(λ) − AdvA,3.i∗.2(λ) ≤
negl(λ).
Proof. Let us first consider the differences between Game 3.i∗.1 and Game 3.i∗.2.
The setup, challenge phase, and ciphertext query are handled in an identical
manner in both games. The key generation queries are computed differently
(in particular the components {t(j,β)i∗+1}j∈diff,β∈{0,1} in each secret key).
The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.4.4, and











Lemma 7.4.14. Assuming the trapdoor generation algorithms LTen satisfy the
(q, σpre)-row removal property, for any PPT adversary A and i
∗ ∈ [`], there
exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.2(λ) −
AdvA,3.i∗.3(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.4.5, and we will be using
the row removal property to prove it. We will first present the differences
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between the two games and then discuss why the row removal property is
applicable here. The exact reduction from the row removal property to indis-
tinguishability of Game 3.i∗.2 and Game 3.i∗.3 can be found in the proof of
Lemma 7.4.5.
Differences between Game 3.i∗.2 and Game 3.i∗.3:
1. Set S(i
∗): In Game 3.i∗.2, the challenger sets S(i
∗) = [λ] × {0, 1}2, while
in Game 3.i∗.3, S(i
∗) = comm× {0, 1}2 (tag∗, tag are chosen at the start
of the security game, so the set diff is well defined here). Also, ñi∗ = ñ =
(4λ+ w)n in Game 3.i∗.2, while ñi∗ = ñ− |diff| · 4n in Game 3.i∗.3.
2. {B(j,β)i,b }i=i∗ matrices: In Game 3.i∗.2, the challenger chooses (Mi∗ , Ti∗)←
EnTrapGen(1ñ, 1m, q), while in Game 3.i∗.3, it chooses matrices (Mi∗ , Ti∗)←
EnTrapGen(1ñ−|diff|·4n, 1m, q). As a result, in Game 3.i∗.2, it derives all
matrices {B(j,β)i∗,b }(j,β,b)∈[λ]×{0,1}2 from Mi∗ . In Game 3.i∗.3, the challenger
chooses {B(j,β)i∗,b }j∈diff,b,β∈{0,1} uniformly at random, while the remaining
are derived from Mi∗ .
3. Ciphertexts: Since the set S(i
∗) is different in both games, the challenge
and query ciphertexts are constructed differently in both games. In
particular, the challenge ciphertext components (U∗i∗,0,U
∗
i∗,1) and the
ciphertext query components (Ui∗,0,Ui∗,1) are computed using Mi∗ and
Ti∗ , which are computed differently in Game 3.i
∗.2 and Game 3.i∗.3.
Let us now discuss why the row removal property suffices for proving this
lemma.
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. Fix any j ∈ diff,





b in Mixed-SubEnc, it follows that
– B
(j,β)
i∗,0 ·U∗i∗,0 = C
(j,β)
i∗,0 , and the rest are mapped to random matrices;
– B
(j,β)
i∗,1 ·U∗i∗,1 = C
(j,β)
i∗,1 , and the rest are mapped to random matrices;
– B
(j,1−β)
i∗,0 ·Ui∗,0 = C
(j,1−β)




i∗,1 ·Ui∗,1 = C
(j,1−β)
i∗,1 , and the rest are mapped to random ma-
trices.
• Next, note that the {C(j,β)i∗,b }j∈diff,b,β∈{0,1} are not used for responding to
key generation queries.



















to a uniformly random matrix.
The proof of this lemma therefore follows using the row removal prop-
erty.
Lemma 7.4.15. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT
adversary A and i∗ ∈ [`] there exists a negligible function negl3.i∗.4(·) such that
for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.3(λ)− AdvA,3.i∗.4(λ) ≤ negl3.i∗.4(λ).
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Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.4.6, except
that it involves more hybrid experiments.
































i∗ . In Game 3.i
∗.4, t̃
(j,β)
i∗ ← Zmq . Let qkeys = qkeys(λ) denote
the number of keys queried by A(1λ). To prove that these two games are
computationally indistinguishable, we will define qkeys · λ hybrid experiments.
Hybrid Ho,ĵ,0 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys}, ĵ ∈ [λ] In this hybrid, for the
first o keys, for j ∈ diff ∩ [ĵ], the t̃(j,0)i∗ components are sampled uniformly at
random, while the remaining components are sampled as in Game 3.i∗.3.
Hybrid Ho,ĵ,1 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys} , ĵ ∈ [λ] In this hybrid, for all
keys and j ∈ diff, the t̃(j,0)i∗ components are sampled uniformly at random.
For the first o queries and j ∈ diff ∩ [ĵ], the t̃(j,1)i∗ components are sampled
uniformly at random, while the remaining are sampled as in Game 3.i∗.3.
Clearly, H0,0,0 corresponds to Game 3.i
∗.3, Hqkeys,λ,1 is identical to Game 3.i
∗.4,
Ho−1,λ,b ≡ Ho,0,b, and Hqkeys,λ,0 ≡ H0,0,1. Let aA,i,ĵ,b(λ) denote the advantage of
A in Hi,ĵ,b.
Claim 7.4.3. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT ad-
versary A making qkeys(·) key queries there exists a negligible function no,ĵ,0(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, qkeys = qkeys(λ) and all indices o ∈ [qkeys] and ĵ ∈ [λ],
aA,o,j−1,0 − aA,o,j,0 ≤ no,ĵ,0(λ).
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Claim 7.4.4. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT ad-
versary A making qkeys(·) key queries there exists a negligible function no,0,0(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, qkeys = qkeys(λ) and all indices o ∈ [qkeys] and ĵ ∈ [λ],
aA,o,ĵ−1,1 − aA,o,ĵ,1 ≤ no,ĵ,1(λ).
The proofs of these claims are similar to the proof of Claim 7.4.1. If
ĵ /∈ diff, then Ho,ĵ−1,b ≡ Ho,ĵ,b. Otherwise, we can reduce LWE to the indis-
tinguishability of these two hybrids.
Lemma 7.4.16. For any PPT adversary A and i∗ ∈ [`−1] there exists a negli-
gible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.i∗.4(λ)−AdvA,3.(i∗+1).1(λ) ≤
negl(λ).
This proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 7.4.12.
Lemma 7.4.17. For any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,3.`.4(λ)− AdvA,4(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 3.`.4 and Game 4 is that the t
(j∗,β)
`+1
terms contain an additional noise term, ẽ
(j∗,β)
`+1 . The proof of this lemma is
identical to the proof of Lemma 7.4.12 and follows via the smudging lemma
(Lemma 3.1.1).
Lemma 7.4.18. Let σ : N → R+ and q : N → N be functions, and χs(λ) ≡
D√2σ(λ) and χlwe(λ) ≡ Dσ(λ) for each λ ∈ N. Assuming the LWE-ss(n,q,σlwe)
assumption holds, for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,4(λ)− AdvA,5(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
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Proof. The only difference between Game 4 and Game 5 is in the key gener-



























`+1 , and similarly
the term t
(j∗,1−β∗)







`+1 + other terms . In Game 5, for




`+1 are set to be uniformly random. Using















`+1 to uniformly random vectors. This switch is possible
because









`+1 , and ẽ
(j∗,1−β∗)
`+1 are not required anywhere else in Game 4 or











are uniformly random matrices.
Formally, we will show that Game 4 and Game 5 are computationally
indistinguishable via a sequence of hybrid experiments. Let qkeys = qkeys(λ)
denote the number of keys queried by A(1λ). To prove that these two games
are computationally indistinguishable, we will define qkeys hybrid experiments.





lvl+1 components are sampled uniformly at random in the first o
queries. For the remaining qkeys − o key queries, the keys are generated as in
Game 4 in the remaining queries.
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Clearly, H0 corresponds to Game 4, while Hqkeys is identical to Game 5.
Let aA,i(λ) denote the advantage of A in Hi.
Claim 7.4.5. Let σ : N → R+ and q : N → N be functions, and χs(λ) ≡
D√2σ(λ) and χlwe(λ) ≡ Dσ(λ) for each λ ∈ N. Assuming the LWE-ss(n,q,σlwe)
assumption holds, for any PPT adversary A making qkeys(·) key queries there
exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, qkeys = qkeys(λ) and
all indices o ∈ [qkeys], aA,o−1 − aA,o ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. Suppose there exist an adversary making qkeys key queries, and a non-
negligible function η(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, there exists an index o ∈ [qkeys]
such that aA,o−1 − aA,o ≥ η(λ). We will use A to build a reduction algorithm
B that breaks the LWE-ss(n,q,σlwe) assumption.
The reduction algorithm receives (k, w, L) from the adversary and sets
the parameters as in Ho−1/Ho. It makes 2m queries to the LWE-ss challenger
and receives {(aj, uj)}j≤2m. It chooses tag
∗, tag ← {0, 1}λ, and j∗ is the first
position where tag∗ and tag differ. Next, it sets ñi as in Ho−1/Ho and chooses
(Mi, Ti)← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q).
Challenge phase The reduction algorithm receives challenge ciphertext
BP∗, which specifies the reject state rej∗, and uses Mixed-SubEnc for comput-
ing the challenge ciphertext. Note that Mixed-SubEnc chooses P`+1,v uniformly
at random. The reduction algorithm sets P`+1,rej∗ to be a matrix whose jth
column is aTj . All other P`+1,v are chosen uniformly at random.
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Ciphertext query The reduction algorithm receives ciphertext query BP
and uses Mixed-SubEnc for computing the ciphertext query. Let rej denote the
reject state of BP. It sets P`+1,rej to be a matrix whose jth column is a
T
m+j.
The remaining P`+1,v matrices are chosen uniformly at random.
Key queries The reduction algorithm first sets uβ
∗
= [u1 . . . um] and u
1−β∗ =
[um+1 . . . u2m]. For the first o− 1 key queries, the t(j
∗,β)
`+1 components are cho-
















































. The remaining key queries are handled as in Ho−1/Ho.





`+1 are uniformly random, and hence the re-
duction algorithm simulates Ho. If each uj = s̃ · aTj + ẽj, then the reduction
algorithm simulates Ho−1.
Lemma 7.4.19. Assuming the trapdoor system LTen satisfies the (q, σpre)-row
removal property, for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,5(λ)− AdvA,5.1(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. Let us first consider the differences between Game 5 and Game 5.1.
• Set S(1): In Game 5, the challenger sets S(1) = comm× {0, 1}2, while in
Game 5.1, S(1) = {(j, β, b) : j ∈ comm ∧ β = tagj} (tag∗, tag are chosen
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at the start of the security game, so these sets are well defined here).
Also, ñ1 = (4|comm| + w)n in Game 5, while ñ1 = (2|comm| + w)n in
Game 5.1.
• {B(j,β)i,b }i=1 matrices: In Game 5, the challenger chooses matrices (M1, T1)←
EnTrapGen(1(4|comm|+w)n, 1m, q), while in Game 3.i∗.3, it chooses the ma-
trices (M1, T1)← EnTrapGen(1(2|comm|+w)n, 1m, q). As a result, in Game 5,
it derives all {B(j,β)1,b }(j,β,b)∈comm×{0,1}2 from M1. In Game 5.1, the chal-
lenger chooses {B(j,β)1,b }j∈comm,β 6=tagj ,b∈{0,1} uniformly at random, while the
remaining are derived from M1.
• Ciphertexts: Since the set S(1) is different in both games, the challenge
ciphertext components (U∗1,0,U
∗
1,1) and the ciphertext query components
(U1,0,U1,1) are computed using M1 and T1, which are computed differ-
ently in Game 5 and Game 5.1.
Let us now discuss why the row removal property suffices for proving this






, fix any j ∈ comm,





it follows that B
(j,1−β)
1,b · U is a random matrix for both b ∈ {0, 1} (because
tag∗j = β).
The proof of this lemma therefore follows using the row removal prop-
erty (the reduction algorithm is similar to the one described in the proof of
Lemma 7.4.5).
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Lemma 7.4.20. Assuming the trapdoor system LTen satisfies the (q, σpre)-row
removal property, for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N and i∗ ∈ [`] , AdvA,5.(i∗−1)(λ) − AdvA,5.`(λ) ≤
negl(λ).
The proof of this lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 7.4.19.
Lemma 7.4.21. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
AdvA,5.`(λ)− AdvA,6.2(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.4.6.





























2 ← Zmq . Let qkeys = qkeys(λ) denote
the number of keys queried by A(1λ). To prove that these two games are
computationally indistinguishable, we will define qkeys · λ hybrid experiments.
Hybrid Ho,ĵ,0 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys}, ĵ ∈ [λ] In this hybrid, for the
first o keys, for j ∈ comm ∩ [ĵ], the t(j,1−tagj)1 , t
(j,1−tagj)
2 components are sam-
pled uniformly at random, while the remaining components are sampled as in
Game 5.`.
Hybrid Ho,ĵ,1 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys} , ĵ ∈ [λ] This hybrid is similar to







Clearly, H0,0,0 corresponds to Game 5.`, Hqkeys,λ,1 is identical to Game 6.2,
and Ho−1,λ,0 ≡ Ho,0,0. Let aA,o,ĵ,b(λ) denote the advantage of A in Ho,ĵ,b.
Claim 7.4.6. For every PPT adversary A making qkeys queries, there exists
a negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, o ∈ [qkeys], and j ∈ [λ], aA,o,ĵ,0 − aA,o,ĵ,1 ≤
negl(λ).
The proof of this claim follows via the smudging lemma (Lemma 3.1.1).
Claim 7.4.7. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT ad-
versary A making qkeys(·) key queries there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, qkeys = qkeys(λ), and all indices o ∈ [qkeys] and ĵ ∈ [λ],
aA,o,ĵ−1,1 − aA,o,ĵ,0 ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The proof of this claim follows from the LWE assumption. The reduc-
























3m+1 . . . a
T
4m]. It also sets u1,0 = [u1 . . . um], u2,0 = [um+1 . . . u2m],
u1,1 = [u2m+1 . . . u3m], u2,1 = [u3m+1 . . . u4m].








2 = u2,x̃1 + e
(ĵ,1−tagĵ)
2 . The rest of the
key components can be handled without the LWE challenge terms.
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Lemma 7.4.22. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N
and i∗ ∈ {3, . . . , `}, AdvA,6.i∗−1(λ)− AdvA,6.i∗(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 6.(i∗ − 1) and Game 6.i∗ is with















it switches these terms to random in Game 6.i∗.
The proof of this lemma uses (standard) LWE, similar to the proof of
Lemma 7.4.21. One minor difference between this lemma and Lemma 7.4.21





2 (this is because the vector s
(j,1−tagj)
1 is used for computing both of
these components). However, in this lemma, the reduction algorithm sets the





the LWE challenge is used for setting t
(j,1−tagj)
i∗ .
Lemma 7.4.23. For any adversary A and λ ∈ N, AdvA,6.(`+1)(λ) = AdvA,7.1(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 6.(`+1) and Game 7.1 is with respect
to the {t(j,tagj)1 }j∈comm components in key queries. In Game 6, for each key














1 for each j ∈ comm. In Game 7.1, the {t
(j,tagj)
1 }j∈comm vectors are
set to be uniformly random vectors.
Note that in Game 6.(` + 1), the y(j) terms are chosen afresh for each






random). As a result, the components {t(j,tagj)1 }j∈comm are uniformly random
vectors, and therefore the secret keys in the two games are identically dis-
tributed.
Lemma 7.4.24. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT
adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N
and i∗ ∈ {2, . . . , `}, AdvA,7.i∗−1(λ)− AdvA,7.i∗(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 7.(i∗ − 1) and Game 7.i∗ is with
respect to the {t(j,tagj)i∗ }j∈comm components in key queries. In Game 7.(i∗ − 1),















i∗ for each j ∈ comm. In Game 7.i∗, the {t
(j,tagj)
i∗ }j∈comm vectors
are set to be uniformly random vectors. We will show that these two games
are computationally indistinguishable via a hybrid argument. First, we will
define qkeys · λ hybrid experiments.
Hybrid Ho,ĵ,0 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys}, ĵ ∈ [λ] In this hybrid, for the
first o keys, for j ∈ comm∩ [ĵ], the t(j,tagj)i∗ components are sampled uniformly
at random, while the remaining components are sampled as in Game 7.i∗.
Hybrid Ho,ĵ,1 for o ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qkeys} , ĵ ∈ [λ] This hybrid is similar to





Clearly, H0,0,0 corresponds to Game 7.(i
∗ − 1), Hqkeys,λ,1 is identical to
Game 7.i∗, and Ho−1,λ,0 ≡ Ho,0,0. Let aA,o,ĵ,b(λ) denote the advantage of A in
Ho,ĵ,b.
Claim 7.4.8. For every PPT adversary A making qkeys queries, there exists a
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, o ∈ [qkeys] and j ∈ [λ], aA,o,ĵ,0−aA,o,ĵ,1 ≤ negl(λ).
The proof of this claim follows via the smudging lemma (Lemma 3.1.1).
Claim 7.4.9. Assuming the LWEn,q,σlwe assumption holds, for any PPT ad-
versary A making qkeys(·) key queries there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, qkeys = qkeys(λ) and all indices o ∈ [qkeys] and ĵ ∈ [λ],
aA,o,ĵ−1,1 − aA,o,ĵ,0 ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The proof of this claim follows from the LWE assumption, where the re-





and the LWE challenge is used to set t
(ĵ,tagĵ)
i∗ . Note that the vector s
(ĵ,tagĵ)
i∗−1 is
used only for defining t
(ĵ,tagĵ)
i∗ . This is because this vector is chosen afresh for




Recall that Game 8 is identical to Game 7.(`+ 1).
4If t
(ĵ,tagĵ)
i∗−1 was not already switched to random, then s
(ĵ,tagĵ)
i∗−1 would have been used to
define it.
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Lemma 7.4.25. Assuming LTen satisfies the (q, χappr, σpre)-target switching
property and (q, σpre)-well-sampledness of preimage, for any PPT adversary A
there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N and i∗ ∈ [`],
AdvA,8.(i∗−1)(λ)− AdvA,8.i∗(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. First, let us discuss the differences between Game 8.(i∗−1) and Game 8.i∗.
In Game 8.(i∗ − 1), the challenge ciphertext components {U∗i,b}i≥i∗,b∈{0,1} and
query ciphertext components {Ui,b}i≥i∗,b∈{0,1} are computed using Mixed-SubEnc,
while the remaining are chosen from Gaussian with parameter χpre. Game 8.i
∗
is similar to Game 8.(i∗ − 1), except for the challenge ciphertext components
U∗i∗,0,U
∗
1,1 and the query ciphertext components U1,0,U1,1 are chosen from
the Gaussian distribution with parameter σpre. To show that these games are
indistinguishable, we will define a hybrid experiment H.
Hybrid H This hybrid is similar to Game 8.(i∗ − 1), except that the chal-
lenger computes {U∗i∗,b,Ui∗,b}b∈{0,1} such that they map Mi∗ to uniformly ran-
dom matrices.
Let AdvA,H denote the advantage of adversary A in hybrid H.
Claim 7.4.10. Assuming LTen satisfies the (q, χappr, σpre)-target switching prop-
erty, for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such
that for all λ ∈ N and i∗ ∈ [`], AdvA,8.(i∗−1)(λ)− AdvA,H(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The proof of this claim is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.4.8. First, let
us discuss the reasons why the target switching property is applicable here. Let
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S(i
∗) be defined as in Game 8.(i∗ − 1)/Game 8.i∗, with BP∗ = {π∗i,b}(i,b)∈[`]×{0,1}
and BP = {πi,b}(i,b)∈[`]×{0,1} the challenge/query programs.




are chosen from a Gaussian distribution, and therefore these terms do






i>i∗,b∈{0,1} do not contain any information
about the {Pi∗,v}v∈[w] or {B(j,β)i∗,b }(j,β,b)∈S(i∗) matrices (this follows from
the construction).
3. The keys are all either random vectors or computed in terms of the
challenge/query ciphertext components, and therefore do not explicitly
require {Pi∗,v}v∈[w] or {B(j,β)i∗,b }(j,β,b)∈S(i∗) matrices.



















Z1,b = [← Zñi×mq ] .
The reduction algorithm sends
(
1ñi , 1m, ∅
)
to the target switching property
challenger.5 It does not receive any matrix from the challenger (since the chal-
lenge set is empty). Next, it chooses (Mi, Ti) ← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q) for all
5Note that the set specified by the adversary in the target switching property game can
be empty.
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i > i∗, and parses Mi as in Game 8.(i
∗−1)/Game 8.i∗ to obtain {B(j,β)i,b }(j,β,b)∈S(i)
and {Pi,v}v∈[w] for all i > i
∗. It receives BP∗ as the challenge query from the
adversary. The reduction algorithm sends Z∗0,b,Z
∗
1,b to the target switching
property challenger and receives Ui∗,b in response. It chooses the remaining
components as in Game 8.(i∗−1)/Game 8.i∗ and sends the challenge ciphertext
to the adversary.
Next, it receives the ciphertext query BP. It sends Z0,b,Z1,b to the
target switching property challenger and receives Ui∗,b. The remaining cipher-
text components are chosen as in Game 8.(i∗−1)/Game 8.i∗, and the reduction
algorithm sends the challenge ciphertext to the adversary. Finally, the adver-
sary makes key queries. For each key query, the reduction algorithm sets
{t(j,β)i }(i,j,β)∈[`+1]×[λ]×{0,1} as in Game 8.(i∗ − 1)/Game 8.i∗ and sends them to
the adversary. The adversary sends its guess, which the reduction algorithm
forwards to the challenger.
Therefore, if there exist a PPT adversary A and a nonnegligible func-
tion η such that AdvA,8.(i∗−1)(λ)−AdvA,H(λ) ≥ η(λ) for all λ, then there exists
a PPT algorithm B that breaks the target switching property.
Claim 7.4.11. Assuming LTen satisfies the (q, σpre)-well-sampledness of the
preimage, for any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,H(λ)− AdvA,8.i∗(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. This proof follows directly from the (q, σ)-well-sampledness of the pre-
image property. Suppose there exist a PPT adversary A and a reduction
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algorithm η(·) such that AdvA,H(λ)− AdvA,8.i∗(λ) ≥ η(λ) for all λ ∈ N. Then
there exists a reduction algorithm that breaks the (q, σ)-well-sampledness of
the preimage property.
The reduction algorithm sends 1ñi , 1m, 14m to the challenger. Note that
m > ñi log q + λ and σ >
√
n · log q · logm + λ, as required. It receives a
matrix U ∈ Zm×4mq , which it parses as U =
[
U∗i∗,0 | U∗i∗,1 | Ui∗,0 | Ui∗,1
]
.
The reduction algorithm also chooses (Mi, Ti)← EnTrapGen(1ñi , 1m, q) for all
i 6= i∗.
On receiving the challenge ciphertext, it chooses the remaining cipher-
text components as in Game 8.(i∗−1)/Game 8.i∗ and sends them to the adver-
sary. Similarly, it handles the ciphertext query. Finally, for the key queries,
the reduction algorithm handles them as in Game 8.(i∗ − 1)/Game 8.i∗.
Using these two claims, it follows that AdvA,8.(i∗−1)(λ)− AdvA,8.i∗(λ) is
bounded by a negligible function.
Lemma 7.4.26. For any PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,8.`(λ)− AdvA,9(λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. The only difference between these two hybrids is with respect to the


















`+1 , while in Game 9, this vector





























`+1 ← χmlwe. Note that the Ui,b matrices are all drawn from the
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Gaussian distribution with parameter σpre, and therefore, with all but neg-
ligible probability,
∥∥ẽ(j,β)`+1 ·∏`δ=2 U(β)δ,x̃δ∥∥ ≤ mσlwe · (mσpre)`−1. Since σlast/mσlwe ·
(mσpre)
`−1 ≥ 2λ, we can use the smudging lemma to argue that the statistical
distance between these two games is at most m · qkeys · neglsmud(λ).
Lemma 7.4.27. Assuming the LWE-spd,q,σpre,χlwe assumption (Assumption 3)
holds (where d(λ) = 6n · log q), for any PPT adversary A, there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, AdvA,9(λ) − AdvA,10(λ) ≤
negl(λ).
Proof. The only difference between Game 9 and Game 10 is with respect to



























`+1 , while in Game 10, these vectors are uniformly random. To prove this
claim, it suffices to switch
(




to a uniformly random vector.
Since y(j) ← Zmq , U
(β)
1,x̃1
← Dm×mZ,σpre , and ẽ
(j,β)
`+1 ← χmlwe, we can use the LWE-sp
assumption as in the proof of Theorem 6.3.4.
7.4.5 Proving 1-query restricted accept indistinguishability
First, note that by using the lemmas provided in Section 7.4.4, we
can conclude that our construction satisfies 1-query complete accept indistin-
guishability security. Concretely, algorithms SK-Enc∗ and KeyGen∗, which take
as input the public parameters, are defined as follows: SK-Enc∗ is the same
as the standard encryption algorithm Enc (that is, it outputs random Gaussian
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i are sampled uniformly at random from Zmq . Since in Game 10
the challenger is already using SK-Enc∗ and KeyGen∗ to answer correspond-
ing queries, therefore, using lemmas in Section 7.4.4, we can argue 1-query
complete accept indistinguishability security.
Lastly, to finish the proof we only need to argue that the probability
adversary outputs 1 in the 1-query restricted accept indistinguishability se-
curity game—when the challenger computes challenge ciphertext as a normal
functional encryption ciphertext instead of encrypting BP∗—is negligibly close
to the probability adversary outputs 1 in Game 10. Note that this again fol-
lows from the lemmas in Section 7.4.4, or, in other words, it follows from the
fact that our construction satisfies 1-query complete accept indistinguishabil-
ity security. This is because if an adversary can distinguish Game 10 from the
scenario described above, then we could come up with a reduction algorithm
that breaks the 1-query complete accept indistinguishability security of our
construction.
The idea is straightforward. The reduction algorithm will simply for-
ward messages (back and forth) between the attacker and the complete accept
indistinguishability challenger, except with the following changes:
• The reduction algorithm does not forward the adversary’s challenge pro-
gram BP∗ as its challenge query to the challenger of the complete accept
indistinguishability game. Instead it runs the normal encryption algo-
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rithm Enc and sends the output back to the adversary as its challenge
ciphertext.
• In addition, the reduction algorithm sends the adversary’s post-challenge
encryption query (if any) to the challenger as its challenge query and
forwards the challenger’s response to the adversary.
• Also, the reduction algorithm does not make any post-challenge encryp-
tion query. (Note that key queries are answered as before.)
• Finally, it outputs whatever the adversary outputs.
Clearly the reduction algorithm perfectly simulates the indistinguishability ex-
periment (between Game 10 and the scenario described above); thus if the ad-
versary’s advantage is nonnegligible, then the reduction algorithm also breaks
1-query complete accept indistinguishability security with nonnegligible prob-
ability. This completes the proof.
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Chapter 8
Embedding Identities in Traitor Tracing
In this chapter, we describe how to embed identities in a traitor tracing
system. We give new constructions for traitor tracing systems with embedded
identity tracing under the learning with errors assumption.
We start by formally defining the concept of traitor tracing systems
with embedded identity tracing. We refer to such systems as embedded iden-
tity traitor tracing (EITT) systems. In order to capture a broader class of
traitor tracing systems, we consider three different variants for embedded iden-
tity tracing — (1) indexed EITT, (2) bounded EITT, and (3) full (unbounded)
EITT. Here the notion of full/unbounded EITT is most general, and we show
that a bounded EITT scheme (with suitable parameters) can be generically
transformed into an unbounded EITT scheme, and we also show that an in-
dexed EITT scheme directly gives a bounded EITT scheme.
Next, we move on to realizing these EITT systems under LWE. To that
end, we first introduce a new intermediate primitive which we call embedded-
identity private linear broadcast encryption (EIPLBE) that we eventually use
to build EITT schemes. As the name suggests, the notion of EIPLBE is in-
spired by and is an extension of private linear broadcast encryption (PLBE)
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schemes Section 5.1. Finally, we describe how to adapt the mixed FE frame-
work developed in Section 4.2 to instantiate ans EIPLBE scheme.
8.1 Defining Embedded Identity Traitor Tracing
8.1.1 Indexed Embedded-Identity Traitor Tracing
In this section, we present the syntax and definitions for traitor tracing
with embedded identities where the number of users is bounded, and the key
generation is ‘indexed’.
Let T be a (indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing
scheme for message space M = {Mλ}λ and identity space ID = {{0, 1}κ}κ∈N.
It consists of five algorithms Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec and Trace with the fol-
lowing syntax:
Setup(1λ, 1κ, nindx) → (msk, pk, key) . The setup algorithm takes as input
the security parameter λ, the ‘identity space’ parameter κ, index space
[nindx], and outputs a master secret key msk, a public key pk, and a
tracing key key.
KeyGen(msk, id ∈ {0, 1}κ, i ∈ [nindx]) → ski,id. The key generation algorithm
takes as input the master secret key, identity id ∈ {0, 1}κ and index
i ∈ [nindx]. It outputs a secret key ski,id.
Enc(pk,m ∈Mλ)→ ct. The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key
pk, message m ∈Mλ and outputs a ciphertext ct.
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Dec(sk, ct) → z. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk,
ciphertext ct and outputs z ∈Mλ ∪ {⊥}.
TraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1)→ T ⊆ {0, 1}κ. The trace algorithm has oracle access
to a program D, it takes as input key (which is the master secret key
msk in a private-key tracing scheme, and the public key pk in a public
tracing algorithm), parameter y and two messages m0,m1. It outputs a
set T of index-identity pairs, where T ⊆ {0, 1}κ.
Correctness A traitor tracing scheme is said to be correct if there exists
a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ, κ, n ∈ N, m ∈ Mλ, identity
id ∈ {0, 1}κ and i ∈ [n], the following holds
Pr
Dec(sk, ct) = m : (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n);sk← KeyGen(msk, id, i);
ct← Enc(pk,m)
 ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Efficiency Let T-s, T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k be functions. A (indexed
keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme is said to be (T-s,
T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k)- efficient if the following efficiency requirements
hold:
• The running time of Setup(1λ, 1κ, nindx) is at most T-s(λ, κ, nindx).
• The running time of Enc(pk,m) is at most T-e(λ, κ, nindx).
• The running time of KeyGen(msk, id) is at most T-k(λ, κ, nindx).
• The running time of Dec(sk, ct) is at most T-d(λ, κ, nindx).
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• The number of oracle calls made by TraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1) to decoding
box D is at most T-t(λ, κ, nindx, y).
• The size of the ciphertext output by Enc(pk,m) is at most S-c(λ, κ, nindx).
• The size of the key output by KeyGen(msk, id) is at most S-k(λ, κ, nindx).
Security As in the traditional traitor tracing definitions, we have two se-
curity definitions. The first security definition (IND-CPA security) states that
any PPT adversary should not distinguish between encryptions of different
messages. This definition is identical to the IND-CPA definition in traditional
traitor tracing. The second definition states that if there exists a pirate decoder
box, then the tracing algorithm can trace the identity of at least one of the
secret keys used to build the decoding box, and there are no ‘false-positives’.
Definition 8.1.1 (IND-CPA security). Let T = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Trace)
be a (indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme. This
scheme is IND-CPA secure if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists
a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, the following holds
Pr
A(ct) = b :
(1κ, 1nindx)← A(1λ);
(msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, nindx);
b← {0, 1}; (m0,m1)← A(pk);
ct← Enc(pk,mb)
 ≤ 12 + negl(λ).
Definition 8.1.2 (Secure tracing). Let T = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Trace)
be a (indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme. For
any non-negligible function ε(·) and PPT adversary A, consider the experiment
Expt-TT-emb-indexTA,ε(λ) defined in Fig. 8.1.
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Experiment Expt-TT-emb-indexTA,ε(λ)
• 1κ, 1nindx ← A(1λ)
• (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, nindx)
• (D,m0,m1)← AO(·)(pk)
• T ← TraceD(key, 11/ε(λ),m0,m1)
Each oracle query made by the adversary A consists of an index-identity
pair (i, id) ∈ [nindx] × {0, 1}κ. Let SID the set of identities queried by
A. Here, oracle O(·) has msk hardwired and on query (i, id) it outputs
KeyGen(msk, id, i) if index i is distinct from all previous queries made by the
adversary, otherwise it outputs⊥. In other words, for each index i ∈ [nindx],
the adversary is allowed to make at most one key query. However, for
different indices i, i′ ∈ [nindx], the identity can be same (that is, (i, id) and
(i′, id) are valid queries if i 6= i′).
Figure 8.1: Experiment Expt-TT-emb-index
Based on the above experiment, we now define the following (proba-
bilistic) events and the corresponding probabilities (which are a functions of
λ, parameterized by A, ε):
• Good-Decoder : Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← Enc(pk,mb)] ≥ 1/2 + ε(λ)
Pr -G-DA,ε(λ) = Pr[Good-Decoder].
• Cor-Tr : T 6= ∅ ∧ T ⊆ SID
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Cor-Tr].
• Fal-Tr : T 6⊆ SID
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Fal-Tr].
A scheme T is said to be ind-secure if for every PPT adversary A, poly-
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nomial q(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), there exists negligible functions
negl1(·), negl2(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ), the following
holds
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) ≤ negl1(λ), Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl2(λ).
Remark 8.1.1. We want to point out that in both IND-CPA and secure tracing
games we require the adversary to output the index bound nindx in unary
instead of binary (i.e., A outputs (1κ, 1nindx) instead of (1κ, nindx)). Now since
the running time of the adversary A is bounded by a polynomial, thus it can
only select a polynomially-bounded value for index bound nindx. However, the
setup algorithm is given the input nindx in binary. This distinction will later
be useful in our constructions and security proofs.
8.1.2 Bounded Embedded-Identity Traitor Tracing
We now present the syntax and definitions for traitor tracing with em-
bedded identities where the key generation is not indexed, but the number of
key queries is bounded.
Let T be a (bounded keys, public/private tracing)-embedded identity
tracing scheme for message space M = {Mλ}λ and identity space ID =
{{0, 1}κ}κ∈N. It consists of five algorithms Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec and Trace
with the following syntax:
Setup(1λ, 1κ, nbd) → (msk, pk, key) . The setup algorithm takes as input the
security parameter λ, identity space index κ, bound on number of key
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queries nbd, and outputs a master secret key msk and a public key pk.
KeyGen(msk, id ∈ {0, 1}κ) → skid. The key generation algorithm takes as
input the master secret key and identity id ∈ {0, 1}κ. It outputs a secret
key skid.
The syntax of Enc, Dec, and Trace is identical to that for indexed EITT
systems.
Correctness A traitor tracing scheme is said to be correct if there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ, κ, nbd ∈ N, m ∈Mλ and identity
id ∈ {0, 1}κ, the following holds
Pr
Dec(sk, ct) = m : (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, nbd);sk← KeyGen(msk, id)
ct← Enc(pk,m)
 ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Efficiency Let T-s, T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k be functions. A (bounded
keys, public/private tracing)-embedded identity tracing scheme is said to be
(T-s, T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k)- efficient if the following efficiency require-
ments hold:
• The running time of Setup(1λ, 1κ, nbd) is at most T-s(λ, κ, nbd).
• The running time of Enc(pk,m) is at most T-e(λ, κ, nbd).
• The running time of KeyGen(msk, id) is at most T-k(λ, κ, nbd).
• The running time of Dec(sk, ct) is at most T-d(λ, κ, nbd).
• The number of oracle calls made by TraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1) to decoding
box D is at most T-t(λ, κ, nbd, y).
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• The size of the ciphertext output by Enc(pk,m) is at most S-c(λ, κ, nbd).
• The size of the key output by KeyGen(msk, id) is at most S-k(λ, κ, nbd).
Security The IND-CPA security definition is identical to the one in Defini-
tion 8.1.1; the tracing-based security definition is very similar, but instead of
requiring that the index queries are distinct, we require that the number of
queries in the ‘correct-trace experiment’ is at most nbd.
Definition 8.1.3 (Secure tracing). Let T = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Trace)
be a (bounded keys, public/private tracing)-embedded identity tracing scheme.
For any non-negligible function ε(·) and PPT adversary A, consider the ex-
periment Expt-TT-emb-bdTA,ε(λ) defined in Fig. 8.2.
Experiment Expt-TT-emb-bdTA,ε(λ)
• 1κ, 1nbd ← A(1λ).
• (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, nbd).
• (D,m0,m1)← AO(·)(pk).
• T ← TraceD(key, 11/ε(λ),m0,m1).
Let SID be the set of identities queried by A. Here, O(·) is an oracle that
has msk hardwired, takes as input an identity id ∈ {0, 1}κ and outputs
KeyGen(msk, id).
Figure 8.2: Experiment Expt-TT-emb-bd
Based on the above experiment, we now define the following (proba-
bilistic) events and the corresponding probabilities (which are a functions of
λ, parameterized by A, ε):
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• Good-Decoder : Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← Enc(pk,mb)] ≥ 1/2 + ε(λ)
Admissible-Adv : A makes at most nbd key queries
Pr -G-DA,ε(λ) = Pr[Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv].
• Cor-Tr : T 6= ∅ ∧ T ⊆ SID
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Cor-Tr].
• Fal-Tr : T 6⊆ SID
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Fal-Tr].
A traitor tracing scheme T is said to be ind-secure if for every PPT
adversary A, polynomial q(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), there exists
negligible functions negl1(·), negl2(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) >
1/q(λ), the following holds
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) ≤ negl1(λ), Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl2(λ).
8.1.3 Unbounded (Full) Embedded-Identity Traitor Tracing
We now present the syntax and definitions for general unbounded traitor
tracing with embedded identities.
Let T be a (unbounded keys, public/private tracing)-embedded iden-
tity tracing scheme for message space M = {Mλ}λ and identity space ID =
{{0, 1}κ}κ∈N. It consists of five algorithms Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec and Trace
with the following syntax:
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Setup(1λ, 1κ)→ (msk, pk, key) . The setup algorithm takes as input the secu-
rity parameter λ, identity space index κ and outputs a master secret key
msk and a public key pk.
The syntax of KeyGen, Enc, and Dec is identical to that for bounded EITT
systems.
TraceD(key, 1y, Qbd,m0,m1) → T ⊆ {0, 1}κ. The trace algorithm has oracle
access to a program D, it takes as input a master secret key key, pa-
rameters y and Qbd, and two messages m0,m1. It outputs a set T of
identities, where T ⊆ {0, 1}κ.
Correctness A traitor tracing scheme is said to be correct if there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ, κ ∈ N, m ∈ Mλ and identity
id ∈ {0, 1}κ, the following holds
Pr
Dec(sk, ct) = m : (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ);sk← KeyGen(msk, id)
ct← Enc(pk,m)
 ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Efficiency Let T-s, T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k be functions. A (unbounded
keys, public/private tracing)-embedded identity tracing scheme is said to be
(T-s, T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k)- efficient if the following efficiency require-
ments hold:
• The running time of Setup(1λ, 1κ) is at most T-s(λ, κ).
• The running time of Enc(pk,m) is at most T-e(λ, κ).
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• The running time of KeyGen(msk, id) is at most T-k(λ, κ).
• The running time of Dec(sk, ct) is at most T-d(λ, κ).
• The number of oracle calls made by TraceD(key, 1y, Qbd,m0,m1) to de-
coding box D is at most T-t(λ, κ, y,Qbd).
• The size of the ciphertext output by Enc(pk,m) is at most S-c(λ, κ).
• The size of the key output by KeyGen(msk, id) is at most S-k(λ, κ).
Security The IND-CPA security definition is identical to the one in previous
sections; the tracing-based security definition is very similar, but there is no
bound on the number of secret key queries.
Definition 8.1.4 (Secure tracing). Let T = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Trace)
be a (unbounded keys, public/private tracing)-embedded identity tracing scheme.
For any non-negligible function ε(·), polynomial p(·) and PPT adversary A,
consider the experiment Expt-TT-embTA,ε(λ) defined in Fig. 8.3.
Experiment Expt-TT-embTA,ε,p(λ)
• 1κ ← A(1λ).
• (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ).
• (D,m0,m1)← AO(·)(pk)
• T ← TraceD(key, 11/ε(λ), p(λ),m0,m1).
Let SID be the set of identities queried by A. Here, O(·) is an oracle that
has msk hardwired, takes as input an identity id ∈ {0, 1}κ and outputs
KeyGen(msk, id).
Figure 8.3: Experiment Expt-TT-emb
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Based on the above experiment, we now define the following (proba-
bilistic) events and the corresponding probabilities (which are a functions of
λ, parameterized by A, ε, p):
• Good-Decoder : Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← Enc(pk,mb)] ≥ 1/2 + ε(λ)
Pr -G-DA,ε,p(λ) = Pr[Good-Decoder ∧ p(λ) ≥ |SID|].
• Cor-Tr : T 6= ∅ ∧ T ⊆ SID
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε,p(λ) = Pr[Cor-Tr].
• Fal-Tr : T 6⊆ SID
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε,p(λ) = Pr[Fal-Tr].
A traitor tracing scheme T is said to be secure if for every PPT ad-
versary A, polynomials q(·), p(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), there ex-
ists negligible functions negl1(·), negl2(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying
ε(λ) > 1/q(λ), the following holds
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) ≤ negl1(λ), Pr -Cor-TrA,ε,p(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε,p(λ)− negl2(λ).
Remark 8.1.2. Note that unlike Definitions 8.1.2 and 8.1.3, here the trace
algorithm takes an additional parameter Qbd. In the correct trace definition,
we require that as long as the tracing algorithm uses a bound greater than
the number of keys queried, the tracing algorithm must identify at least one
traitor. However, the false trace guarantee should hold for all polynomially
bounded Qbd values. In particular, even if the number of keys queried is
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more than the bound used in tracing, the trace algorithm must not output
an identity that was not queried. We can show that this definition implies
the ‘standard’ tracing definition where the trace algorithm does not take this
bound as input. One simply needs to run this bounded-version of trace with
increasing powers of two until the trace algorithm outputs at least one traitor.
The tracing algorithm in [104] also requires a bound q. However, in
their definition, the false trace and correct trace events are defined only when
the tracing bound is equal to the number of keys queried. As a result, it is not
clear if this definition can be used to achieve the ‘standard’ tracing definition.
8.2 Indexed EITT to Bounded EITT
In this section, we will show how to build a (bounded keys, pub-
lic/private tracing)-embedded identity tracing scheme from a (indexed keygen,
public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme.
8.2.1 Construction
Let TT-ind = (Ind.Setup, Ind.Enc, Ind.KeyGen, Ind.Dec, Ind.Trace) be a
(indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme for mes-
sage space M = {Mλ}λ, identity space ID = {{0, 1}κ}κ∈N, and with (T-s, T-e,
T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k)-efficiency, and let S = (SS.Setup, SS.Sign, SS.Verify)
be a signature scheme with message space {{0, 1}κ}κ∈N and signature space{
{0, 1}`ss(λ)
}
λ∈N. We use TT-ind to build a non-indexed traitor tracing scheme
TT = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Trace) as follows.
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Setup(1λ, 1κ, nbd)→ (msk, pk, key). The setup algorithm runs the TT-ind setup
algorithm λ times with index value nindx = 2 · n2bd and identity index
κ+ `ss(λ) as follows:
∀i ∈ [λ], (mski, pki, keyi)← Ind.Setup(1λ, 1κ+`ss(λ), nindx = 2 · n2bd).
It also chooses a signing/verification keys (ss.sk, ss.vk)← SS.Setup(1λ, 1κ).
It then sets the master secret and public keys as msk =
(
(mski)i∈[λ] , ss.sk, ss.vk
)
,
pk = (pki)i∈[λ] and key = ss.vk, (keyi, pki)i∈[λ].
KeyGen(msk, id)→ sk. Let msk =
(
(mski)i∈[λ] , ss.sk, ss.vk
)
. The key gener-
ation algorithm chooses λ uniformly random indices ji ← [2 · n2bd] for
i ∈ [λ]. Next, it computes a signature on id; that is, it computes
σ ← SS.Sign(ss.sk, id). Finally, for ith subsystem, it computes indexed
keys for index {ji} and identity (id, σ). That is, for i ∈ [λ], it com-
putes ski ← Ind.KeyGen(mski, (id, σ), ji), and outputs the secret key sk
as sk = (ski)i∈[λ].
Enc(pk,m)→ ct. Let pk = (pki)i∈[λ]. The encryption algorithm first chooses





. It then encrypts messages ri under key pki as follows:
∀i ∈ [λ], cti ← Ind.Enc(pki, ri).
Finally, it outputs the ciphertext as ct = (cti)i∈[λ].
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Dec(sk, ct)→ z. Let sk = (ski)i∈[λ], and ct = (cti)i∈[λ]. The decryption algo-
rithm runs the TT-ind decryption on each secret key-ciphertext pair as
zi ← Dec(ski, cti) for i ∈ [λ].
If zi = ⊥ for any i ∈ [λ], then it outputs z = ⊥, otherwise it outputs
z =
⊕λ
i=1 zi as the message.
isGoodDecoderD((pki)i∈[λ] , 1
y,m0,m1, r, i)
Input: Keys (pki)i∈[λ], Parameter y, Messages m0,m1, r, Index i ∈ [λ].
Output: Yes/No.
1. Set count = 0. (Let ε = 1/y.)
2. For j = 1 to λ · y:
- Choose λ− 1 messages rk randomly for k ∈ [λ] \ {i} such that⊕
k∈[λ]\{i} rk = r. (That is, bit-wise parity of the messages
chosen matches the message r.)
- Choose random bit b ← {0, 1}, and compute ciphertexts
as ctk ← Ind.Enc(pkk, rk) for k ∈ [λ] \ {i}, and cti ←
Ind.Enc(pki, r ⊕mb).
- Query ciphertext (ct1, . . . , ctλ) to the oracle D. Let b
′ denote
the oracle’s response.
- If b = b′, set count = count + 1.
3. If count/(λ · y) ≥ 1/2 + ε/3, then output ‘Yes’. Otherwise output
‘No’.
Figure 8.4: Routine isGoodDecoder
TraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1)→ T. Let key =
(
(mski, pki)i∈[λ] , ss.vk
)
and ε = 1/y.
First we define a supplementary algorithms isGoodDecoder (in Figure 8.4)
and SubTrace (in Figure 8.5) that both get oracle access to the decoder D
and take as input all λ public-secret key pairs (mski, pki)i, parameter y,
messages m0,m1, r and an index i ∈ [λ]. The tracing algorithm executes
325
SubTraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1, r, i)
Input: Keys key = (keyi, pki)i∈[λ], Parameter y, Messages m0,m1, r, Index
i ∈ [λ].
Output: T ⊆ {0, 1}κ.
1. It runs the TT-ind tracing algorithm on inputs — keys keyi, pki, pa-
rameter 4y, messages m0 ⊕ r,m1 ⊕ r — and with oracle access to
oracle D̃ which we define next.
2. On each query ct to oracle D̃ by Ind.Trace, the sub-tracing algo-
rithm first chooses λ − 1 messages rj randomly for j ∈ [λ] \ {i}
such that
⊕
j∈[λ]\{i} ri = r. (That is, bit-wise parity of the mes-
sages chosen matches the message r.) It encrypts these mes-
sages as ctj ← Ind.Enc(pkj , rj), and then sends the ciphertext
(ct1, . . . , cti−1, ct, cti+1, . . . , ctλ) to the oracle D as its query. And
it forwards the oracle D’s response to the Ind.Trace algorithm.
3. Finally, the Ind.Trace algorithm outputs a set T . The sub-tracing
algorithm outputs the same set T as its output.
In short, SubTraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1, r, i)
= Ind.TraceD̃((mski, pki), 1
4y,m0 ⊕ r,m1 ⊕ r),
where
D̃(ct) = D(ct1, . . . , cti−1, ct, cti+1, . . . , ctλ),
∀j ∈ [λ] \ {i} , rj ←M such that
⊕
j∈[λ]\{i} ri = r,
∀j ∈ [λ] \ {i} , ctj ← Ind.Enc(pkj , rj)
Figure 8.5: Routine SubTrace
the following procedure using isGoodDecoder and SubTrace routines as
follows:
1. Set i = 1.
2. Set flag = ‘No’. For j = 1 to λ · y:
- Choose a random message r ←M.
326
- Run isGoodDecoder as flag← isGoodDecoderD(key, 1y,m0,m1, r, i).
- If flag = ‘Yes’, break. Else, continue.
3. If flag = ‘Yes’, run SubTrace as T ← SubTraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1, r, i).
Else, set T = ∅.
4. If T = ∅ and i < λ, set i = i + 1 and go to step 2. Otherwise,
output T .
Set T final = ∅. For each (id, σ) = ĩd ∈ T , if SS.Verify(ss.vk, id, σ) = 1, the
tracing algorithm adds id to T final. Concretely,
T final = {id : ∃ σ such that (id, σ) ∈ T and SS.Verify(ss.vk, id, σ) = 1} .
Finally, it outputs the set T final as the set of traitors.
8.2.2 Correctness and Security
Next, we prove the following.
Theorem 8.2.1. If TT-ind = (Ind.Setup, Ind.Enc, Ind.KeyGen, Ind.Dec, Ind.Trace)
is a secure (indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme
(as per Definitions 8.1.1 and 4.1.2) with (T-s, T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c, S-k)-
efficiency, and S = (SS.Setup, SS.Sign, SS.Verify) is a secure signature scheme
(as per Definition 3.4.2), then the scheme TT = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Trace)
(described in Section 8.2.1) is a secure (bounded keys, public/private tracing)-
embedded identity tracing scheme (as per Definitions 8.1.1 and 8.1.3) with
(T-s′, T-e′, T-k′,T-d′,T-t′, S-c′, S-k′)-efficiency, where the efficiency measures
are related as follows:
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• T-s′(λ, κ, n) = λ · T-s(λ, κ, 2 · n2) + poly(λ, κ, log n),
• T-k′(λ, κ, n) = λ · T-k(λ, κ, 2 · n2) + poly(λ, κ, log n),
• T-e′(λ, κ, n) = λ · T-e(λ, κ, 2 · n2) + poly(λ, κ, log n),
• T-d′(λ, κ, n) = λ · T-d(λ, κ, 2 · n2) + poly(λ, κ, log n),
• T-t′(λ, κ, n, y) = λ · T-t(λ, κ, 2 · n2, 4y) + λ3 · y2,
• S-c′(λ, κ, n) = λ · S-c(λ, κ, 2 · n2),
• S-k′(λ, κ, n) = λ · S-k(λ, κ, 2 · n2).
Proof. Correctness: Fix any security parameter λ, public key pk = (pki)i∈[λ],
master secret key msk =
(
(mski)i∈[λ] , (ss.sk, ss.vk)
)
, tracing key key = (keyi, pki),
message m ∈ M and identity id. The encryption algorithm chooses {ri}i∈[λ]
such that
⊕
i ri = m, computes cti ← Ind.Enc(pki, ri) and sets ct = (cti)i∈[λ].
The key generation algorithm first chooses λ indices {ji}i∈[λ], computes a sig-
nature σ on id, and outputs λ keys (ski)i∈[λ], where ski is a key for identity
(id, σ) and index ji. From the correctness of the underlying scheme TT-ind, it
follows that decryption of cti using ski outputs ri. As a result, the decryption
of ct using sk outputs message m.
IND-CPA security: IND-CPA security of our scheme follows directly from
the IND-CPA security of TT-ind. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A
that breaks the IND-CPA security of our scheme with advantage ε. We can
use A to break the IND-CPA security of TT-ind with advantage ε. The re-
duction algorithm first receives pk1 from the TT-ind challenger. It chooses
(mski, pki, keyi) ← Ind.Setup(1λ, 1κ, nindx) for each i ∈ {2, . . . , λ}, and sends
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(pki)i∈[λ] to A. (If TT-ind is a public tracing scheme, then the reduction al-
gorithm also receives a tracing key key1 from the challenger, and it sends the
tracing key (keyi, pki)i∈[λ] to A).
Next, A sends two messages m0,m1 to B. The reduction algorithm







challenger. The challenger sends ct1 to B. The reduction algorithm computes
encryptions of r2, . . . , rλ, and sends ct = (cti)i∈[λ] to A. The adversary sends
its guess, which the reduction algorithm forwards to the challenger.
Clearly, if A has advantage ε, then so does B.
Efficiency: It is easy to verify that T-s′, T-k′, T-e′, T-d′, T-t′, S-c′ and S-k′
satisfy the efficiency measures.
Correct Trace and False Trace guarantees: We will now show that our
scheme satisfies Definition 8.1.3.
False Trace: We will first show that the false trace probability of our
scheme is negligible in the security parameter. Recall, the false trace probabil-
ity is defined as follows: the adversary receives the public key (and the tracing
key in a public tracing algorithm). Next, it queries for a set of keys SID cor-
responding to a set of identities (note that in the false trace experiment, the
adversary can query for an unbounded number of keys). Finally, it outputs a
decoding box D and two messages m0,m1. The tracing algorithm uses D and
m0,m1 to output a set of traitors T
final. In particular, the tracing algorithm
uses the SubTrace algorithm to find a polynomial sized set T = {(idj, σj)}j,
329
and puts an identity id in T final if (id, σ) ∈ T and SS.Verify(ss.vk, id, σ) = 1.
The false trace probability is the probability that T final 6⊆ SID.
Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the false trace prob-
ability is ε. We can use A to break the signature scheme’s security. The
reduction algorithm B receives the verification key ss.vk from the challenger.
It chooses λ public/master secret/tracing keys {(mski, pki, keyi)} for the un-
derlying traitor tracing system TT-ind, and sends (pki)i∈[λ] to the adversary





ing key). Next, the adversary gets access to a key generation oracle. For
every query id, the reduction algorithm sends id to the challenger, and re-
ceives signature σ. It then chooses λ uniformly random indices {ji}i∈[λ] and
generates indexed keys skj ← Ind.KeyGen (mski, (id, σ), ji) for each i ∈ [λ]. It
sends (ski)i∈[λ] to A. Finally, after polynomially many secret key queries, the
adversary outputs a decoding box D and messages m0,m1. The reduction
algorithm first checks if it is a good decoder (that is, steps 1 and 2 of the
tracing algorithm). Next, if it is a good decoder, it runs SubTrace to obtain
a set T = {idj, σj}j. If there exists an (id, σ) pair in T such that id was not
queried by A and SS.Verify(ss.vk, id, σ) = 1, then it sends id to the challenger.
Since the false trace event happens with probability ε, the reduction algorithm
breaks the security of the signature scheme with probability ε.
Remark 8.2.1. Note that we do not require the ‘false trace’ guarantee of the
underlying tracing scheme TT-ind. We only require that the tracing algorithm
of the underlying scheme is polynomial time.
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Correct Trace: Recall the traitor tracing experiment (Figure 8.2): the
challenger sends a public key pk, then the adversary queries for a set of secret
keys (at most nbd keys) corresponding to identities. Finally, the adversary
outputs a decoding box D. We need to show that if the decoding box if ε
good, then the tracing algorithm can trace at least one identity for which the
adversary queried a secret key. More formally, the correct trace guarantee is
captured by the following events/probabilities:
Good-Decoder : Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← Enc(pk,mb)] ≥ 1/2 + ε(λ)
Admissible-Adv : A makes at most nbd key queries
Pr -G-DA,ε(λ) = Pr[Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv].
Cor-Tr : T 6= ∅ ∧ T ⊆ SID, Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Cor-Tr].
We require that Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl2(λ).
We will define some more events and their probabilities, which will be
useful for our proof.
• Tracing without correctness: Event Tr, which is similar to Cor-Tr, except
that we do not require T ⊆ SID. More formally, let Tr : T 6= ∅, and the
corresponding probability Pr -TrA,ε(λ) = Pr[Tr].
• Position with distinct indices for each key: Recall in our construction,
each key for identity id consists of λ different ‘indexed’ keys, where the
λ indices are chosen uniformly at random from [2n2bd]. Let Dist-Indx be
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the event that there exists i ∈ [λ] such that the ith index of each key is
distinct.
• Dist-Indxi: Position i is the first position such that the ith index of each
key is distinct. Hence, by definition, Dist-Indx =
⋃
i Dist-Indxi.
• Tracing without correctness in ith iteration: Let Ti denote the set of
(identity, signatute) pairs traced in the ith iteration. The event Tri hap-
pens if Ti is non-empty.
• Tracing with same signature as that received in key: Let Ti denote
the set of (identity, signature) pairs that are traced in the ith iter-
ation. The event Cor-Tr-Sigi happens if for all (id, σ) ∈ Ti, id was
queried during the key query phase, and the key generation oracle output
sk← Ind.KeyGen(mski, (id, σ), j) for some index j.
• The flag is set to ‘Yes’ in the ith iteration: The event Found-Good-ri
happens if in the ith iteration, the flag is set to ‘Yes’.
• Good decoder D̃ during the SubTrace routine execution in ith iteration:
We say that event Good-D̃i happens if in the i
th iteration, the execution
reaches step 3 (that is, it found a ‘good’ r in the ith iteration), and the
decoder D̃ constructed is an ε/4 good decoder for distinguishing messages
m0 ⊕ r and m1 ⊕ r. Note that if no good r is found in step 3, then we
say that Good-D̃i did not happen.
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With these events defined, we will now show that Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥
Pr -G-DA,ε(λ) − negl(λ) for some negligible function negl(·). The proof will
proceed via a series of inequalities as shown below.
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) (8.1)
≥ Pr -TrA,ε(λ)− negl1(λ) (8.2)






















Good-D̃i ∧ Found-Good-ri ∧ Good-Decoder















Pr [Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv ∧ Dist-Indxi]− negl4(λ) (8.9)
= Pr [Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv ∧ Dist-Indx]− negl4(λ) (8.10)
≥ Pr [Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv]− negl5(λ) (8.11)
We will now discuss each of these steps, and why the above inequalities hold.
Step 8.1 to 8.2 follows from the false trace guarantee. Using the false trace
guarantee, we can show that Pr -TrA,ε(λ) ≤ Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) + negl(λ).
Claim 8.2.1. Pr -TrA,ε(λ) ≤ Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) + negl(λ).
Proof. From the definition of the events, it follows that Pr -TrA,ε(λ) = Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ)+
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Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ). Next, using the false trace guarantees, we can argue that
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) + Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) ≤ Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) + negl(λ).
Step 8.2 to 8.3 follows from definition of Pr -TrA,ε(λ). Step 8.3 to 8.4 fol-
lows from the fact that Dist-Indx = ∪iDist-Indxi, and these events are mutually
exclusive. Step 8.4 to 8.5 holds because the event Cor-Tr-Sigi implies Tr (we are
assuming our signature scheme is perfectly correct, and hence any signature
generated by the signing key is accepted by the verification algorithm). Step
8.5 to 8.6 follows from the correct-trace guarantee of the underlying TT-ind
scheme. This is formalized in the following claim.
Claim 8.2.2. Assuming the traitor tracing scheme satisfies the correct-trace
guarantee as defined in Definition 4.1.2, there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that for all i ∈ [λ],





Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that Pr[Good-D̃i∧Admissible-Adv
∧ Dist-Indxi]− Pr [Cor-Tr-Sigi ∧ Dist-Indxi] is non-negligible. We will use A to
build a PPT algorithm B that breaks the security of TT-ind. The reduc-
tion algorithm first receives the bound nbd (in unary) from the adversary.
It sets nindx = 2 · n2bd, sends nindx to the challenger (in unary) and receives
the public key pki (and keyi if TT-ind is a public tracing scheme). For each
k 6= i, it chooses (pkk,mskk, keyk) ← Ind.Setup(1λ, 1κ+`ss(λ), nindx), chooses a
signing/verification key, and sends the public key to A (and the tracing key if
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applicable). Next, the adversary queries for secret keys. For each query id, the
reduction algorithm chooses λ indices jid,1, . . . , jid,λ. It computes a signature
σ on id and queries for a TT-ind key ski corresponding to (id, σ) for index jid,i.
For k 6= i, it computes a skk using mskk. Finally, it sends (sk1, . . . , skλ) to A.
After at most nbd key queries, the adversary submits a decoding box D and
messages m0,m1. The reduction algorithm first checks if, for all key queries,
the ith position’s indices are distinct. If not, it outputs a dummy decoding box
and quits. Next, it runs isGoodDecoder((pki)i∈[λ] , 1
y,m0,m1, r) for uniformly
random and independently chosen r, until it finds an r s.t. isGoodDecoder
outputs ‘Yes’. If no such r is found after λ · y iterations, it quits (and outputs
a dummy decoding box). It constructs D̃ using D (as described in SubTrace)
and sets the distinguishing messages to be m̃0 = m0 + r, m̃1 = m1 + r. It
sends D̃, m̃0, m̃1 to the challenger.
First, let us compute the probability that the reduction algorithm out-
puts a 1/4y good decoding box for m̃0, m̃1. This happens if all the following
events happen:
• All the position i indices of the keys are distinct.
• The decoder D̃ is a 1/4y good decoder for m̃0, m̃1. This happens only if
isGoodDecoder outputs ‘Yes’ for one of the randomly chosen r values.
The probability that B outputs a good decoding box is Pr[Good-D̃i∧Admissible-Adv
∧ Dist-Indxi]. Using the security of TT-ind, Pr[Cor-Tr-Sigi ∧ Dist-Indxi] ≥
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Pr[Good-D̃i ∧ Dist-Indxi]− negl(λ). Here, note that the set of (identity, signa-
ture) pairs output by the tracing algorithm is a subset of the (identity, sig-
nature) queries made by the reduction algorithm. This concludes our proof.
Step 8.6 to 8.7 follows directly from the definition of the events. Next,
we will show that Found-Good-ri and Good-D̃i happens with negligible proba-
bility. This justifies the step 8.7 to 8.8 inequality.











negl(λ), and hence the claim follows.
We will now show that for every i, Good-Decoder and Found-Good-ri
happen with negligible probability. Hence, we can justify the step 8.8 to 8.9
transition.






Proof. As in the previous proof, this also follows via a simple application of







Next, since ∪iDist-Indxi = Dist-Indx, and all the Dist-Indxi are mutually
exclusive, step 8.9 to 8.10 follows. Finally, using the following claim, we can
argue the step 8.10 to 8.11 inequality.
Claim 8.2.5. There exist a negligible function negl(·) such that Pr[Good-Decoder∧
Admissible-Adv ∧ Dist-Indx] ≥ Pr[Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv]− negl(λ).
Proof. Consider the following experiment: choose xi,j ← [2 · n2bd] for each
i ∈ [λ], j ∈ [nbd] independently. Let Yi = 1 if the set {xi,j}j∈[λ] consists of
nbd distinct entries, else Yi = 0. Using a simple union bound, it follows that
Pr[Yi = 0] ≤ 1/4, and since all Yi are independent, Pr[ ∀i, Yi = 0] ≤ 1/4λ.
From the above experiment, it follows that Pr[Good-Decoder∧Admissible-Adv∧
Dist-Indx] ≤ negl(λ). As a result,
Pr [Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv]
= Pr [Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv ∧ Dist-Indx]
+ Pr
[
Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv ∧ Dist-Indx
]
≤ Pr [Good-Decoder ∧ Admissible-Adv ∧ Dist-Indx] + negl(λ)
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8.3 Bounded EITT to Unbounded EITT
In this section, we provide an efficient generic transformation that re-
moves the bound set on the number of users/keys that an adversary is allowed
to corrupt during setup.
8.3.1 Construction
Let TT-bd = (BD.Setup,BD.KeyGen,BD.Enc,BD.Dec,BD.Trace) be a
(bounded keys, public/private tracing)-embedded identity tracing scheme for
message space M = {Mλ}λ, identity space ID = {{0, 1}κ}κ∈N, and with
(T-setup, T-enc, T-key)-efficiency. We use TT-bd to build a traitor tracing
TT = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Trace) with unbounded number of users as
follows. (Here we provide a transformation for TT schemes with secret key
tracing, but the construction can be easily extended to work in the public
tracing setting as well.)
Setup(1λ, 1κ)→ (msk, pk, key). The setup algorithm runs the TT-bd setup al-
gorithm λ times with increasing values of the user bound nbd as follows:
∀i ∈ [λ], (mski, pki, keyi)← BD.Setup(1λ, 1κ, nbd = 2i).
It then sets the master secret and public keys as an λ-tuple of all these
keys, i.e. msk = (mski)i∈[λ], pk = (pki)i∈[λ] and key = (pki, keyi)i∈[λ].
KeyGen(msk, id)→ sk. Let msk = (mski)i∈[λ]. The key generation algorithm
runs the TT-bd key generation algorithm with all λ keys independently
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as ski ← BD.KeyGen(mski, id) for i ∈ [λ]. It outputs the secret key sk as
sk = (ski)i∈[λ].
Enc(pk,m)→ ct. Let pk = (pki)i∈[λ]. The encryption algorithm first chooses





. It then encrypts messages ri under key pki as follows:
∀i ∈ [λ], cti ← BD.Enc(pki, ri).
Finally, it outputs the ciphertext as ct = (cti)i∈[λ].
Dec(sk, ct)→ z. Let sk = (ski)i∈[λ], and ct = (cti)i∈[λ]. The decryption algo-
rithm runs the TT-bd decryption on each secret key-ciphertext pair as
zi ← Dec(ski, cti) for i ∈ [λ].
If zi = ⊥ for any i ∈ [λ], then it outputs z = ⊥, otherwise it outputs
z =
⊕λ
i=1 zi as the message.
TraceD(key, 1y, Qbd,m0,m1)→ T. Let key = (keyi, pki)i∈[λ] and ε = 1/y. First
we define a supplementary algorithms isGoodDecoder (in Figure 8.6) and
SubTrace (in Figure 8.7) that both get oracle access to the decoder D
and take as input all λ tracing/public key pairs (keyi, pki)i, parameter y,
messages m0,m1, r and an index i ∈ [λ]. The tracing algorithm executes
the following procedure using isGoodDecoder and SubTrace routines as
follows:




Input: Public keys (pki)i∈[λ], Parameter y, Messages m0,m1, r, Index i ∈
[λ].
Output: Yes/No.
1. Set count = 0. (Let ε = 1/y.)
2. For j = 1 to λ · y:
- Choose λ− 1 messages rk randomly for k ∈ [λ] \ {i} such that⊕
k∈[λ]\{i} rk = r. (That is, bit-wise parity of the messages
chosen matches the message r.)
- Choose random bit b ← {0, 1}, and compute ciphertexts
as ctk ← BD.Enc(pkk, rk) for k ∈ [λ] \ {i}, and cti ←
BD.Enc(pki, r ⊕mb).
- Query ciphertext (ct1, . . . , ctλ) to the oracle D. Let b
′ denote
the oracle’s response.
- If b = b′, set count = count + 1.
3. If count/(λ · y) ≥ 1/2 + ε/3, then output ‘Yes’. Otherwise output
‘No’.
Figure 8.6: Routine isGoodDecoder
2. Set flag = ‘No’. For j = 1 to λ · y:
- Choose a random message r ←M.




, 1y,m0,m1, r, i).
- If flag = ‘Yes’, break. Else, continue.
3. If flag = ‘Yes’, run SubTrace as T ← SubTraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1, r, i).
Else, set T = ∅.
4. Output T .
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SubTraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1, r, i)
Input: Keys key = (keyi, pki)i∈[λ], Parameter y, Messages m0,m1, r, Index
i ∈ [λ].
Output: T ⊆ {0, 1}κ.
1. It runs the TT-bd tracing algorithm on inputs — keys keyi, pki, pa-
rameter 4y, messages m0 ⊕ r,m1 ⊕ r — and with oracle access to
oracle D̃ which we define next.
2. On each query ct to oracle D̃ by BD.Trace, the sub-tracing algo-
rithm first chooses λ − 1 messages rj randomly for j ∈ [λ] \ {i}
such that
⊕
j∈[λ]\{i} ri = r. (That is, bit-wise parity of the mes-
sages chosen matches the message r.) It encrypts these mes-
sages as ctj ← BD.Enc(pkj , rj), and then sends the ciphertext
(ct1, . . . , cti−1, ct, cti+1, . . . , ctλ) to the oracle D as its query. And
it forwards the oracle D’s response to the BD.Trace algorithm.
3. Finally, the BD.Trace algorithm outputs a set T . The sub-tracing
algorithm outputs the same set T as its output.
In short, SubTraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1, r, i)
= BD.TraceD̃((keyi, pki), 1
4y,m0 ⊕ r,m1 ⊕ r),
where
D̃(ct) = D(ct1, . . . , cti−1, ct, cti+1, . . . , ctλ),
∀j ∈ [λ] \ {i} , rj ←M such that
⊕
j∈[λ]\{i} ri = r,
∀j ∈ [λ] \ {i} , ctj ← BD.Enc(pkj , rj)
Figure 8.7: Routine SubTrace
8.3.2 Correctness and Security
Next, we prove the following.
Theorem 8.3.1. If TT-bd = (BD.Setup,BD.KeyGen,BD.Enc,BD.Dec,BD.Trace)
is a secure (bounded keys, public/private tracing)-embedded identity tracing
scheme (as per Definitions 8.1.3 and 8.1.1) with (T-s, T-e, T-k, T-d, T-t, S-c,
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S-k)-efficiency, then the scheme TT = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Trace) (de-
scribed in Section 8.3.1) is a secure (unbounded keys, public/private tracing)-
embedded identity tracing scheme (as per Definitions 8.1.4 and 8.1.1) with
(T-s′, T-e′, T-k′,T-d′,T-t′, S-c′, S-k′)-efficiency, where the efficiency measures
are related as follows:
• T-s′(λ, κ) =
∑λ
i=1 T-s(λ, κ, 2
i),
• T-k′(λ, κ) =
∑λ
i=1 T-k(λ, κ, 2
i),
• T-e′(λ, κ) =
∑λ
i=1 T-e(λ, κ, 2
i) + poly(λ),
• T-d′(λ, κ) =
∑λ
i=1 T-d(λ, κ, 2
i) + poly(λ),
• T-t′(λ, κ, y,Qbd) = T-t(λ, κ, 2dlogQbde, 4y) + λ2 · y2,
• S-c′(λ, κ) =
∑λ
i=1 S-c(λ, κ, 2
i),
• S-k′(λ, κ) =
∑λ
i=1 S-k(λ, κ, 2
i).
Proof. Correctness: Fix any security parameter λ, public key pk = (pki)i∈[λ],





, tracing key key = (keyi, pki)i∈[λ],
message m ∈ M and identity id. The encryption algorithm chooses {ri}i∈[λ]
such that
⊕
i ri = m, computes cti ← BD.Enc(pki, ri) and sets ct = (cti)i∈[λ].
The key generation algorithm outputs λ keys (ski)i∈[λ], where ski is a key
for identity id computed using mski. From the correctness of the underlying
scheme TT-bd, it follows that decryption of cti using ski outputs ri. As a
result, the decryption of ct using sk outputs message m.
IND-CPA security: IND-CPA security of our scheme follows directly from
the IND-CPA security of TT-bd. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that
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breaks the IND-CPA security of our scheme with advantage ε. We can use
A to break the IND-CPA security of TT-bd with advantage ε. The reduction
algorithm first sends λ and bound = 2 to the challenger, and receives pk1 from
the TT-ind challenger. It chooses (mski, pki, keyi) ← BD.Setup(1λ, 1κ, 2i) for
each i ∈ {2, . . . , λ}, and sends (pki)i∈[λ] to A. (If TT-bd is a public tracing
scheme, then the reduction algorithm also receives a tracing key key1 from the
challenger, and it sends the tracing key (keyi, pki)i∈[λ] to A).
Next, A sends two messages m0,m1 to B. The reduction algorithm







challenger. The challenger sends ct1 to B. The reduction algorithm computes
encryptions of r2, . . . , rλ, and sends ct = (cti)i∈[λ] to A. The adversary sends
its guess, which the reduction algorithm forwards to the challenger.
Clearly, if A has advantage ε, then so does B.
Correct Trace and False Trace guarantees: We will show that our scheme
satisfies Definition 8.1.4.
False Trace: First, let us consider the false trace probability. False
trace happens if the sub-tracing algorithm outputs a non-empty set T such
that T 6⊆ SID, where SID is the set of keys queried by the adversary. We
will show that if there exists an adversary A, polynomial p and non-negligible
functions ε, η such that Pr -Fal-TrA,ε,p(λ) ≥ η(λ), then there exists a PPT
algorithm B that breaks the false-trace guarantee of TT-bd.
The reduction algorithm B first sends p(λ) (in unary) to the TT-bd
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challenger, and let i = dp(λ)e. It receives a public key pki (and a tracing key









for a public tracing scheme). Next, the adversary
requests for keys. For each query id, the reduction algorithm computes skid,j
using mskj if j 6= i. It sends id to the challenger, and receives skid,i. It sends
skid = (skid,j) to A. Finally, A outputs a decoding box D and messages m0,m1.




, 1y,m0,m1, r, i) for
λ · y choices of r until it finds an r s.t. isGoodDecoder outputs ‘Yes’. The
reduction algorithm outputs D̃ (as defined in SubTrace) as the decoding box,
and m0 ⊕ r, m1 ⊕ r as the two messages.
Clearly, if Pr -Fal-TrA,ε,p(λ) ≥ η(λ), then B breaks the false-trace guar-
antee of TT-bd.
Correct Trace: As before, our proof will proceed via a sequence of
inequalities. The events are defined exactly as in the proof of Theorem 8.2.1.
Let i = dp(λ)e.
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε,p(λ) (8.12)
= Pr[Cor-Tri] (8.13)
≥ Pr[Good-Decoderi ∧ p(λ) ≥ |SID|]− negl1(λ) (8.14)
≥ Pr[Good-Decoderi ∧ p(λ) ≥ |SID| ∧ Found-Good-ri ∧ Good-Decoder] (8.15)
≥ Pr[Found-Good-ri ∧ Good-Decoder ∧ p(λ) ≥ |SID|] (8.16)
≥ Pr[Good-Decoder ∧ p(λ) ≥ |SID|] (8.17)
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The first equality (Step 8.12 to 8.13) follows from the definition of corret-trace.
Next, Step 8.13 to 8.14 follows from the correct-trace guarantee of TT-bd. This
is formalized in the following claim.
Claim 8.3.1. Assuming TT-bd satisfies Definition 8.1.3, for any PPT ad-
versary A, polynomial p(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), Pr[Cor-Tri] ≥
Pr[Good-Decoderi ∧ p(λ) ≥ |SID|]− negl1(λ).
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there exists a PPT adversary A, polynomial
p(·) and non-negligible functions ε(·), η(·) such that Pr[Good-Decoderi∧p(λ) ≥
|SID|] − Pr[Cor-Tri] ≥ η(λ). We will use A to construct a PPT algorithm B
that breaks the correct-trace guarantee of TT-bd.
Let i = dlog p(λ)e. The reduction algorithm B sends λ, p(λ) (in unary)
to the challenger, and receives pki (and the tracing key keyi if TT-bd is a public
tracing scheme). It then chooses (mskj, pkj, keyj) ← BD.Setup(1λ, 1κ, 2j) for




j∈[λ]. It then receives key queries (at most p(λ) key
queries). For each key query id, the reduction algorithm generates skid,j for
j 6= i, sends id to the challenger, and receives skid,i. It sends skid = (skid,j) to
the adversary.
Finally, the adversary sends a decoding box D and messages m0,m1.
The reduction algorithm runs isGoodDecoder with different r values until the
flag is ‘Yes’. Then, it uses that r value to set the decoding box D̃ (as in
SubTrace), messages m′b = mb⊕ r and sends D̃,m′0,m′1 to the challenger.
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The inequality from 8.14 to 8.15 follows directly from the definition
of the events. Next, the justification for transition from Step 8.15 to 8.16
and Step 8.16 to 8.17 is similar to the proofs of Claim 8.2.3 and Claim 8.2.4
respectively.
8.4 A New Framework for Embedded-Identity Traitor
Tracing
8.4.1 Embedded-Identity Private Linear Broadcast Encryption
We introduce the notion of embedded-identity private linear broadcast
encryption (EIPLBE) as a generalization of private linear broadcast encryption
scheme. There are five algorithms in a EIPLBE scheme — Setup,KeyGen,Enc,
SplEnc,Dec. The setup algorithm outputs a master secret key and a public
key. The key generation algorithm is used to sample private keys for index-
identity pairs (j, id). The public key encryption algorithm can be used to
encrypt messages, and ciphertexts can be decrypted using any of the private
keys via the decryption algorithm. In addition to these algorithms, there is
also a special-encryption algorithm SplEnc. This algorithm, which uses the
master secret key, can be used to encrypt messages to any index-position-
value tuple (i, `, b). A secret key for user (j, id) can decrypt a ciphertext for
index-position-value tuple (i, `, b) only if (1) j ≥ i+ 1, or (2) (i, `) = (j,⊥) or
(i, id`) = (j, 1− b).
Below we first provide the EIPLBE syntax, and then present the secu-
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rity definitions.
Syntax A EIPLBE scheme EIPLBE = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc, SplEnc,Dec) for
message space M = {Mλ}λ and identity space ID = {{0, 1}κ}κ∈N has the
following syntax.
Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)→ (msk, pk, key) . The setup algorithm takes as input the se-
curity parameter λ, the ‘identity space’ parameter κ, index space n, and
outputs a master secret key msk and a public key pk.
KeyGen (msk, id ∈ {0, 1}κ, i ∈ [n])→ sk. The key generation algorithm takes as
input the master secret key, an identity id ∈ {0, 1}κ and index i ∈ [n].
It outputs a secret key sk.
Enc(pk,m)→ ct. The encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk,
message m ∈Mλ, and outputs a ciphertext ct.
SplEnc(key,m, (i, `, b))→ ct. The special-encryption algorithm takes as input
a key key, message m ∈ Mλ, and index-position-value tuple (i, `, b) ∈
[n + 1] × ([κ] ∪ {⊥}) × {0, 1}, and outputs a ciphertext ct. (Here the
scheme is said to be public key EIPLBE scheme if key = pk. Otherwise,
it is said to be private key EIPLBE scheme.)
Dec(sk, ct)→ z. The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk, ci-
phertext ct and outputs z ∈Mλ ∪ {⊥}.
347
Correctness A EIPLBE scheme is said to be correct if there exists a negli-
gible function negl(·) such that for all λ, κ, n ∈ N, m ∈ Mλ, and i ∈ [n + 1],
j ∈ [n], id ∈ {0, 1}κ, ` ∈ ([κ] ∪ {⊥}) and b ∈ {0, 1}, the following holds
Pr
Dec(sk, ct) = m : (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)sk← KeyGen(msk, id, j)
ct← Enc(pk,m)
 ≥ 1− negl(λ),
and if j ≥ i + 1, or (i, `) = (j,⊥), or (i, id`) = (j, 1 − b), the following also
holds
Pr
Dec(sk, ct) = m : (msk, pk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)sk← KeyGen(msk, id, j)
ct← SplEnc(key,m, (i, `, b))
 ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Efficiency Let T-s, T-e, T-̃e, T-k, T-d, S-c, S-k be functions. A EIPLBE
scheme is said to be (T-s, T-e, T-̃e, T-k, T-d, S-c, S-k)- efficient if the following
efficiency requirements hold:
• The running time of Setup(1λ, 1κ, n) is at most T-s(λ, κ, n).
• The running time of Enc(pk,m) is at most T-e(λ, κ, n).
• The running time of SplEnc(key,m, (i, `, b)) is at most T-̃e(λ, κ, n).
• The running time of KeyGen(msk, id, i) is at most T-k(λ, κ, n).
• The running time of Dec(sk, ct) is at most T-d(λ, κ, n).
• The size of the ciphertexts is at most S-c(λ, κ, n).
• The size of the key is at most S-k(λ, κ, n).
8.4.1.1 q-query EIPLBE Security
Now we provide the security definitions for EIPLBE as a generalization
of the PLBE q-query security Section 5.1.1. (Also, see Remark 8.1.1.)
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Definition 8.4.1 (q-query Normal Hiding Security). Let q(·) be any fixed
polynomial. A EIPLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query normal hiding security
if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for every λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr
AO1(·,·),O2(·,·)(ctb) = b :
(1κ, 1n)← A(1λ)
(pk,msk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)
m← AO1(·,·),O2(·,·) (pk)
b← {0, 1}; ct0 ← Enc(pk,m)
ct1 ← SplEnc(key,m, (1,⊥, 0))
 ≤ 12 + negl(λ)
where O1(·, ·) = SplEnc(key, ·, ·), and O2(·, ·) = KeyGen(msk, ·, ·) with the fol-
lowing oracle restrictions:
• SplEnc Oracle: A can make at most q(λ) queries, and for each query
(m, (j, `, γ)) the index j must be equal to 1.
• KeyGen Oracle: A can make at most one query for each index position
j. That is, let (j1, id1), . . . , (jk, idk) denote all the key queries made by
A, then ja and jb must be distinct for all a 6= b.
Definition 8.4.2 (q-query Index Hiding Security). Let q(·) be any fixed poly-
nomial. A EIPLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query index hiding security if
for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for every λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr
AO1(·,·),O2(·,·)(ct) = b :
(1κ, 1n, i)← A(1λ)
(pk,msk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)
m← AO1(·,·),O2(·,·) (pk) ; b← {0, 1}
ct← SplEnc(key,m, (i+ b,⊥, 0))
 ≤ 12 + negl(λ)
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where O1(·, ·) = SplEnc(key, ·, ·), and O2(·, ·) = KeyGen(msk, ·, ·) with the fol-
lowing oracle restrictions:
• SplEnc Oracle: A can make at most q(λ) queries, and for each query
(m, (j, `, γ)) the index j must be equal to either i or i+ 1.
• KeyGen Oracle: A can make at most one query for each index position j ∈
[n], and no key query of the form (i, id). That is, let (j1, id1), . . . , (jk, idk)
denote all the key queries made by A, then ja and jb must be distinct
for all a 6= b. And, ja 6= i for any a.
Definition 8.4.3 (q-query Upper Identity Hiding Security). Let q(·) be any
fixed polynomial. A EIPLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query upper identity
hiding security if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that for every λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr
AO1(·,·),O2(·,·)(ctb) = b :
(1κ, 1n, i, `, β)← A(1λ)
(pk,msk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)
m← AO1(·,·),O2(·,·) (pk) ; b← {0, 1}
ct0 ← SplEnc(key,m, (i+ 1,⊥, 0))
ct1 ← SplEnc(key,m, (i, `, β))
 ≤ 12 + negl(λ)
where O1(·, ·) = SplEnc(key, ·, ·), and O2(·, ·) = KeyGen(msk, ·, ·) with the fol-
lowing oracle restrictions:
• SplEnc Oracle: A can make at most q(λ) queries, and for each query
(m, (j, `, γ)) the index j must be equal to either i or i+ 1.
• KeyGen Oracle: A can make at most one query for each index position
j ∈ [n], and no key query of the form (i, id) such that id` = 1− β. That
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is, let (j1, id1), . . . , (jk, idk) denote all the key queries made by A, then
ja and jb must be distinct for all a 6= b. And, for every a, (ida)` 6= 1− β
or ja 6= i.
Definition 8.4.4 (q-query Lower Identity Hiding Security). Let q(·) be any
fixed polynomial. A EIPLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query lower identity
hiding security if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that for every λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr
AO1(·,·),O2(·,·)(ctb) = b :
(1κ, 1n, i, `, β)← A(1λ)
(pk,msk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)
m← AO1(·,·),O2(·,·) (pk) ; b← {0, 1}
ct0 ← SplEnc(key,m, (i,⊥, 0))
ct1 ← SplEnc(key,m, (i, `, β))
 ≤ 12 + negl(λ)
where O1(·, ·) = SplEnc(key, ·, ·), and O2(·, ·) = KeyGen(msk, ·, ·) with the fol-
lowing oracle restrictions:
• SplEnc Oracle: A can make at most q(λ) queries, and for each query
(m, (j, `, γ)) the index j must be equal to i.
• KeyGen Oracle: A can make at most one query for each index position
j ∈ [n], and no key query of the form (i, id) such that id` = β. That
is, let (j1, id1), . . . , (jk, idk) denote all the key queries made by A, then
ja and jb must be distinct for all a 6= b. And, for every a, (ida)` 6= β or
ja 6= i.
Definition 8.4.5 (q-query Message Hiding Security). Let q(·) be any fixed
polynomial. A EIPLBE scheme is said to satisfy q-query message hiding se-
curity if for every stateful PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
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negl(·) such that for every λ ∈ N, the following holds:
Pr
AO1(·,·),O2(·,·)(ct) = b :
(1κ, 1n)← A(1λ)
(pk,msk, key)← Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)
(m0,m1)← AO1(·,·),O2(·,·) (pk)
b← {0, 1}
ct← SplEnc(key,mb, (n+ 1,⊥, 0))
 ≤ 12 + negl(λ)
where O1(·, ·) = SplEnc(key, ·, ·), and O2(·, ·) = KeyGen(msk, ·, ·) with the fol-
lowing oracle restrictions:
• SplEnc Oracle: A can make at most q(λ) queries, and for each query
(m, (i, `, γ)) the index i must be equal to n+ 1.
• KeyGen Oracle: A can make at most one query for each index position
i. That is, let (i1, id1), . . . , (ik, idk) denote all the key queries made by A,
then ia and ib must be distinct for all a 6= b.
8.4.2 Building Indexed EITT from EIPLBE
In this section, we describe a simple construction for building an in-
dexed EITT scheme from any EIPLBE scheme. The following construction
and the high level proof structure is similar to the one provided in Section 5.2.
8.4.2.1 Construction
Consider an EIPLBE scheme EIPLBE = (EIPLBE.Setup, EIPLBE.KeyGen,
EIPLBE.Enc, EIPLBE.SplEnc, EIPLBE.Dec) for message space M = {Mλ}λ and
identity space ID = {{0, 1}κ}κ∈N. Below we provide our embedded identity
TT construction with identical message and identity spaces. (Here we provide
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a transformation for TT schemes with secret key tracing, but the construc-
tion can be easily extended to work in the public tracing setting if the special
encryption algorithm in the underlying EIPLBE scheme is public key as well.)
Setup(1λ, 1κ, n)→ (msk, pk, key). The setup algorithm runs the EIPLBE setup
as (msk, pk, key) ← EIPLBE.Setup(1λ, 1κ, n), and outputs master secret-
public-tracing key tuple (msk, pk, key).
KeyGen(msk, id, i)→ ski,id. The key generation algorithm runs the EIPLBE key
generation algorithm as ski,id ← EIPLBE.KeyGen(msk, id, i), and outputs
secret key ski,id.
Enc(pk,m) → ct. The encryption algorithm runs the EIPLBE encryption al-
gorithm as ct← EIPLBE.Enc(pk, m), and outputs ciphertext ct.
Dec(sk, ct)→ z. The decryption algorithm runs the EIPLBE decryption algo-
rithm as z ← EIPLBE.Dec(sk, ct), and outputs z.
TraceD(key, 1y,m0,m1) → T. Let ε = 1/y. First, consider the Index-Trace
algorithm defined in Fig. 8.8. The sub-tracing algorithm simply tests
whether the decoder box uses the user key for index i where i is one of
the inputs provided to Index-Trace. Now the tracing algorithm simply
runs the Index-Trace algorithm for all indices i ∈ [n], and for each index
i where the Index-Trace algorithm outputs 1, the tracing algorithm adds
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index i to the index-set of traitors T indx.1 Next, consider the ID-Trace
algorithm defined in Fig. 8.9. The identity-tracing algorithm takes as
input the index-set T indx and uses the decoder box to find the identity of
the particular indexed user. Next, the tracing algorithm simply runs the
ID-Trace algorithm for all indices i ∈ T indx, and for each index i where
the ID-Trace algorithm does not output ⊥, the tracing algorithm adds
the output of the ID-Trace algorithm to the identity-set of traitors T .
Concretely, the algorithm runs as follows:
• Set T indx := ∅. For i = 1 to n:
– Compute (b, p, q)← Index-Trace(key, 1y,m0,m1, i).
– If b = 1, set T indx := T indx ∪ {(i, p, q)}.
• Set T := ∅. For (i, p, q) ∈ T indx:
– Compute id← ID-Trace(key, 1y,m0,m1, (i, p, q)).
– Set T := T ∪ {id}.
• Output T .
Finally, it outputs the set T as the set of traitors.
Correctness This follows directly from correctness of the underlying EIPLBE
scheme.
1Technically, the set T indx constains tuples of the form (i, p, q) where i is an index and
p, q are probabilities which are the estimations of successful decryption probability at index
i and i+ 1 (respectively).
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Algorithm Index-Trace(key, 1y,m0,m1, i)
Inputs: Key key, parameter y, messages m0,m1, index i
Output: 0/1
Let ε = b1/yc. It sets N = λ · n/ε, and count1 = count2 = 0. For j = 1 to
N , it computes the following:
1. It chooses bj ← {0, 1} and computes ctj,1 ←
EIPLBE.SplEnc(key,mbj , (i,⊥, 0)) and sends ctj,1 to D. If D
outputs bj , set count1 = count1 + 1, else set count1 = count1 − 1.
2. It chooses cj ← {0, 1} and computes ctj,2 ←
EIPLBE.SplEnc(key,mcj , (i + 1,⊥, 0)) and sends ctj,2 to D. If
D outputs cj , set count2 = count2 + 1, else set count2 = count2 − 1.
If count1−count2N >
ε




N ), else output (0,⊥,⊥).
Figure 8.8: Index-Trace
Algorithm ID-Trace(key, 1y,m0,m1, (i, p, q))
Inputs: Key key, parameter y, messages m0,m1, index i, probabilities p, q
Output: id ∈ {0, 1}κ
Let ε = b1/yc. It sets N = λ · n/ε, and count` = 0 for ` ∈ [κ]. For ` = 1 to
κ, it proceeds as follows:
1. For j = 1 to N , it computes the following:
(a) It chooses bj ← {0, 1} and computes ctj ←
EIPLBE.SplEnc(key,mbj , (i, `, 0)) and sends ctj to D. If D
outputs bj , set count` = count`+ 1, else set count` = count`−1.







, set id` = 0. Else set id` = 1.
Finally, output id.
Figure 8.9: Index-Trace
Efficiency If the scheme EIPLBE = (EIPLBE.Setup, EIPLBE.KeyGen, EIPLBE.Enc,
EIPLBE.SplEnc, EIPLBE.Dec) is a EIPLBE scheme with (T-s, T-e, T-̃e, T-k,
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T-d, S-c, S-k)-efficiency, then the scheme TT = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec,
Trace) is a (indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme
with (T-s′, T-e′, T-k′,T-d′,T-t′, S-c′, S-k′)-efficiency, where the efficiency mea-
sures are related as follows:
• T-s′(λ, κ, n) = T-s(λ, κ, n),
• T-k′(λ, κ, n) = T-k(λ, κ, n),
• T-e′(λ, κ, n) = T-e(λ, κ, n),
• T-d′(λ, κ, n) = T-d(λ, κ, n),
• T-t′(λ, κ, n, y) = (2n+ κ) · λ · y · n,
• S-c′(λ, κ, n) = S-c(λ, κ, n),
• S-k′(λ, κ, n) = S-k(λ, κ, n).
8.4.2.2 Security
In this section, we prove security of our construction. Formally, we
prove the following.
Theorem 8.4.1. If the scheme EIPLBE = (EIPLBE.Setup, EIPLBE.KeyGen,
EIPLBE.Enc, EIPLBE.SplEnc, EIPLBE.Dec) is a 1-query secure EIPLBE scheme
as per Definitions 8.4.1 to 8.4.5, then the scheme T = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc,
Dec, Trace) is a secure (indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity trac-
ing scheme as per Definitions 4.1.2 and 8.1.1.
We prove the above theorem in two parts. First, we prove IND-CPA
security of the above construction. Later we argue correctness of tracing to
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complete the proof of security. Note that in the proof we use the fact that n
is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter. (See Remark 8.1.1.)
IND-CPA Security We would like to point out that the scheme T is IND-
CPA secure even if the EIPLBE scheme satisfies only 0-query security. In other
words, we do not need the scheme to achieve 1-query security for arguing IND-
CPA security. At a high level, the proof of IND-CPA security is identical to
that used for proving IND-CPA security of (standard) traitor tracing systems
from (standard) private linear broadcast encryption scheme [25]. Below we
provide a high level sketch.
Lemma 8.4.1. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 0-query secure EIPLBE scheme
as per Definitions 8.4.1, 8.4.2 and 8.4.5, then the scheme T is an IND-CPA
secure (indexed keygen, public/private)-embedded identity tracing scheme as
per Definition 8.1.1.
Proof. We will construct a sequence of 2n + 4 hybrid experiments to prove
IND-CPA security. The first experiment, that is Hybrid H0, is exactly the
IND-CPA game.
Hybrid H0 : In this experiment, the challenger sends public key pk, receives
m0,m1 from A and sends ct← EIPLBE.Enc(pk,m0) to A.
Hybrid Hi,b (for i ∈ [n + 1], b ∈ {0, 1}) : This experiment is identical to
the IND-CPA experiment, except that the adversary, after sending challenge
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messages m0,m1, receives ct← EIPLBE.SplEnc(key,mb, (i,⊥, 0)).
Hybrid H1 : In this experiment, the challenger sends public key pk, receives
m0,m1 from A and sends ct← EIPLBE.Enc(pk,m1) to A.
For any PPT adversary A, let pA,x(·) be a function of λ that denotes the
probability of A outputting 0 in Hybrid Hx. Note that pA,0 − pA,1 is the
advantage of A in the IND-CPA security game.
Claim 8.4.1. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 0-query normal hiding secure EIPLBE
scheme as per Definition 8.4.1, then for any PPT adversary A, there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N and b ∈ {0, 1}, |pA,b−pA,1,b| ≤
negl(λ).
This follows from 0-query normal hiding security of EIPLBE.
Claim 8.4.2. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 0-query index hiding secure EIPLBE
scheme as per Definition 8.4.2, then for any PPT adversary A, there exists
a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N and (i, b) ∈ [n] × {0, 1},
|pA,i,b − pA,i+1,b| ≤ negl(λ).
This follows from 0-query index hiding security of EIPLBE.
Claim 8.4.3. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 0-query message hiding secure EIPLBE
scheme as per Definition 8.4.5, then for any PPT adversary A, there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, |pA,n+1,0−pA,n+1,1| ≤ negl(λ).
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This follows from 0-query message hiding security of EIPLBE.
Combining the above claims, we get proof of Lemma 8.4.1.
Correctness of Tracing Next, we show that the false trace probability is
bounded by a negligible function, and the correct trace probability is close to
the probability of A outputting an ε-successful decoding box for some non-
negligible ε.
First, we introduce some notations. Fix some public-master secret key
pair (pk,msk). Given any pirate decoder box D and messages m0,m1, for any
i ∈ [n+ 1], ` ∈ [κ], let
pDi,⊥ = Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← EIPLBE.SplEnc(key,mb, (i,⊥, 0))]
pDi,` = Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← EIPLBE.SplEnc(key,mb, (i, `, 0))]
pDnrml = Pr[D(ct) = b : b← {0, 1}, ct← EIPLBE.Enc(pk,mb)]
where the probability is taken over random coins of decoder D as well as the
randomness used during encryption.
False Trace Probability First, we show that the tracing algorithm never falsely
accuses any user with non-negligible probability. Formally, we prove the fol-
lowing.
Theorem 8.4.2. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 1-query secure EIPLBE scheme
as per Definitions 8.4.1 to 8.4.5, then for every PPT adversary A, polynomial
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q(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ),
Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(λ) ≤ negl(λ),
where Pr -Fal-TrA,ε(·) is as defined in Definition 4.1.2.
Proof. Let S ⊆ [n] × {0, 1}κ be the set of index-identity pairs queried by the
adversary A for secret keys, Sindx ⊆ [n] be the set of indices queried by the
adversary A for secret keys, and let D be the decoder box output by A.
In the sequel we skip the dependence of ε(·) on λ for simplicity of
notation. For i ∈ [n], ` ∈ [κ], we define events
Diff-AdvDi : p
D
i,⊥ − pDi+1,⊥ > ε/8n
Diff-AdvDi,`,lwr : p
D
i,⊥ − pDi,` > ε/16n
Diff-AdvDi,`,upr : p
D












For simplicity of notation, we will drop dependence on decoder D when-
ever clear from context. Next, note that the probability of the event false trace















 ∃id ∈ {0, 1}κ such that
(i, id) ∈ S ∧
(
(Diff-Advi,`,lwr ∧ id` = 1) ∨
(Diff-Advi,`,upr ∧ id` = 0)
)  .
We will show that each of these terms is bounded by a negligible function. We
start by bounding the first term.
Lemma 8.4.2. For every PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function
negl1(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
Pr[Fal-Tr | Diff-Adv] ≤ negl1(λ).
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from Chernoff bounds, and is similar
to those provided in [82, Lemma 4.4] and [79, Lemma 5.3]. Here we sketch the
high level idea.
Note that event Fal-Tr occurs iff the tracing algorithm outputs a user
identity which was not key queried by the adversary. Recall that the tracing
algorithm takes a two-step approach. It proceeds by first tracing the key
indices of the corrupted keys, and then it traces the corresponding identity.
Now there are two sources of error in incorrect tracing. First, during step
one of tracing the algorithm might incorrectly include some index i /∈ Sindx
in the index-set of traitors T indx. Second, during step two it may output a
non-corrupt identity id for some index i ∈ Sindx, that is for some i ∈ Sindx the
ID-Trace algorithm traces the id incorrectly at at least one bit position. Thus,
we could write the following (using union bound), where sets T and T indx are
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as defined in the description of the tracing algorithm,





Fal-Tr ∧ i /∈ Sindx







Fal-Tr ∧ ∃id, ĩd : (i, id) ∈ S




In the above expression, the first term on the right side bounds the type 1
error (i.e., faulty step one tracing) and the second term bounds the type 2
error (i.e., faulty step two tracing).
Now let us analyze the first term. Note that if event Diff-Adv occurs
then it implies that for every i /∈ Sindx event Diff-Advi occurred. Thus, it must
hold that for every i ∈ [n]
Pr
[
i /∈ Sindx ∧ (∃ p, q : (i, p, q) ∈ T indx) | Diff-Adv
]
≤ 2−O(λ).
This follows from a Chernoff bound since Diff-Advi states that pi,⊥ − pi+1,⊥ ≤
ε/8n and event (∃ p, q : (i, p, q) ∈ T indx) suggests that p̂i,⊥−p̂i+1,⊥ > ε/4n where
p̂ denotes the corresponding estimate computed by the tracing algorithm.
Next, let us analyze the second term. For a fixed (i, `), the probability
term corresponds to the event that the ID-Trace algorithm outputs the traitor
identity ĩd such that id` 6= ĩd` where the adversary makes a key query for
index-identity pair (i, id). (Recall that the adversary is allowed to receive at
most one key per index. See Definition 4.1.2.) Concretely, by conditioning on
the event Diff-Adv we get that for every (i, id) ∈ S, ` ∈ [κ], event Diff-Advi,`,X
always occurs where X = lwr if id` = 1 else X = upr. Thus, it must hold that
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for every (i, id) ∈ S, ` ∈ [κ]
Pr
[
∃id, ĩd : (i, id) ∈ S ∧ ĩd ∈ T ∧ id` 6= ĩd` | Diff-Adv
]
≤ 2−O(λ).
For simplicity, fix (i, id, `) and let id` = 1. Then the above statement follows
from a Chernoff bound since we know that event Diff-Advi,`,lwr occurs, thus
we have that pi,⊥ − pi,` ≤ ε/16n and event ĩd ∈ T ∧ ĩd` = 0 suggests that
p̂i,⊥ − p̂i,` > ε/8n where p̂ denotes the corresponding estimate computed by
the tracing algorithm.
Therefore, combining all the above claims we get that
Pr[Fal-Tr | Diff-Adv] ≤ n · 2−O(λ) + n · κ · 2−O(λ) = negl1(λ).
Lemma 8.4.3. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 1-query index hiding secure EIPLBE
scheme as per Definition 8.4.2, then for every PPT adversary A, polynomial
q(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), there exists a negligible function negl2(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ) and i ∈ [n],
Pr[i /∈ Sindx ∧ Diff-Advi] ≤ negl2(λ),
where n is the index bound chosen, and Sindx is the set of indices queried by A.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to those provided in [82, Lemma 4.5]
and [79, Lemma 5.4].
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Lemma 8.4.4. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 1-query lower and upper identity
hiding secure EIPLBE scheme as per Definitions 8.4.3 and 8.4.4, then for
every PPT adversary A, polynomial q(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), there
exists a negligible function negl3(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) >
1/q(λ) and i ∈ [n], ` ∈ [κ],
Pr
[
∃id ∈ {0, 1}κ s.t. (i, id) ∈ S ∧
(
(Diff-Advi,`,lwr ∧ id` = 1) ∨
(Diff-Advi,`,upr ∧ id` = 0)
)]
≤ negl3(λ),
where n is the index bound chosen, and S is the set of index-identity pairs
queried by A.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there exists a PPT adversary A, polynomial
q(·) and non-negligible functions ε(·), δ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying
ε(λ) > 1/q(λ), there exists an i∗ ∈ [n], `∗ ∈ [κ] s.t.
Pr
[
∃id ∈ {0, 1}κ s.t. (i∗, id) ∈ S ∧
(
(Diff-Advi∗,`∗,lwr ∧ id`∗ = 1) ∨
(Diff-Advi∗,`∗,upr ∧ id`∗ = 0)
)]
≥ δ(λ).
Then we can use A to build a PPT reduction algorithm B that breaks the
upper/lower identity hiding security property of EIPLBE. The reduction algo-
rithm B first receives 1n, 1κ from the adversary. It chooses a random index
i ← [n], position ` ∈ [κ], and value b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends the challenge
index-position-value tuple (i, `, 0) and (1n, 1κ) to the EIPLBE challenger.2 (In
other words, the reduction algorithm randomly guesses the index-position pair
2Note that both n and κ are outputted in unary, thus they are some polynomials in the
security parameter.
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(i∗, `∗) as well as if b = 0 it interacts with EIPLBE lower identity hiding chal-
lenger, otherwise if b = 1 it interacts with EIPLBE upper identity hiding
challenger.) It then receives the EIPLBE public key pk from the challenger,
which it sends to A. The adversary A then queries for secret keys. If A key
queries for index-identity pair (j, id) where j = i and id` = b, then B aborts
and sends a random guess to the EIPLBE challenger. Else, on key query for
(j, id) from A, reduction algorithm B forwards (j, id) to the EIPLBE chal-
lenger and forwards the challenger’s response to the adversary. After all key
queries, the adversary outputs a decoding box D and messages m0,m1 to B.
B then chooses two bits α, β uniformly at random, i.e. α, β ← {0, 1}. Next,
B sends message mα as its challenge message, and receives challenge cipher-
text ct∗ from EIPLBE challenger. It also queries the EIPLBE challenger for
a special-encryption of mα for index-position-value tuple (i, `, 0) if β = 0, else
for (i + b,⊥, 0). Let ct be the challenger’s response. Finally, B runs decoder
box D on ct and ct∗ independently, and if D(ct) = D(ct∗), it outputs b′ = β,
else it outputs b′ = 1− β as its guess.
First, note that B is an admissible adversary in the upper/lower identity
hiding security game (if b = 0 then ‘lower’, else ‘upper’ respectively). This is
because B does not query the challenger for secret key on index-identity pair
(j, id) such that j = i and id` = b. Additionally, it only makes a single special-
encryption query on index-position-value tuple (i, `, 0) or (i+ b,⊥, 0). Finally,
by an analysis similar to that in [82, Lemma 4.1, 4.5] and [79, Lemma 5.4],








Thus, the lemma follows.
From the above lemmas, it follows that the probability of false trace is at most
negl1(λ) + n · negl2(λ) + n · κ · negl3(λ), thus theorem follows.
Correct Trace Probability Now we show that whenever the adversary
outputs a good decoder, then with all but negligible probability the tracing
algorithm outputs a non-empty set T . Combining this with Theorem 8.4.2,
we get that the tracing algorithm correctly traces. Formally, we show the
following.
Theorem 8.4.3. If the scheme EIPLBE is a 1-query secure EIPLBE scheme
as per Definitions 8.4.1 to 8.4.5, then for every PPT adversary A, polynomial
q(·) and non-negligible function ε(·), there exists a negligible function negl(·)
such that for all λ ∈ N satisfying ε(λ) > 1/q(λ),
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl(λ)
where Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(·) and Pr -G-DA,ε(·) are as defined in Definition 4.1.2.
Proof. Let us start by analyzing the probability that tracing algorithm outputs
a non-empty set T . First, we know that if event Good-Decoder occurs, then
pDnrml ≥ 1/2 + ε for some non-negligible ε. Next, let Sindx ⊆ [n] be the set
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of indices i ∈ [n] such that pDi,⊥ − pDi+1,⊥ > ε/2n. By using Chernoff bounds
similar to that in Lemma 8.4.2, we get that
∀ i ∈ Sindx, Pr
[
p̂Di,⊥ − p̂Di+1,⊥ < ε/4n
]
≤ 2−O(λ) = negl1(λ), (8.18)
where p̂ denotes the corresponding estimate computed by the tracing algo-
rithm.
Note that by 1-query message hiding security of the underlying EIPLBE
scheme, we have that pDn+1,⊥ ≤ 1/2 + negl2(λ) for some negligible function
negl2(·). Also, by 1-query normal hiding security, we have that pDnrml − pD1,⊥ ≤
negl3(λ) for some negligible function negl3(·). Thus, we can write that
pD1,⊥ − pDn+1,⊥ ≥ ε− negl2(λ)− negl3(λ) > ε/2.
Given this we can conclude that the set Sindx (as defined above) must be non-
empty whenever event Good-Decoder occurs. Combining this with Eq. (8.18),
we get that if event Good-Decoder occurs then with all-but-negligible proba-
bility
T indx 6= ∅, and ∀ (i, p, q) ∈ T indx : p− q > ε
4n
where T indx is as defined in the tracing algorithm.
Looking back at Fig. 8.9, we observe that for every tuple (i, p, q) the
ID-Trace algorithm always outputs some identity id. This is because the algo-
rithm simply checks for every ` ∈ [κ], either pDi,` > (p+ q)/2 and the algorithm
sets id` = 1, otherwise it sets id` = 0. Thus, this implies the following:
T indx 6= ∅ =⇒ T 6= ∅.
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Therefore, we can write the following
Pr[T 6= ∅] ≥ (1− n · negl1(λ)) · Pr -G-DA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl(λ).
Finally, combining with Theorem 8.4.2, we get that
Pr -Cor-TrA,ε(λ) ≥ Pr -G-DA,ε(λ)− negl(λ).
This concludes the proof.
8.5 Building EIPLBE from ABE and Mixed FE
We now briefly discuss how to build EIPLBE with ciphertext size poly-
logarithmic in the index bound n. For this construction, we rely on the notion
of mixed FE as described in Section 4.2.
In Section 5.4, we described a PLBE construction from a KP-ABE
scheme and a mixed FE scheme for comparisons. It turns out that the same
transformation can also be used to build as EIPLBE scheme if we use the
following (more expressive) function family:
{fy∗,`,b(y, id) = 1 iff y > y∗ or (y, id`) = (y∗, 1− b)}y∗,`,b .
Since the functions in the above function family can be represented by a poly-
nomial sized branching program (, or a log-depth circuit), thus we could instan-
tiate the above construction using our mixed FE construction from Chapter 7.
Hence, combining this with existing LWE-based KP-ABE schemes [76, 22],
we obtain an LWE-based EIPLBE scheme with succinct ciphertexts, thereby
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building a collusion-resistant compact EITT scheme via the transformations





ABE and Mixed FE to PLBE: Preserving
perfect correctness
In this chapter, we give an alternate construction for constructing
PLBE such that if the underlying ABE scheme achieves perfect correctness,
then so does the PLBE scheme, even if the mixed FE scheme is not perfectly
correct. Since existing ABE schemes [76, 22] can be made perfectly correct by
appropriately truncating noise distributions used, this gives a pathway to get
perfect correctness under LWE. Note that the construction described in Sec-
tion 5.4.1 only achieves perfect correctness when both underlying ABE and
mixed FE schemes are perfectly correct. This is because the policy circuit
is the mixed FE decryption circuit, and thus in order to guarantee perfect
correctness, we need the minimum requirement that the mixed FE normal ci-
phertexts always decrypt to 1. Below we give the main idea to obtain perfect
correctness.
Outline At a very high level, the idea is to encrypt the message m un-
der two independent ABE systems such that at least one of the ciphertext
components can always be decrypted to obtain the underlying message. To
this end, during setup we sample two ABE key pairs (abe.ppb, abe.mskb) (for
371
b ∈ {0, 1}) and a mixed FE key pair (mixed.pp,mixed.msk). To generate the
secret key for the ith user, we generate a mixed FE secret key mixed.ski for
message i, and later compute two ABE keys abe.ski,0, abe.ski,1 for predicates
Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·) and Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·) using abe.msk0, abe.msk1,
respectively. Here Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·) denotes the circuit that first de-
crypts the input using key mixed.ski and later applies a “not” gate (i.e., out-
puts the complement). Now the PLBE ciphertexts will consist of two parts,
one for each ABE subsystem. For PLBE normal encryption, one computes two
ciphertexts ctb (for b ∈ {0, 1}) as encryptions of message m under attributes
ctattr using parameters abe.ppb, where ctattr is computed as before. Now for
encrypting a message to index i, the encryption algorithm behaves differently
in that it computes ct0 as before, but ct1 will now be an encryption of message
0 under the same attributes. The reason for not encrypting the message m
in the second component of the index ciphertext becomes clear while proving
security.
Now for arguing perfect correctness, we observe that it should be the
case that Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ctattr) equals either 0 or 1. Thus, at least one of
the PLBE normal ciphertext components could be correctly decrypted. Note
that for such an argument we only require that ABE be perfectly correct. Next,
the security proof is similar to that in Section 5.4.3, except that when arguing
normal hiding security of our construction we need to rely on both the ABE
security as well as the weak accept indistinguishability property of the mixed
FE scheme. The main idea is that by correctness of the functional encryption
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scheme, we can say that with all but negligible probability the attribute used
in the second component of the challenge ciphertext is not satisfied by any of
the ABE keys queried. Thus, as our first hybrid argument, we could use ABE
security to switch the second challenge ciphertext component to an encryption
of 0 instead of message m. The remaining proof is identical to as before, with
the only modification being that the reduction algorithm needs to generate the
ABE keys for the second component on its own during the entire reduction.
Below we describe our construction PLBE = (Setup,Enc,Enc-index,Dec) for
messages spaces {Mκ}κ in detail.
A.1 Construction
Let ABE = (ABE.Setup,ABE.Enc,ABE.KeyGen,ABE.Dec) be a KP-ABE
scheme for a set of attribute spaces {Xκ}κ, predicate classes {Cκ}κ, and mes-
sage spaces {Mκ}κ, and let Mixed-FE = (Mixed.Setup, Mixed.Enc,Mixed.SK-Enc,
Mixed.KeyGen,Mixed.Dec) be a mixed FE scheme, for function classes {Fκ}κ
and message space {Iκ}κ, with ciphertexts of length `(λ, κ). For every n, let
κ = κ(n) be the lexicographically smallest functionality index such that every
string of length log(n) can be uniquely represented in message space Iκ (i.e.,
{0, 1}log(n) ⊆ Iκ), and function class Fκ contains the “comparison” (>) opera-
tor. Also, let κ̃ = κ̃(λ, κ) be the lexicographically smallest functionality index
such that every string of length `(λ, κ) can be uniquely represented in attribute
class Xκ̃ (i.e., {0, 1}`(λ,κ) ⊆ Xκ̃), and Cκ̃ contains a mixed FE decryption circuit
(as well its complement circuit) corresponding to functionality index κ. Below
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. The setup algorithm runs ABE.Setup
and Mixed.Setup to generate ABE and mixed FE public parameters
and master secret key as (abe.pp, abe.msk) ← ABE.Setup(1λ, 1κ̃) and
(mixed.pp, mixed.msk)←Mixed.Setup(1λ, 1κ). Next, it runs Mixed.KeyGen
to generate n mixed FE secret keys mixed.ski as
∀ i ≤ n, mixed.ski ← Mixed.KeyGen(mixed.msk, i).
Let C0mixed.ski denote the circuit Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·), and let C
1
mixed.ski
denote the circuit Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ·); i.e., C1mixed.ski is the Mixed-FE
decryption circuit with key mixed.ski hardwired and a “not” gate applied
on the output of decryption. Next, it computes 2n ABE secret keys
abe.ski,b as
∀ i ≤ n, b ∈ {0, 1}, abe.ski,b ← ABE.KeyGen(abe.mskb, Cbmixed.ski).
Finally, it sets pp = (abe.pp0, abe.pp1,mixed.pp), msk = (abe.msk0, abe.msk1,
mixed.msk), and ski = (abe.ski,0, abe.ski,1) for i ≤ n.
• Enc(pp,m)→ ct. Let pp = (abe.pp0, abe.pp1,mixed.pp). The encryption
algorithm first computes ctattr ← Mixed.Enc(mixed.pp). Next, it encrypts
messagem as ctb ← ABE.Enc(abe.ppb, ctattr,m) for b ∈ {0, 1} and outputs
ciphertext ct = (ct0, ct1).
• Enc-index(msk,m, i) → ct. Let msk = (abe.msk0, abe.msk1,mixed.msk)
and compi denote the comparison function
?
> i, i.e., compi(x) = 1 iff x >
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i. The encryption algorithm first computes ctattr ←Mixed.SK-Enc(mixed.msk,
compi). Next, it encrypts message m as ct0 ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp0, ctattr,m)
and ct1 ← ABE.Enc(abe.pp1, ctattr, 0) and outputs ciphertext ct = (ct0, ct1).
• Dec(sk, ct) → m or ⊥ . Let sk = (sk0, sk1) and ct = (ct0, ct1). The
decryption algorithm runs ABE.Dec on ciphertexts ctb using key skb as
yb = ABE.Dec(skb, ctb) for b ∈ {0, 1}. If y0 6= ⊥, it outputs y0. Otherwise,
it sets y1 as the output of decryption.
A.2 Correctness
For all λ, n ∈ N, message m ∈ Mλ, public parameters and mas-
ter secret keys (abe.ppb, abe.mskb) ← ABE.Setup(1λ, 1κ̃) (for b ∈ {0, 1}),
(mixed.pp,mixed.msk)← Mixed.Setup(1λ, 1κ), the secret keys ski,b for i ≤ n, b ∈
{0, 1} are simply the ABE keys abe.ski,b ← ABE.KeyGen(abe.mskb, Cbmixed.ski).
For any index i ≤ n, consider the following two cases:
1. Normal encryption. For any ciphertext ct = (ct0, ct1) computed as
ctb ← ABE.Enc(abe.ppb, ctattr,m) for b ∈ {0, 1}, where ctattr ← Mixed.Enc(mixed.pp),
we know that either Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski, ctattr) = 1 or Mixed.Dec(mixed.ski,
ctattr) = 0. In other words, C
b
mixed.ski
(ctattr) = 1 for some bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Therefore, by perfect correctness of ABE scheme, we have that for some
bit b ∈ {0, 1}, ABE.Dec(abe.ski,b, ctb) = m. Therefore, the PLBE de-
cryption algorithm always decrypts the normal ciphertexts correctly.
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2. Index encryption. This is identical to the argument provided in Sec-
tion 5.4.2. Note that perfect correctness for PLBE only requires perfect
decryption in the case of normal encryption. Thus, it is sufficient to
prove statistical correctness in the case of index encryption.
Therefore, the PLBE scheme is perfectly correct.
A.3 Security
The proof of security is almost identical to that provided in Section 5.4.3,
except that to argue normal hiding security of our construction, we first need
to use ABE security of the auxiliary subsystem (for b = 1) and the statistical
correctness property of the underlying Mixed FE scheme simultaneously to
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Stehlé. Classical hardness of learning with errors. In Symposium on
Theory of Computing Conference, STOC’13, Palo Alto, CA, USA, June
1-4, 2013, pages 575–584, 2013.
[34] Zvika Brakerski, Alex Lombardi, Gil Segev, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan.
Anonymous ibe, leakage resilience and circular security from new as-
sumptions. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Ap-
plications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 535–564. Springer, 2018.
[35] Zvika Brakerski and Gil Segev. Function-private functional encryption
in the private-key setting. In Theory of Cryptography - 12th Theory of
Cryptography Conference, TCC 2015, Warsaw, Poland, March 23-25,
2015, Proceedings, Part II, pages 306–324, 2015.
[36] Zvika Brakerski, Rotem Tsabary, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Hoeteck
Wee. Private constrained prfs (and more) from LWE. In Theory of
Cryptography - 15th International Conference, TCC 2017, Baltimore,
MD, USA, November 12-15, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, pages 264–302,
2017.
384
[37] Zvika Brakerski, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, Hoeteck Wee, and Daniel Wichs.
Obfuscating conjunctions under entropic ring lwe. In Proceedings of the
2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science,
2016.
[38] Caesar cipher. Caesar cipher — Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [On-
line; accessed 1-October-2019].
[39] Ran Canetti and Yilei Chen. Constraint-hiding constrained prfs for nc1
from lwe. In EUROCRYPT, 2017.
[40] David Cash, Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz, and Chris Peikert. Bonsai
trees, or how to delegate a lattice basis. In Advances in Cryptology -
EUROCRYPT 2010, 29th Annual International Conference on the The-
ory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, French Riviera, May
30 - June 3, 2010. Proceedings, pages 523–552, 2010.
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[51] Jean-Sébastien Coron, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Tancrède Lepoint, He-
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